scholarly journals Proportional Electoral Systems and Number of Parties in Parliament Evidence from Macedonia

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-478
Author(s):  
Zhidas Daskalovski

AbstractWhat is the best electoral system to increase the number of political parties represented in Parliament? This article answers the question using data from all the elections in Macedonia since 2002, and by making simulations of the results according to different electoral systems. In principle, we found that the electoral model that would bring most parties to the Macedonian Parliament is the Droop and Hare used in one electoral district. Moreover, the article answers the question how favourable different electoral systems are to larger/smaller parties. We find that the following is the order of electoral systems from most to least favourable for larger parties: Imperiali highest averages, D’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Largest remainders – Imperiali, Danish, Largest remainders – Droop, Largest remainders – Hare.

2021 ◽  
pp. 146-180
Author(s):  
Peter John

This chapter assesses what politicians and members of political parties really care about: getting into office on the back of a successful election campaign. Rather than the general determinants of voting outlined in the previous chapter, this is about the choices voters and parties face within a particular system, so they can organize themselves to win. For that they need to play by the rules of the game, which includes developing strategies within electoral systems. The chapter then discusses the impact of electoral systems on that calculus, and how the number of parties is affected by the electoral system in place. It also looks at the factors that assist the winning of elections, and the extent to which the choices of parties and voters are affected by growing instability in the system. Overall, the chapter provides an overview of British political parties and party systems.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 711-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Drummond

When voters place parties in their system along the left-right dimension, they often pull their preferred party closer towards them (assimilation) and push the opposition further away (contrast). This article asks a simple question: are such assimilation and contrast effects similarly powerful across different types of electoral system? I hypothesize that systems employing single-member districts will tend to strengthen assimilation and contrast because they mechanically reduce the number of parties, while shifting the focus of electoral competition away from the party and towards the candidate. Using data from 18 advanced democracies compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and hierarchical modelling I find that contrast effects are indeed stronger in majoritarian systems, while assimilation effects appear similarly strong regardless of the institutional setting. These findings suggest that institutional design holds lasting consequences for how we perceive politics and, perhaps also, for our ability to effectuate democracy.


Author(s):  
Daniel Bochsler

Most research on electoral systems deals with the effects of institutions on political representation. However, political parties design the electoral systems, and thereby navigate between self-interest and multiple, often nonreconcilable normative ideals. This chapter reviews the growing literature on the choice of electoral systems from different perspectives. Structural theories explain that the choice of electoral systems is closely linked to the history of suffrage extensions, cultural heterogeneity and the organization of the economy. Agency-based theories highlight how parliamentary majorities strategically pass electoral reforms in order to consolidate their power in the long run—for instance, in order to avoid future losses in elections. However, often lawmakers fail to predict their electoral fortunes and therefore pass reforms that turn out not to be in their favor, or they even contribute to undermining their own reforms later with strategic maneuvers. Finally, the chapter analyzes the choice of electoral system in the context of transitions toward democracies and in former colonies.


Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman

This article looks at the impact of electoral laws on political parties. It focuses on empirical research, rather than on the implicitly normative foundations of different voting rules or on formal modeling results. The discussion presents comparisons of a limited number of polar electoral system types. The article lists forms of proportional election methods and plurality elections, which are considered to be two of the most important methods of voting. Finally, the article serves to report the results of one of the four main concerns of the field by observing the electoral system effects on the number of parties, etc.


Author(s):  
Nathan Allen

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.


2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Corral ◽  
Francisco Sánchez ◽  
Cristina Rivas Pérez

AbstractMany studies suggest that mixed-member electoral systems produce different attitudes and behaviors among representatives. This article assesses how this type of electoral system shapes Bolivian legislators' perceptions of their roles as representatives, their district activities, and their relationships with their political parties. It examines these dimensions using elite survey data and interviews with legislators and their personal assistants. The results show that the electoral system does not produce a uniform impact. It shapes how legislators perceive their role as representatives and the nature of the relationship they build with their political parties, but it does not produce differences in the kinds of activities that both types of legislators carry out in their districts.


1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Moser

Scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the post-communist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states.These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels—proportional representation—may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurdistan Saeed ◽  
Chawan Salah

This study deals with the electoral systems applied in Iraq after 2003 for the Iraqi Parliament elections. The issue's importance lies in the fact that elections are the legitimate means adopted by modern political systems based on the separation of powers. Therefore, after changing the political system in Iraq in 2003 from a one-party system to a democratic parliamentary system, the permanent constitution of 2005 granted the right to political participation for citizens. Including the right to participate in elections through nomination or candidacy for the Iraqi Council of Representatives, this study examines the electoral systems applied after 2003 and the reasons for the instability of the Iraqi parliament elections on a specific law. The study dealt with the types of electoral systems by focusing on the concept and emergence of elections and the most critical electoral systems adopted by political systems. Furthermore, the electoral systems applied after 2003 in the Iraqi parliament elections by focusing on the electoral laws or their amendments that preceded each electoral cycle since 2003 until now. The study concluded that the electoral system in Iraq was not legally stable; several amendments have been made to the laws regulating the elections for the House of Representatives. So the two elections did not repeat under one law because of political parties' criticism leveled at it. Moreover, the attempt by the large parliamentary blocs, through their control of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, to legislate laws that limit the victory of the blocs and small parties.


2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 506-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Raymond

Recent work has noted an increase in the number of parties at the national level in both proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. While the conventional wisdom maintains that the incentives provided by the electoral system will prevent the number of parties at the district level from exceeding two in majoritarian systems, the evidence presented here demonstrates otherwise. I argue that this has occurred because the number of cleavages articulated by parties has increased as several third parties have begun articulating cleavages that are not well represented by the two larger parties.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reut Itzkovitch-Malka ◽  
Reuven Y Hazan

This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effect of inter- as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two, in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods, however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.


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