Time is on whose side? Determining the duration of collective agreements in a decentralized collective bargaining system

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 758-783
Author(s):  
Patrice Jalette ◽  
Frédéric Lauzon Duguay ◽  
Mélanie Laroche
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Contract Duration ◽  
Maximum Duration ◽  
Strategic Issue ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining

This article examines how the union and management determine the duration of the collective agreement in a decentralized bargaining system characterized by the absence of a rule establishing a maximum duration. Based on information on a population of over 5000 collective agreements and bargaining pairs from the Canadian province of Québec, our analysis reveals that establishment-level collective agreement duration is the result of general economic conditions, but also of coercive comparisons, as well as the parties’ resources and capacities and relative bargaining power, and the characteristics of their interactions. This case shows how contract duration is a strategic issue in establishment-level negotiations where the balance of power generally favours employers.

Imperfect Information and Strikes: An Analysis of Canadian Experience, 1967–82

ILR Review ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Michel Cousineau ◽  
Robert Lacroix
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Probit Analysis ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Canadian Experience ◽  
Canadian Manufacturing ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Over Time

To test their hypothesis that the propensity to strike is affected less by the actual balance of bargaining power than by the parties' uncertainty about their relative power, the authors perform a probit analysis of data on 1,871 collective agreements negotiated in the Canadian manufacturing sector between 1967 and 1982. They find, consistent with their hypothesis, that some characteristics of individual bargaining units, the relevant industries, and the economy as a whole that affect both the quantity and reliability of information needed to assess relative bargaining power do have significant value in predicting strike incidence across industries and over time.

scholarly journals A kollektív munkaszerződés szabályozásának problémái Romániában

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 217-227
Author(s):  
Magdolna Vallasek
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
Drastic Reduction ◽  
Social Dialogue ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Partners ◽  
Definition Of

"Following the coming into force of the new Social Dialogue Act in 2011, the Romanian collective bargaining system has fundamentally changed due to the restructuring of the levels of collective bargaining and the definition of the representativeness criteria. The collective agreement is the central institution of the collective labour law, the existence or non-existence of it, the content of the agreement being of a real interest for the enforcement of employees’ interest. The new regulation significantly weakened the bargaining power of the social partners, which very soon led to a drastic reduction in the number of the concluded collective agreements. In our study, we try to point out the problematic issues of the Romanian regulation related to the collective agreement, anticipating at the same time the possible new perspectives opened up by the attempt to amend the law."

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

scholarly journals Voluntary Quits: Do Works Councils Matter? An Analysis of the Reform of the German Works Constitution Act 2001

2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-109
Author(s):  
Julian B. Adam
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Full Time ◽  
Difference In Difference ◽  
Works Councils ◽  
Collective Voice ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Works Council ◽  
Establishment Panel Data

Abstract Most of the literature on the effects of German works councils does not deal with the issue of potential endogeneity of works council existence. Exploiting exogenous variation in works council authority stemming from a 2001 reform of the German Works Constitution Act, I apply a regression difference-in-difference using establishment panel data. I find that increasing works council size and the introduction of one full-time councilor causally reduces the number of voluntary quits by about 30 %. This decline is driven entirely by collective voice effects and there is no evidence for monopoly effects in place. Similar to the findings of previous research, the effect is significant only in establishments which are subject to a collective agreement. The results suggest that the effectiveness of works councils either heavily relies on the support of unions, or that works councils mainly serve as a guardian of collective agreements.

Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries

1987 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Kobrin
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
National Study ◽  
Global Integration ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Cross National Study ◽  
Over Time

The bargaining power model of HC–MNC (host country–multinational corporation) interaction conceives of economic nationalism in terms of rational self-interest and assumes both inherent conflict and convergent objectives. In extractive industries, there is strong evidence that outcomes are a function of relative bargaining power and that as power shifts to developing HCs over time, the bargain obsolesces. A cross-national study of the bargaining model, using data from 563 subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturing firms in forty-nine developing countries, indicates that while the bargaining framework is an accurate model of MNC–host country relationships, manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based, and secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource industries. Shifts in bargaining power to HCs may take place when technology is mature and global integration limited. In industries characterized by changing technologies and the spread of global integration, the bargain will obsolesce very slowly and the relative power of MNCs may even increase over time.

scholarly journals When balance of power meets globalization: China, India and the small states of South Asia

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
TV Paul
Keyword(s):  
South Asian ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Economic Globalization ◽  
Military Bases ◽  
Small States ◽  
Short Term ◽  
China And India ◽  
Structural Theories

This article addresses the research question: how have most small states of South Asian region managed to acquire substantial amount of investment from China and India without falling into the strategic orbit of either power? This is an anomaly because most structural theories, in particular neorealism, would expect small states not to have much power and influence on their own in their relationship with powerful states. I answer this puzzle by arguing that the limited competition between China and India in an era of intensified economic globalization has provided a window of opportunity to small states to maximize their returns from the two without upsetting their relationship with either in a big way. This short-term bargaining window has been facilitated by the managed rivalry and economic interdependence between China and India which is yet to become an intense strategic rivalry. The article cautions that as the Chinese and Indian ambitions in the Indo-Pacific collide, the smaller states may be asked to make choices akin to bandwagoning with either one, in particular by offering military bases and naval facilities. This development, if it occurs, will drastically affect the bargaining power of the smaller states.

Relative Bargaining Power, Corporate Restructuring, and Managerial Incentives

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Dencker
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Fortune 500 ◽  
Corporate Restructuring ◽  
Change Processes ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Base Salary ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Over Time

Using longitudinal personnel data from a U.S. Fortune 500 manufacturing firm for the period of 1967 to 1993, I assess the effects of corporate restructuring and power differences between a firm and its managers on the nature and use of different incentives. I extend relative bargaining power theory to predict that a firm's ability to provide incentives in the ways it prefers—bonuses instead of increases to base salary or promotions—varies due to differences over time in monitoring and sanctions stemming from organizational change processes. Findings are consistent with the theory and show a negative effect of bonuses on salary increases and of bonuses on promotions, with tradeoffs greatest when the firm's oversight of rewards was highest and termination threats were most explicit. Further support for the theory is the finding that the strength of the negative effect of bonuses on promotions varied across managerial groups due to differences in managers' bargaining power: “fast-trackers” were much less likely to experience a tradeoff than were low performing managers, and women were less likely to experience a tradeoff than were men.

Auditor switching and audit fee discounting: the Iranian experience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei ◽  
Norman Mohd-Saleh
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Maximum Point ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different. Design/methodology/approach The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable. Findings Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.

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