China–Turkey Relations from the Perspective of Neoclassical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 234779892110626
Author(s):  
Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin ◽  
Federico Donelli ◽  
Riccardo Gasco
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Strategic Culture ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Neoclassical Realism ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Middle Powers

There is plenty of studies focusing on China’s global outreach through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In tandem with this, the extensive literature on China depicts it as the next hegemon to succeed in the USA. Along this line, flourishing ties with various Asian nations, including the Middle Eastern countries, as a result of China’s recent foreign policy activism has been addressed extensively. While most research has been stressing the rising assertiveness of China in world politics, only a limited number of studies have touched upon the responses from middle or small powers against China’s ascent. Drawing from neoclassical realism, this article contends two levels of analysis for delineating the interaction between Turkey, a middle power, and China, a rising great power. First, the exchange between Turkey and the USA is vital in determining the cordial relations between Turkey and China. Alteration in the American policy vis-à-vis Turkey in the wake of the Arab Spring is relevant to Turkey’s growing relations with China. Second, is the rising anti-Westernism of foreign policy elites as part of the alteration in the strategic culture of Turkish politics, which makes Turkey’s rapprochement with China possible. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these two levels are intertwined and feed each other. Consequently, employing a neoclassical realist approach, the article argues that the middle powers’ stance against a rising hegemon is conditional upon the bilateral relations with the current hegemon and peculiarities of domestic politics.

scholarly journals A New Perspective on Poland’s Policy towards Russia in 2005–2007: a Middle Power Attempts to Engage a Rising Major Power

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Marijuš Antonovič
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Neoclassical Realism ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Law And Justice ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Made In

Abstract Scholars of middle powers have been trying to solve its definitional issues and some progress has been made in the systemic approach. This article shows that further advancement may be gained by employing neoclassical realism in studying middle powers’ foreign policy behaviour. This done by analysing Poland’s policy towards Russia in 2005–2007. It is widely accepted in academic literature that Poland in 2005–2007, during the rule of the Law and Justice Party, pursued a confrontational policy towards Russia. However, this article challenges such widespread views. It demonstrates that Poland’s policy towards Russia was actually simultaneously based on balancing and engagement. Using a neoclassical realist framework and data gathered from interviews with Poland’s main foreign policymakers at that time, this article shows that the balancing was caused by the power asymmetry and differing interests between Russia and Poland, whereas the engagement – by the Polish policymakers’ attempts to influence Russia’s intentions towards Poland and by their perceived situation in the European balance of power.

Grand Strategy of the Master Class

2021 ◽  
pp. 106-122
Author(s):  
Matthew Karp
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Strategic Culture ◽  
Antebellum Era ◽  
Fugitive Slave

This chapter discusses the role of Southerners and slavery in US foreign policy from the antebellum era to the Civil War. Studies that explore slavery's specific impact on foreign policy have generally confined themselves to the ways that slaveholders worked to secure fugitive slave laws, enact restrictions on black sailors, or, at most, fight to add new slave states to the Union. However, the kind of domination that slaveholders desired went beyond the need to reinforce their narrow property rights, or even the desire to expand the amount of territory under slave cultivation. Antebellum slaveholders assumed national Cabinet posts to command the power of the entire United States, and then, crucially, to use that power to strengthen slavery in world politics. If grand strategy is “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy,” slaveholding leaders were not merely provincial sectionalists but bold and cosmopolitan strategic thinkers. Their profound ideological commitment to slavery did not merely affect domestic politics within a divided republic; it left a deep imprint on the “strategic culture” of American foreign policy.

Neoclassical Realism

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norrin M. Ripsman
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
International System ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Strategic Culture ◽  
Foreign Policy Analysis ◽  
Neoclassical Realism ◽  
Leader Perceptions ◽  
Point Of Departure

Neoclassical realism is an approach to foreign policy analysis that seeks to understand international politics by taking into account the nature of the international system—the political environment within which states interact. Taking neorealism as their point of departure, neoclassical realists argue that states respond in large part to the constraints and opportunities of the international system when they conduct their foreign and security policies, but that their responses are shaped by unit-level factors such as state–society relations, the nature of their domestic political regimes, strategic culture, and leader perceptions. Neoclassical realists have identified a number of important limitations to the neorealist model—for example, states do not always perceive systemic stimuli correctly, or the international system does not always present clear signals about threats and opportunities. Adherents of neoclassical realism insist that their approach represents a significant improvement on existing approaches to international relations and foreign policy, including “Innenpolitik” approaches. Nevertheless, neoclassical realism faces a host of criticisms, such as the claim that it is comparatively inefficient and that it is impossible to separate international and domestic variables. To overcome these challenges, neoclassical realists need to consider a few key avenues for future research, such as generating well-specified neoclassical realist theories of foreign policy and devoting more attention to the domestic politics of international cooperation in order to shed the “competition bias” of neoclassical realism.

scholarly journals From Middle Powers to Entrepreneurial Powers in World Politics: Brazil’s Successes and Failures in International Crises

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Feliciano de Sá Guimarães ◽  
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽  
Structural Condition ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Policy Tools ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Power Position

AbstractThis article uses the concept of entrepreneurial powers to discuss how and under what circumstances Brazil successfully accomplishes its goals in international crises. The concept of entrepreneurial power focuses on systematic evidence of middle-power behavior and its relation to foreign policy tools. Brazil resorts to three agency-based foreign policy tools that are the substance of its entrepreneurial power. These instruments are always mediated by a structural condition, the dominant power pivotal position in the crisis. This study applies qualitative comparative analysis methodology to 32 international crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil played a role. It finds that for regional crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is sufficient for success, regardless of the dominant power position; and for global crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is a necessary and sufficient condition for Brazil to accomplish its goals, despite the dominant power position on the issue.

Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: India and Australia at the Forefront

2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110567
Author(s):  
Shubhamitra Das
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
Conflict And Cooperation ◽  
Western Model ◽  
Middle Powers

Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of great movement, conflict and cooperation, contestations and coalition-building. The emergence of minilateral and multilateral cooperation by the middle powers is increasing in the region, with the regional countries enthusiastically mapping the region focussing on their centrality. History proves that the role of middle-power countries became more prominent during the moments of international transition. The two contrasting powers like India and Australia; one with a post-colonial identity in foreign policy-making, subtle emphasis on non-aligned movement (NAM) and emerging as an influential power, and, on the other, a traditional middle power with an alliance structure and regionalism akin to the Western model, have equal stakes in the region and it is inevitable for them to take a leadership position in building what is called a middle power communion in the Indo-Pacific. This article will explore the understanding of middle powers and how India and Australia, as middle powers; are strategically placed and, being great powers within their respective regions; take the responsibility of region-building and maintaining peace with great powers, and how the Indo-Pacific and Quad are emerging as discourses within their foreign policy-making.

New Aspects of Discourse about the Berlin’s Realpolitik

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
German Society ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
European Security ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.

Regional Middle Powers and the Indo-Pacific Strategic Narrative

2019 ◽  
pp. 110-142
Author(s):  
Timothy Doyle ◽  
Dennis Rumley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Pacific Region ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Policy Interest

In this chapter we argue that, in the Indo-Pacific region since the ‘end’ of the ‘old’ Cold War, there has been a process of political and economic competition among regional great powers for influence over Indo-Pacific core middle powers. One of the essential aims of this process is to create a regional middle power coalition in opposition to either China or the US, one of the elements of the new Cold War. As a result, the foreign policies of US-co-opted states will exhibit a shift in emphasis towards support for the US pivot and an expression of a greater foreign policy interest than heretofore in the Indo-Pacific region, following the US. The result is that an Indo-Pacific self-identification and an ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’ become important components of the foreign policy rhetoric and debate of US-co-opted states.

Searching for Middle Powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Neack
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Global South ◽  
The Self ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
International Power ◽  
Post War ◽  
Middle Powers

What is a “middle power,” and what foreign policy is associated with it? Scholars and diplomats in Canada, Australia, and a more or less stable collection of northern countries—and increasingly scholars from the Global South—have proposed that the term denotes a particular international position, rights, and responsibilities. Canada has been especially associated with claims that it deserved unique representation in the halls of international power by virtue of its secondary or middle contributions to World War II and the post-war peace. Middle powers, it was proposed, were countries who both made significant contributions to that global order and were more likely than the self-interested great powers to protect the values of that order. However, the term “middle power” never has had a clear meaning or definition, and the so-called middle powers have largely been self-electing (whether the self-election was by scholars or practitioners). Scholarly efforts to bring more rigor to the concept have failed to agree on its basic definition and membership list. This failure results largely from a fundamental disagreement over whether the “middle power” is defined by its functional capabilities, characterized by its strong moral imperative as a “good international citizen,” designated by its position in the international hierarchy, or revealed in its foreign policy behaviors. In time, the behavioral notion that middle powers engaged in “middle power diplomacy” held sway in the scholarship such that any country that pursued multilateral compromises, engaged in acts of “good international citizenship,” and promoted coalition building was labeled a middle power. This subsequently led to a growing scholarship on which states were “middle powers” based on their foreign policy behaviors. In particular, countries from the Global South who embraced multilateralism were included in the ranks of the middle powers. The inclusion of countries from the Global South created a fundamental problem for the term, since middle power advocates portrayed them as strong supporters of the international order. Southern middle powers, on the other hand, were champions or leaders of states who stood against that order because of historical and present injustices in it. However, even those countries said to be Southern or emerging middle powers seem more interested in establishing their own status within the existing order rather than asserting a common vision on behalf of a revised order. Ultimately, the lack of agreement about what “middle power” means leaves scholars and practitioners uncertain about whether the term is a useful guide for any particular country’s foreign policy.

SAUDI ARABIA AT THE TOP OF POLITICAL TURBULENCE

2020 ◽  
pp. 273-285
Author(s):  
A. S. Derbenev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Eastern Region ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Political Conflicts ◽  
Current Period ◽  
Arab Muslim ◽  
History Of

The States of Arabian Peninsula are now going through a challenging period of their history. The history of Arab states have never been easy. The current period of political turbulence is associated with military and political conflicts in the Middle Eastern region, especially in Syria and Yemen. The current situation takes an extremely serious turn. At the beginning of the 21st century, Riyadh’s political confronted a set of conditions that encompasses the Arab people's existential problems. There is an obvious trend that can hardly be assessed as advantageous due to the fact that this problem will naturally create background for the essential convergence of the interests of the Arab regional space’s different segments that will exist in the new political realm. In the early 21st century rapid changes and important events occurred in the world politics, and in the Eastern part of the Arab-Muslim world alike. The Saudi monarchy has no doubt that the foreign policy schemes are fragile and for this reason it looks toward diversifying its foreign policy.

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