Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Trade Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren ◽  
Isak Svensson

Two characteristics of mediators – bias and leverage – are discussed intensively in the research on international mediation. However, whereas bias and leverage have been examined in mediation by states, relatively little is known about their role in mediation by international organizations (ios). This study provides new ways of conceptualizingiobias and leverage and utilizes unique data to measure the impact ofiobias and leverage on mediation outcomes. Exploring all cases of civil war mediation byios in the period 1975–2004, we find thatios where member states provide support to both sides in a conflict outperformios whose member states remain disinterested.ios with significant trade leverage also increase the likelihood of mediation success. The study demonstrates thatios rarely have a neutral relationship to civil war combatants, that mediation byios is laden with member state interests, and that such interests shape outcomes.

2020 ◽  
pp. 004711782097032
Author(s):  
Diana Panke

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, ‘energy’ states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

Functionalism is conventionally considered the mainstream paradigm of the law of international organizations: organizations are agents of their member states by the means of a contractual relationship; the law created by international organizations is purely international law; the institutional veil is characterized by a crystallin transparency; the autonomy of the organization is minimal and only granted by a rigid conferral of competences and few implied powers; the conduct of member states acting in the institutional forum is relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter introduces the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are purely international law. It describes the flaws of this theory, discussing the breach of institutional rules by the organization and the adoption of countermeasures against a wrongful act committed by a member state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-324
Author(s):  
Nicolas Bernard

The treatment by the United Kingdom of Union citizens remaining on its territory after Brexit and conversely that of UK nationals by EU27 Member States on theirs has given rise to much discussion and analysis. By contrast, there has been comparatively little systematic and detailed exploration of the question of the impact of Brexit on the exercise of Union citizens’ rights against their own Member State. It is an issue which is for the most part ignored in the current Withdrawal Agreement. The purpose of this article is to show that this blind spot opens up a potential gap in legal protection of the rights of Union citizens, which is likely to remain regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations and whether a withdrawal agreement is concluded or not. The paper discusses the extent to which the adversarial nature of the withdrawal process has contributed to this failure to address this issue and the ways in which courts could step in to provide the legal protection that political processes were unable to deliver.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Palchetti

It is not rare that, in a dispute brought before an international tribunal against a member State of an organization, that State, by relying on the Monetary Gold principle, asks the tribunal to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, arguing that this would lead to determining the responsibility of the organization. Such an objection raises the question of whether the Monetary Gold principle, which so far has been applied in cases when the absent third party was a State, also applies to absent organizations. The present article intends to study the question of the applicability of the Monetary Gold principle in relation to situations in which member States can be held responsible for the conduct of the organization. While in principle there are situations in which the determination of the responsibility of the organization appears to be a precondition to the determination of the responsibility of the member State, the fact that an international tribunal does not have jurisdiction over international organizations should lead one to exclude that the Monetary Gold principle applies at all to situations in which the absent third party is an international organization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (6) ◽  
pp. 1963-1981
Author(s):  
Gisela Hirschmann

Abstract International organizations (IOs) play a key role in promoting multilateral cooperation on critical transnational issues. Yet, their authority has increasingly been contested by member states that cut financial contributions or even withdraw their membership. How do IOs respond to such contestation? While the existing literature has mostly focused on reactions by other member states, I argue in this article that our understanding of IOs' responses to contestation remains incomplete without an analysis of IO bureaucracies. I propose a conceptual framework to analyse three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, i.e. no immediate response; adaptation, i.e. institutional changes to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s); and resilience-building, i.e. developing organizational capacities to limit contestation. I argue that each of these responses is shaped by specific bureaucratic mechanisms, namely hunkering, negotiation, framing, coalition-building, shaming and professionalization. Based on a comparative within-case study analysing the reactions of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to budget cuts by the Reagan, Bush and Trump administrations, I further theorize that the organization's threat perception, the position of other member states and bureaucratic leadership are relevant factors that need to be considered to explain the variation in IO responses to contestation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-235
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren

Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.


Author(s):  
Xu Yi-chong ◽  
Patrick Weller

This chapter surveys the existing approaches to studying IOs, and discusses our public policy approach. It describes IOs as institutions that are defined by formal and informal rules, by practices and sets of expectations that shape the way those involved in IOs’ activities work. Rather than accepting the traditional proposition that member states decide, the chapter argues that we need to go inside the organization to examine how all the actors perceive their roles, interpret their responsibilities, and interact with each other. It identifies three groups of actors—state representatives, heads of IOs, and secretariats—and discusses their strength, advantages, and levers in IO operations. It particularly highlights the impact of organizational structure, history, and culture on actors’ behaviour and examines their powers of persuasion in a comparative study across six IOs.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

An intergovernmental treaty that has specific aims for cooperation has a very different thrust than national constitutions, which are designed to allow political order and to safeguard individual rights. I argue that the literature in political science on the ECJ is too focused on showing how member states can influence the Court. It overlooks the supranational outcomes that ensue when the Treaty contains policy prescriptions, while being constitutionalized through supremacy and direct effect. Through its case law, the Court provides additions to the Treaty. To demonstrate the importance of judicial policymaking through case-law development and codification, three steps are fundamental to the book’s argument. First, we have to understand both case-law development and the impact of the Court. Secondly and thirdly, we must ask how the ECJ’s case law may make a difference to policymaking at both the European and member-state levels.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (5) ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Egor Zabolotskii

In recent years the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) pursues a policy aimed at improving cooperation among the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) member states in pension area. Creation of a single financial market, to which pension funds are also parties, is expected to be completed in the EEU by 2025. The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for further reforms of the EEU pension systems and their possible integration. The scope of the study refers to existing arrangements in pension area among the EEU member states and their pension systems. The theoretical framework of research relates to works of national and international organizations and scientists in pension area as well as relevant normative legal acts and agreements between the EEU member states. The results of the study can be used by EEC and member state executive authorities for further cooperation in pension area.


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