Theories, queries, “frames” and language games: Commentary on Wall, Crookes, Johnson Weber (2020) (and the literature on risky-choice framing)

In a recent article, Wall, Crookes, Johnson and Weber (2020) claim that Query Theory has better explanatory success in accounting for recent data than the Explicated Valence Account of Tombu and Mandel (2015). In this commentary, I first argue that this claim is not supported by the full range of available evidence. I then draw attention to the pernicious problem in framing studies in which researchers do not adequately ensure that framing manipulations are what they claim to be—namely, extensionally equivalent re-descriptions of the same events or event classes. The difficulty of estab- lishing extensional equivalence in the context of experimental language games (such as the Asian Disease Problem) is under-appreciated. Unfortunately, inter-subjective agreement that the extensional equivalence assumption is met, even amongst a majority of respectable decision theorists, does not constitute sufficient evidence that it is met. Empirical evidence challenges the equivalence assumption, raising meta-theoretical questions about the integrity of some framing research.

Natural kinds: a new synthesis

What is a natural kind? This old yet lasting philosophical question has recently received new competing answers (e.g., Chakravartty, 2007; Magnus, 2014; Khalidi, 2013; Slater, 2015; Ereshefsky Reydon, 2015). We show that the main ingredients of an encompassing and coherent account of natural kinds are actually on the table, but in need of the right articulation. It is by adopting a non-reductionist, naturalistic and non-conceptualist approach that, in this paper, we elaborate a new synthesis of all these ingredients. Our resulting proposition is a multiple-compartment theory of natural kinds that defines them in purely ontological terms, clearly distinguishes and relates ontological and epistemological issues - more precisely, two grains of ontological descriptions and two grains of explanatory success of natural kinds -, and which sheds light on why natural kinds play an epistemic role both within science and in everyday life.

Predictive Control of Aerial Swarms in Cluttered Environments

Classical models of aerial swarms often describe global coordinated motion as the combination of local interactions that happen at the individual level. Mathematically, these interactions are represented with Potential Fields. Despite their explanatory success, these models fail to guarantee rapid and safe collective motion when applied to aerial robotic swarms flying in cluttered environments of the real world, such as forests and urban areas. Moreover, these models necessitate a tight coupling with the deployment scenarios to induce consistent swarm behaviors. Here, we propose a predictive model that combines the local principles of potential field models with the knowledge of the agents’ dynamics. We show that our approach improves the speed, order, and safety of the swarm, it is independent of the environment layout, and scalable in the swarm speed and inter-agent distance. Our model is validated with a swarm of five quadrotors that can successfully navigate in a real-world indoor environment populated with obstacles.

Social Ontology De-dramatized

The article responds to Richard Lauer’s (2019) “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” The article concurs that “social ontology matters” for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology.

Kant on Evolution: A Re-evaluation

Kant’s remark about the impossibility of there ever being a Newton of a blade of grass has often been interpreted as a misguided pre-emptive strike against Darwin and evolutionary theories in general. This chapter aims to re-evaluate this claim in the context of Kant’s account of organic generation and argue that, contrary to what is usually thought, it does leave room for the possibility of evolution. To do so, I examine Kant’s theory of generation and draw its implications for biological heredity, species diversity, and the role played by environmental factors in organic development. On this basis, I suggest that, first, evolution is a possible albeit far-fetched hypothesis for Kant, and second, Darwin’s theory of natural selection would have turned a far-fetched possibility into a plausible candidate. As I go on to argue, however, despite its explanatory success, the Darwinian account would not have disposed of the need for teleology. This is why Darwin could never have been a Newton of a blade of grass.

A model of collective behavior based purely on vision

Classical models of collective behavior often take a “bird’s-eye perspective,” assuming that individuals have access to social information that is not directly available (e.g., the behavior of individuals outside of their field of view). Despite the explanatory success of those models, it is now thought that a better understanding needs to incorporate the perception of the individual, i.e., how internal and external information are acquired and processed. In particular, vision has appeared to be a central feature to gather external information and influence the collective organization of the group. Here, we show that a vision-based model of collective behavior is sufficient to generate organized collective behavior in the absence of spatial representation and collision. Our work suggests a different approach for the development of purely vision-based autonomous swarm robotic systems and formulates a mathematical framework for exploration of perception-based interactions and how they differ from physical ones.

Scientific Realism and the No Miracles Argument

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is perhaps the most prominent argument in the debate about scientific realism. It contends that the truth of our best scientific theories is the only hypothesis that does not make the astonishing predictive and explanatory success of science a mystery. However, the argument has been criticized from a Bayesian point of view as committing the base rate fallacy. We provide two Bayesian models (one related to the individual-theory-based NMA and one related to the frequency-based NMA) that respond to that objection. The first model takes into account the observed stability of mature scientific theories, the second the success frequency of theories within a scientific discipline. We conclude that the NMA can be used to defend the realist thesis and that its validity is a highly context-sensitive matter.

A model of collective behavior based purely on vision

Classical models of collective behavior often take a “birds-eye perspective,” assuming that individuals have access to social information that is not directly available (e.g., the behavior of individuals outside of their field of view). Despite the explanatory success of those models, it is now thought that a better understanding needs to incorporate of the perception of the individual, i.e. how internal and external information are acquired and processed. In particular, vision has appeared to be a central feature to gather external information and influence the collective organization of the group. Here we show that a vision based model of collective behavior is sufficient to generate organized collective behavior in the absence of spatial representation and collision. Our work suggests a novel approach for development of purely vision-based autonomous swarm robotic systems, and formulates a mathematical framework for exploration of perception-based interactions and how they differ from physical ones. Thus, it is of broader relevance for self-organization in complex systems, neuroscience, behavioral sciences and engineering.

How Deployment Realism withstands Doppelt's Criticisms

Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism, but helps to detail it better. In a more explicit formulation, the realist IBE concludes not only to the truth of theories, but also to the reliability of scientists and scientific method, the order and simplicity of nature, and the approximate truth of background theories.