scholarly journals Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helga Malmin Binningsbø ◽  
Kendra Dupuy

To end the civil war in Sierra Leone the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement guaranteeing power-sharing in July 1999. Such power-sharing is a widely used, often recommended political arrangement to overcome deep divisions between groups. However, scholars disagree on whether power-sharing causes peace, or, on the contrary, causes continuing violence. One reason for this is the literature's tendency to neglect how power-sharing is actually put into place. But post-agreement implementation is essential if we are to judge the performance of power-sharing. Therefore, we investigate the role played by power-sharing in terminating the civil war in Sierra Leone. We argue that the government was able to use the peace agreement to pursue its goal of ending the war through marginalising the RUF.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Binetti ◽  
Martin C. Steinwand

International aid plays an important role in the reconstruction of war-torn societies after the end of civil war, but its effectiveness depends on whether aid reaches the neediest recipients. We study how power sharing in Nepal's post-conflict transition affected the political capture of aid. We argue that despite the explicit inclusion of disadvantaged groups in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2006 and the Interim Constitution, regions that neither aligned with the Maoist rebels nor the government during the civil war remained politically disadvantaged. A possible causal mechanism is the low threat potential of non-combatant groups, which results in under-representation during peace negotiations and in post-conflict institutions. We present statistical evidence that districts in which neither the government nor the Maoist rebels (CPN(M)) had political support during the conflict receive systematically less aid during the post-conflict period, regardless of economic need or damage caused by fighting. At the same time, support for the CPN(M) during the conflict is a significant predictor for higher post-conflict aid flows, but only in times when the CPN(M) holds government office.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gus Waschefort

AbstractThe Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was the primary agitator during the decade-long civil war that ravaged Sierra Leone. One of the hallmarks of RUF tactics was the abduction and military use of children. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) issued an indictment against the high-command of the RUF. Each of the accused was charged with the enlistment, conscription or use of child soldiers. The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao case (RUF case) provides a cogent account of the crime of conscripting or using children younger than fifteen in hostilities. This paper tracks the development of the growing child soldier jurisprudence and plots the contribution of the RUF case. Specific emphasis is placed on the Court's application of abstract concepts to concrete situations, e.g. the determination whether a specific instance of child soldier use amounts to the child's 'active participation in hostilities'. The paper follows a progression whereby the chapeau requirements of Article 4 of the Statute of the SCSL are first assessed and thereafter the actus reus and mens rea elements of the substantive crime of enlisting, conscripting or using children in hostilities are examined in light of the RUF case.


Significance The accord, the full contents of which are still not public, differs from previous deals in that it follows the first direct talks between the parties and because the government has reportedly met two key demands of armed groups: amnesty and power-sharing. These are controversial measures, but they may give the deal a greater chance of success than earlier efforts. Impacts If implemented, the peace agreement could facilitate humanitarian relief efforts and lead to gradual economic recovery. The new government should secure additional financial and technical assistance for the transition from the EU, UN and individual states. The actions of the African Union and neighbouring states, particularly Sudan and Chad, will carry more weight than Western partners.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-498
Author(s):  
Anup Phayal ◽  
T David Mason ◽  
Mehmet Gurses

Abstract Previous research has shown that the outcome of a civil war is related to conflict duration: military victory by either the government or the rebels occurs early if it occurs at all, and the longer a civil war lasts, the more likely it is to end in a negotiated settlement. The models of civil war duration and outcome that have produced these findings are built on characteristics of the civil war and less on attributes of the state itself, other than where the state lies on the Polity autocracy-democracy scale. We propose that how civil wars end varies not only between democracies and authoritarian regimes but among the different authoritarian regime types identified by Geddes, Wright, and Franz. The distinguishing attributes of these regime types—democracy, one-party, personalist, military, monarchical—should lead to different likelihood in defeating a rebel movement, being defeated by a rebel movement, and negotiating a peace agreement with a rebel movement. Results from a series of competing-risk models using the Uppsala–Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset demonstrate support for our claim that how civil wars end is partly a function of the characteristics of the regime.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wakako Maekawa

AbstractTerritorial power-sharing arrangements in civil wars face trade-offs between broadening inclusions and dangers of secession. This article argues that in civil wars over a government, the commitment problem is overcome as secession is not in its political agenda, however, the central concern pertains to the issues that arise in policymaking. Granting autonomy at the subnational level leads to peace without weakening the central authority. In addition, in bargaining over policies with multiple conflict parties, a government strategically makes concessions of territorial power-sharing to retain the status quo of national policy and positions in the government in a situation where dominance by one party is not attainable. It signals a government’s less resolute attitude in accommodating additional rebel groups. Hence, territorial power-sharing entails positive externality. This article finds that in civil wars over a government, at a dyad level, the positive effects of territorial power-sharing in peace decreases over time. Instead, the likelihood of a peace agreement with another rebel group increases. The results imply that the effectiveness of the autonomy arrangement depends on strategic concessions and broader future inclusions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARKUS BÖCKENFÖRDE

AbstractOn 22 July 2009 a Tribunal of five leading international lawyers rendered their award at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), thereby redrawing the boundaries of Abyei, a small patch of land in the centre of Sudan and source of violent conflict throughout recent years. The arbitration was initiated by the two signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that in 2005 brought an end to the longest civil war in Africa. Both parties, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, expressed satisfaction with the award, which conceivably saved the CPA from potential collapse. This article examines the legal oddities which accompanied the settlement of the dispute over the Abyei area. It analyses both the referral of the dispute to the PCA through the lens of the Sudanese Constitution and the legal ambiguities of the award itself.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-305
Author(s):  
Christian Oswald ◽  
Melanie Sauter ◽  
Sigrid Weber ◽  
Rob Williams

Abstract Do rebels target civilians as part of the process of establishing control in their territories? This research note shows that transition periods after rebels gain territorial control are remarkably violent for civilians. Speaking to the civilian victimization and rebel governance literature, we investigate the immediate time period after rebels successfully capture and hold territory. We argue that rebels use violence to gain compliance in newly captured territories until they are able to build up local capacities and institutions for peaceful governance. To test this argument, we draw on methodological advances in integrating event data and combine multiple datasets to study patterns of violence perpetrated by the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2001. The findings of our spatiotemporal analysis show that civilian targeting increases in the period after rebels capture territory from the government compared to areas without territorial takeover, suggesting that life under the roof of rebels is initially more dangerous for civilians.


2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Einas Ahmed

Most of the researches on peace agreements conclude that power-sharing arrangements included in these are mostly to the detriment of long-term democratic transformation. The basic argument of these studies is that peace deals consolidate mainly the power of the signatories to the detriment of other major political forces. This article illustrates that, in contrast to many cases, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005 between the government of Sudan represented by the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), has led to an important political transformation in state structure as well as in power relations. Although the CPA enhanced the legitimacy of the SPLM and the NCP and consolidated their political domination, it, nevertheless, contributed to a significant political opening for other political forces in the North and in the South. The CPA put an end to the historically exclusive political hegemony of the North. This article focuses on the dynamics of relations between the SPLM and the NCP during the transitional period and illustrates how these dynamics have impacted upon the process of political transformation.


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