Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Empirical Success ◽  
The Common ◽  
Pragmatic Interpretation ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology

In this article, I examine “Ontology Matters!” (OM!) arguments. OM! arguments conclude that ontology can contribute to empirical success in social science. First, I capture the common form between different OM! arguments. Second, I describe quantifier variance as discussed in metaontology. Third, I apply quantifier variance to the common form of OM! arguments. I then present two ways in which ontology is prior to social science methodology, one realist and one pragmatic. I argue that a pragmatic interpretation of ontology’s priority gives proponents of realist OM! arguments a special burden that they must meet to render their argument successful.

Instrumentalizing and Naturalizing Social Ontology: Replies to Lohse and Little

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Made In

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article.

Rethinking the Formalism-Substantivism Debate in Social Science: A Perspective from Recent Developments in Economic Methodology

Modern China ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
Yuan Gao
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Economic Methodology ◽  
Cognitive Value ◽  
New Development ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Point Of Departure

Taking as its point of departure the 1960s formalism-substantivism debate in social science methodology, this article argues that what is distinctive about the new development of formalism in economics since then is mainly the prevalence of using “complete models”—tractable, manipulable, and fully specified mathematical objects—to construct and express theories. The objective of complete models is not to establish general laws, but to formulate auxiliary devices of cognition to facilitate the explanation of targeted aspects of the empirical world; not to create idealistic or ideological discourses, but to derive implications with empirically delimited utility—this in order to make inferences that cannot be achieved via purely qualitative methods. This methodological trend is to some extent a substantivization of formalist economics. Exploring its nature can help clarify the unique cognitive value of contemporary formalism and answer the question of why substantivism is still an irreplaceable approach to social scientific studies, even in an age dominated by formalism.

Social Ontology De-dramatized

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-23
Author(s):  
Daniel Little
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Status ◽  
Realist Interpretation ◽  
Explanatory Success ◽  
Social Scientific

The article responds to Richard Lauer’s (2019) “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” The article concurs that “social ontology matters” for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology.

scholarly journals Social science methodology: A unified framework

Acta Politica ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-474
Author(s):  
Adrie Dassen ◽  
Kostas Gemenis
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Unified Framework ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology

scholarly journals Damaging the Case for Improving Social Science Methodology through Misrepresentation: Re-Asserting Confidence in Hypothesis Testing as a Valid Scientific Process

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Nicholson ◽  
Sean Mccusker
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Sociological Research ◽  
Significance Tests ◽  
Hypothesis Tests ◽  
Strong Statement ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Reasonable Model

This paper is a response to Gorard's article, ‘Damaging real lives through obstinacy: re-emphasising why significance testing is wrong’ in Sociological Research Online 21(1). For many years Gorard has criticised the way hypothesis tests are used in social science, but recently he has gone much further and argued that the logical basis for hypothesis testing is flawed: that hypothesis testing does not work, even when used properly. We have sympathy with the view that hypothesis testing is often carried out in social science contexts when it should not be, and that outcomes are often described in inappropriate terms, but this does not mean the theory of hypothesis testing, or its use, is flawed per se. There needs to be evidence to support such a contention. Gorard claims that: ‘Anyone knowing the problems, as described over one hundred years, who continues to teach, use or publish significance tests is acting unethically, and knowingly risking the damage that ensues.’ This is a very strong statement which impugns the integrity, not just the competence, of a large number of highly respected academics. We argue that the evidence he puts forward in this paper does not stand up to scrutiny: that the paper misrepresents what hypothesis tests claim to do, and uses a sample size which is far too small to discriminate properly a 10% difference in means in a simulation he constructs. He then claims that this simulates emotive contexts in which a 10% difference would be important to detect, implicitly misrepresenting the simulation as a reasonable model of those contexts.

scholarly journals Editors’ Note

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-285
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Significance Testing ◽  
Sociological Research ◽  
Scientific Process ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology

In 2016 and 2017, Sociological Research Online published the following article and two subsequent responses: Gorard S (2016) Damaging Real Lives Through Obstinacy: Re-emphasising Why Significance Testing is Wrong. Sociological Research Online 21(1): 1–14. DOI: 10.5153/sro.3857 Nicholson J and McCusker S (2016) Damaging the Case for Improving Social Science Methodology Through Misrepresentation: Re-asserting Confidence in Hypothesis Testing as a Valid Scientific Process. Sociological Research Online 21(2): 1–12. DOI: 10.5153/sro.3985 Gorard (2017) Significance Testing is Still Wrong, and Damages Real Lives: A Brief Reply to Spreckelsen and Van Der Horst, and Nicholson and McCusker. Sociological Research Online 22(2): 1–7. DOI: 10.5153/sro.4281 An erratum has been published in the journal to clarify some corrections that had inadvertently been missed ahead of publication of the first article: Erratum to Gorard (2016) Damaging Real lives Through Obstinacy: Re-emphasising Why Significance Testing is Wrong. Sociological Research Online 21(1): 1–14. DOI: 10.1177/1360780417731066 Readers are advised to read the responses to the original article, particularly paragraph 4.7 in Nicholson and McCusker (2016) and paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 in Gorard (2017) in light of the recently published Erratum. The journal apologises for any inconvenience or misunderstanding this may have caused.

scholarly journals Historical Disparities and Gendered Citation Patterns

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. M. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Citation Data ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Over Time

In this comment on Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell’s article “Gendered Citation Patterns across Political Science and Social Science Methodology Fields,” I explore the role of changes in the disparities of citations to work written by women over time. Breaking down their citation data by era, I find that some of the patterns in citations are the result of the legacy of disparity in the field. Citations to more recent work come closer to matching the distribution of the gender of authors of published work. Although the need for more equitable practices of citation remains, the overall patterns are not quite as bad as Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell conclude.

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