Instrumentalizing and Naturalizing Social Ontology: Replies to Lohse and Little

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article.

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer

In this article, I examine “Ontology Matters!” (OM!) arguments. OM! arguments conclude that ontology can contribute to empirical success in social science. First, I capture the common form between different OM! arguments. Second, I describe quantifier variance as discussed in metaontology. Third, I apply quantifier variance to the common form of OM! arguments. I then present two ways in which ontology is prior to social science methodology, one realist and one pragmatic. I argue that a pragmatic interpretation of ontology’s priority gives proponents of realist OM! arguments a special burden that they must meet to render their argument successful.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-23
Author(s):  
Daniel Little

The article responds to Richard Lauer’s (2019) “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” The article concurs that “social ontology matters” for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Simon Lohse

This article is a reply to Richard Lauer’s “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” and an attempt to contribute to the meta-social ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part I will give a rough sketch of Lauer’s general project and confront his pragmatist approach with a fundamental problem. The second part of my reply will provide a solution for this problem rooted in a philosophy of the social sciences in practice.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Rebat Kumar Dhakal

Highlights Social inquiry is much more than the study of society. It further excavates historical facts, critically reflects on everyday happenings, and envisions the future we wish to create. The intent of initiating this dialogue on social inquiry is two-fold: a) to offer a sociological perspective (i.e. ‘thinking sociologically’), and b) to expand our understanding of sociological thinking. Sociological thinking can be developed by examining the periphery of the core. Context matters in understanding any phenomenon under the sociological microscope. Sociological thinking allows many different viewpoints to coexist within a larger structure and that it respects pluralism. Sociological thinking is about developing or providing a perspective to examine social nuances. Sociological thinking should act as a means for social transformation.  Social inquiry serves as a methodology for the social sciences and humanities. It deals with the philosophy of social science and the workings of the social world – giving a way for understanding both the biosphere and the sociosphere.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175069801987608
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Blustein

It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz’s analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies—one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer

The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein’s recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein’s argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present doubts that his proposal will improve predictive success for the social sciences, which I support with Edith Penrose’s resource-based theory of the firm.


1994 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. F. Craffert

Redefining Paul’s conflict in Galatia: The letter to the Galatians through the lense of the social sciences Traditional attempts at identifying Paul’s oppponents in the letter to the Galatians are methodologically stamped by a history-of-ideas approach; this is accompanied by at least two interpretive traditions (one focusing on the Reformation question of righteousness by works or by faith, and the second by the inclusion of Gentiles in the people of God). After a social- scientific methodology is introduced, three facets of Paul’s social realities are discussed: communication in a predominantly oral culture, Judaism as a first-century religious phenomenon, and the household institution. It is suggested that these provide us with an opportunity for redefining the conflict as a conflict on Paul’s honour and authority.


Author(s):  
Alison Wylie

Feminists have two sorts of interest in the social sciences. With the advent of the second-wave women’s movement, they developed wide-ranging critiques of gender bias in the conceptual framework and methodology, as well as in the goals, institutions and practice of virtually all the social sciences; they argue that the social sciences both reflect and contribute to the sexism of the larger societies in which they are embedded. Alongside these critiques feminist practitioners have established constructive programmes of research that are intended to rectify the inadequacies of existing traditions of research and to address questions of concern to women. In this they are committed both to improving the disciplines in which they participate and to establishing a sound empirical and theoretical basis for feminist activism. This engagement of feminists with social science, as commentators and practitioners, raises a number of philosophical issues that have been addressed by feminist social scientists and philosophers. These include questions about ideals of objectivity and the role of contextual values in social scientific inquiry, the goals of feminist research, the forms of practice appropriate to these goals, and the responsibilities of feminist researchers to the subjects of inquiry and to those who may otherwise be affected by its conduct or results.


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