scholarly journals Resolving international border disputes: The Irish experience

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Coakley

This article explores the value of a specific model of norm replacement in accounting for the circumstances leading to Ireland’s Good Friday agreement (1998), which formally and finally settled the long-running territorial dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK). Drawing on the theoretical literature, it identifies three phases in this process. First, from the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 until the civil unrest in Northern Ireland peaked in 1972 the irredentist norm was substantially unchallenged. It was embedded in the 1937 constitution, which defined the national territory as extending over the whole island of Ireland – including Northern Ireland, a part of the UK. The second phase, from about 1972 to 1998, was one of norm competition. The irredentist norm was severely challenged by new political realities in Northern Ireland, and was potentially destabilising for the state itself. It was increasingly challenged by an alternative ‘consent’ norm, one embracing in effect the geopolitical status quo. The third phase, from 1998 onwards, was one of consolidation of the new norm, now written into the Irish constitution to replace the wording of 1937. The article suggests that this model plays a valuable role in accounting for the changing status of the Irish border, but also that the Irish experience has implications for the broad shape of the model.

2020 ◽  
pp. 002201832097752
Author(s):  
Gemma Davies

Much of the cooperation on criminal justice matters between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland is based on EU level instruments. While there has been consideration of the broader impact of Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement and consensus on the need to avoid a return to a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, more detailed consideration has not been given to the effect that Brexit may have on continued criminal justice cooperation across the border. This article highlights the combined risks that Brexit presents for Northern Ireland in the form of increased criminality at a time when the loss of EU police cooperation mechanisms may result in a reduction of operational capacity and the removal of the legal architecture underpinning informal cooperation. Part 1 seeks to highlight the historical context of UK-Irish cooperation in policing matters. Part 2 explores the risk that post Brexit the Irish border may become a focus for criminal activity. The risks relating to increased immigration crime, smuggling of commodities and potential rise in terrorist activities are explored. Part 3 considers how the risks of increased criminal threats are exacerbated by the loss of EU criminal justice cooperation mechanisms and how this will affect UK-Irish cooperation specifically. Consideration is particularly given to the loss of information sharing systems. Part 4 considers how loss of EU level cooperation mechanisms could be mitigated. The viability of bilateral agreements between the UK and Ireland is considered alongside ways which police cooperation can be formalised to compensate for the potential loss of EU criminal justice information sharing systems. Nordic police cooperation is considered as a potential blueprint for the UK and Ireland.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Paula Devine ◽  
Grace Kelly ◽  
Martina McAuley

Within the United Kingdom (UK), many of the arguments driving devolution and Brexit focused on equality. This article assesses how notions of equality have been shaped over the past two decades. Using a chronology of theoretical, political and public interpretations of equality between 1998 and 2018, the article highlights the shifting positions of Northern Ireland (NI) and the rest of the UK. NI once led the way in relation to equality legislation, and equality was the cornerstone of the Good Friday/Belfast peace agreement. However, the Equality Act 2010 in Great Britain meant that NI was left behind. The nature of future UK/EU relationships and how these might influence the direction and extent of the equality debate in the UK is unclear. While this article focuses on the UK, the questions that it raises have global application, due to the international influences on equality discourse and legislation.


Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 159-194
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter examines multilevel governing within the UK. It is organized around three levels of governing: national, regional, and local. For most of the twentieth century, Great Britain (England, Wales, and Scotland) formed a centralized political unit, with policymaking and law-making being led by the UK government and the UK Parliament. There was devolved government in Northern Ireland from 1922, but this was brought to an end by the UK government in 1972 amid mounting civil unrest and paramilitary violence. At the local level, there are more than 400 local authorities throughout the United Kingdom. These vary considerably in size, both in terms of their territorial area that they cover and their populations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter R Gardner

Ulster-Scots is a contemporary case of ethnicity-building, materialising in Northern Ireland at the end of the 20th century. As the ‘Troubles’ began to be reinterpreted as being about cultural identity in the 1980s, avenues were sought through which to find a ‘Protestant-ness’ comparative to the considerably more developed discourse of Irishness. It was at this point that Ulster-Scots emerged. While its initial decades were marked by derision, hostility, and resistance, it has gained considerable ground in recent years. This article outlines the development of Ulster-Scots from its beginnings in the late 1980s to the present. Utilising in-depth interviews with a variety of current and historical actors, I contend that this development entailed three phases. First, grass-roots educationalists operated independently while unionist elites lobbied for official recognition. In a second phase, the official recognition and institutionalisation of Ulster-Scots in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement initiated a process wherein the Ulster-Scots Agency came to be established as the key player in the field. A third phase began in the early 2010s with the Agency establishing a monopoly over the processes of Ulster-Scots peoplehood-making.


Significance The differing perspectives of unionists and nationalists on the creation of Northern Ireland as a political entity within the United Kingdom, together with Brexit and tensions over the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), have brought the contentious issue of Irish reunification onto the political agenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Impacts Scottish independence would likely increase momentum for a referendum on Irish unity. Successful implementation of the NIP, giving firms access to EU and UK markets, may support arguments for maintaining the status quo. If the UK government abandons the NIP, the adverse trade impact on Northern Irish firms could increase support for unification.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002201832097753
Author(s):  
Gemma Davies ◽  
Paul Arnell

The Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom have a long, close and difficult history. The most recent phase of which dates from 1998 and the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement. Since 1921, however, there has been unique practice between Ireland and the UK as regards the transfer of accused and convicted persons from one to the other. Indeed, there has been a special and close relationship between the two in that regard; albeit one not without difficulties. In recent times EU Justice and Home Affairs measures and the Good Friday Agreement have supplemented and strengthened the relationship. These include, since January 2004, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The EAW has been particularly important in streamlining the extradition process between the Ireland and the UK. This phase of history and co-operation is coming to an end. The UK’s membership of the EU has now ceased, and a transition period during which the UK remains part of the EAW will end on 31st December 2020. The extradition relationship between the two is therefore facing a considerable challenge. There are several options open to Ireland, the UK and the EU as a replacement. Time, political will and the interests of third states, however, may well stand in the way of the conclusion of an agreement that optimally serves the interests of all parties and criminal justice. This paper considers the origins of extradition between the UK and Ireland and the alternative methods of extradition open to the UK and Ireland after Brexit. Consideration is given to the likely operation of a Norway-Iceland style agreement and whether such an agreement will be in place by the end of the transition and, if it was, whether its terms are likely to be sufficient for the needs of Ireland and the UK. The possibility of a bilateral arrangement on extradition between Ireland and the UK is also explored. Underlying the discussion is the critical point that the future extradition relationship must retain its ‘special’ characteristics, and therefore maintain the trust and good will that has developed over the years and given rise to an effective extradition relationship between the two countries. In other words, the lessons of history must be remembered.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Hunt ◽  
Rachel Minto

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) is an assertion of UK nation-state sovereignty. Notwithstanding this state-centrism, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have distinct interests to protect as part of the Brexit negotiations. This article explores how the interests of one regional case, Wales, were accommodated in the pre-negotiation phase, at a domestic level—through intergovernmental structures—and an EU level through paradiplomacy. We explore the structures for sub-state influence, Wales’ engagement with these structures and what has informed its approach. We argue that Wales’ behaviour reflects its positioning as a ‘Good Unionist’ and a ‘Good European’. Despite the weakness of intra-UK structures, Wales has preferred to pursue policy influence at a UK (not an EU) level. In Brussels, regional interests inform the context for Brexit. Here, Wales has focused on awareness-raising, highlighting that the UK Government does not command the ‘monopoly on perspectives’ towards Brexit in the United Kingdom.


Significance However, there has been a notable change in the EU’s tone. In July, the European Commission unexpectedly paused legal action against the United Kingdom for an alleged breach of the NIP, and when London announced on September 6 that it was suspending key elements indefinitely, the EU’s response was muted. Impacts France is so deeply aggrieved over AUKUS that any further UK breaches of the Withdrawal Agreement could prompt a bad-tempered response. The possibility of an early assembly election in Northern Ireland would complicate EU-UK attempts to resolve the NIP issue. The exclusion of high profile, pro-EU politicians in the UK cabinet reshuffle shows how important the Brexit agenda remains for London.


Author(s):  
Michael Graham

Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom with its own Regional Assembly, but is subject to direct rule from the UK Parliament in Westminster in relation to certain reserved matters. The law relating to mental capacity in Northern Ireland is in a period of change.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.


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