Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Trade Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations
Two characteristics of mediators – bias and leverage – are discussed intensively in the research on international mediation. However, whereas bias and leverage have been examined in mediation by states, relatively little is known about their role in mediation by international organizations (ios). This study provides new ways of conceptualizingiobias and leverage and utilizes unique data to measure the impact ofiobias and leverage on mediation outcomes. Exploring all cases of civil war mediation byios in the period 1975–2004, we find thatios where member states provide support to both sides in a conflict outperformios whose member states remain disinterested.ios with significant trade leverage also increase the likelihood of mediation success. The study demonstrates thatios rarely have a neutral relationship to civil war combatants, that mediation byios is laden with member state interests, and that such interests shape outcomes.