scholarly journals Developmental Level of Moral Judgment Influences Behavioral Patterns During Moral Decision-Making

2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 660-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyemin Han ◽  
Kelsie J. Dawson ◽  
Stephen J. Thoma ◽  
Andrea L. Glenn
2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
Turki Abualait ◽  
Shahid Bashir

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.


2017 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Cao ◽  
Jiaxi Zhang ◽  
Lei Song ◽  
Shoupeng Wang ◽  
Danmin Miao ◽  
...  

The present study investigated the effect of dilemma type, framing, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. A total of 591 undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.56 (SD = 1.37) were randomly assigned to 12 groups on the basis of a grid of two dilemma types (the trolley problem or the footbridge dilemma) by three frames (positive, neutral, or negative frame) by two different numbers of workers (5 or 15 people). The main effects of dilemma type, frame, and number of saved workers were all significant. The interaction of dilemma type and number of saved workers and the interaction of the three independent factors were significant. Results indicated that moral judgment is affected by framing. Specifically, people were more inclined to utilitarianism in the positive or neutral frame and more inclined to intuitionism in the negative frame. Furthermore, this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives. Implications of our results are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinan Alper

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. e0164012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustav Tinghög ◽  
David Andersson ◽  
Caroline Bonn ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
Michael Kirchler ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgia Ponsi ◽  
Marina Scattolin ◽  
Riccardo Villa ◽  
Salvatore Maria Aglioti

AbstractParkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by the loss of dopaminergic neurons in the basal ganglia (BG) and thalamocortical circuitry. While defective motor control has long been considered the defining symptom of PD, mounting evidence indicates that the BG are fundamentally important for a multitude of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes in addition to motor function. Here, we review alterations in moral decision-making in people with PD, specifically in the context of deceptive behavior. We report that PD patients exhibit two opposite behavioral patterns: hyper- and hypo-honesty. The hyper-honest subgroup engages in deception less often than matched controls, even when lying is associated with a monetary payoff. This behavioral pattern seems to be linked to dopaminergic hypo-activity, implying enhanced harm avoidance, risk aversion, non-impulsivity, and reduced reward sensitivity. On the contrary, the hypo-honest subgroup—often characterized by the additional diagnosis of impulse control disorders (ICDs) and dopamine dysregulation syndrome (DDS)—deceives more often than both PD patients without ICDs/DDS and controls. This behavioral pattern appears to be associated with dopaminergic hyperactivity, which underpins enhanced novelty-seeking, risk-proneness, impulsivity, and reward sensitivity. We posit that these two complementary behavioral patterns might be related to dysfunction of the dopaminergic reward system, leading to reduced or enhanced motivation to deceive. Only a few studies have directly investigated moral decision-making in PD and other neurodegenerative disorders affecting the BG, and further research on the causal role of subcortical structures in shaping moral behavior is needed.


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