Neutrality of the State and Regulation of Religious Symbols in Schools in Quebec and France

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Koussens
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
Cultural Integration ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
Immigrant Populations ◽  
State Neutrality ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference

The difference in attitudes towards the wearing of religious symbols in schools in France and Canada is symptomatic of the respective legal and political definitions of the official neutrality of the school institution and thus of way in which laicism is used to regulate religious pluralism and the “socio-cultural” integration of immigrant populations. In what ways is state neutrality put into practice, in Quebec and in France, as regards the judicial and political treatment of the wearing of religious symbols in public schools? The author proposes to examine the implementation of the liberal principle of neutrality by the French law dated 15 March 2004 on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada of 2 March 2006 to allow a young Sikh to wear his ritual kirpan at school.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

Constitutional Law in 1957–1958

1959 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-180
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Racial Segregation ◽  
Loyalty Programs ◽  
Annual Conference ◽  
Great Weight ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One

There was no change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1957 Term. Nor was there any let-up in attacks upon the Court arising from its recent decisions regarding such touchy subjects as racial segregation in public schools, loyalty programs, the powers of legislative investigating committees, and subversive persons and activities. A great deal of this criticism travelled a pretty low road, but some came from high and responsible sources, such as Learned Hand. Of great weight was a resolution adopted by the annual Conference of (State) Chief Justices on August 24, 1958, by a vote of 36 to 8, which affirmed its faith in traditional federalism and urged the Supreme Court to “exercise one of the greatest of all judicial powers—the power of judicial selfrestraint—by recognizing and giving effect to the difference between that which on the one hand, the Constitution may prescribe or permit, and that which, on the other, a majority of the Supreme Court, as from time to time constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable ….”

scholarly journals Student Speech and Social Media: The Supreme Court Finally Enters the Fray

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Extracurricular Activities ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
American Military ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Cyber Speech

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

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