Does Abstract Mindset Decrease or Increase Deception?

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinan Alper

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
Turki Abualait ◽  
Shahid Bashir

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin L. Blankenship ◽  
Traci Y. Craig ◽  
Marielle G. Machacek

Morality – the subjective sense that humans discern between right and wrong – plays a ubiquitous role in everyday life. Deontological reasoning conceptualizes moral decision-making as rigid, such that many moral choices are forbidden or required. Not surprisingly, the language used in measures of deontological reasoning tends to be rigid, including phrases such as “always” and “never.” Two studies (N = 553) drawn from two different populations used commonly used measures of moral reasoning and measures of morality to examine the link between individual differences in deontological reasoning and language on the endorsement of moral foundations. Participants low on deontological reasoning generally showed less endorsement for moral principles when extreme language was used in the measures (relative to less extreme language).


2017 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Cao ◽  
Jiaxi Zhang ◽  
Lei Song ◽  
Shoupeng Wang ◽  
Danmin Miao ◽  
...  

The present study investigated the effect of dilemma type, framing, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. A total of 591 undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.56 (SD = 1.37) were randomly assigned to 12 groups on the basis of a grid of two dilemma types (the trolley problem or the footbridge dilemma) by three frames (positive, neutral, or negative frame) by two different numbers of workers (5 or 15 people). The main effects of dilemma type, frame, and number of saved workers were all significant. The interaction of dilemma type and number of saved workers and the interaction of the three independent factors were significant. Results indicated that moral judgment is affected by framing. Specifically, people were more inclined to utilitarianism in the positive or neutral frame and more inclined to intuitionism in the negative frame. Furthermore, this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives. Implications of our results are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Thomas ◽  
Averria S. Martin ◽  
Lisa Eyler ◽  
Ellen E. Lee ◽  
Eduardo Macagno ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Martin ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe

Partner choice captures the idea that individuals exist in a biological market of potential partners, and we can therefore choose or reject our social partners. While prior work has principally explored the functional basis of partner choice, here we focus on its mechanistic basis, motivated by a surge of recent work exploring the psychology underlying partner choice decisions. This work demonstrates that partner choice is predictably sensitive to a number of factors, including 1) a potential partner’s generosity and fairness, 2) cooperative disposition, 3) moral decision-making, and 4) intentions. We then broaden our scope, first reviewing work suggesting that, in some cases, the psychology underlying partner choice may be distinct from other responses to a partner’s behavior. We then discuss work demonstrating the sensitivity of partner choice decisions to market characteristics as well as work that illuminates the neural, ontogenetic and phylogenetic basis of partner choice. We conclude by highlighting outstanding questions and suggest directions for future research.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110015
Author(s):  
Corentin J Gosling ◽  
Bastien Trémolière

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgment has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people’s moral judgments and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, the present study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgments while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In the current study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bastien Trémolière ◽  
Corentin J Gosling

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgment has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people’s moral judgments and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, the present study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgments while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In the current study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.


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