Between Race and Nation: Marcus Garvey and the Politics of Self-Determination

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desmond Jagmohan

This essay argues that Marcus Garvey held a constructivist theory of self-determination, one that saw nationalism and transnationalism as mutually necessary and reinforcing ideals. The argument proceeds in three steps. First it recovers Garvey’s transnationalist emphasis by looking at his intellectual debts to other diaspora struggles, namely political Zionism and Irish nationalism. Second it argues that Garvey held a constructivist view of national identity, which also grounds his argument that the black diaspora has a right to collective self-determination. Third it explicates Garvey’s further contention that the right to self-determination and the persistence of oppression give the African diaspora a pro tanto claim to an independent state, which he considered essential to vanquishing white supremacy and realizing collective self-rule.

1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Kwaw Nyameke Blay

In the history of modern Africa the issue of self-determination has always been of special significance. For a better part of a century and in some cases more, almost the entire continent was subject to colonisation by various European powers. The end of the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of the United Nations Charter, incorporating the principle of self-determination, heralded a new phase for the African colonies in international relations. Defined in its simplest terms, self-determination is the principle by virtue of which a people freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Selfdetermination is in essence the right of self-government. A territory exercises the right by either opting to establish itself as an independent state, associating with an existing state or by accepting to be integrated into an existing state. Self-determination so defined was thus used as the basis for decolonisation in Africa and provided the foundations for equal statehood for the former colonies of Africa in international relations.After decolonisation, the issue of self-determination still persists in Africa attracting sentiments and implications well exemplified by the conflicts Over Biafra and Katanga in the 1960s and currently in Eritrea, the Tigray province of Ethiopia and the Southern Sudan. The very successful propagation of self-determination as the right of every people to self-government by African nationalists during the colonial days seems to have left behind a legacy of a question for post-independence Africa—is the ideal of self-determination


1996 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 283-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

Until quite recently, most Anglo-American political philosophers have had little if anything to say about national self-determination. However, a growing number of prominent political philosophers are now endorsing national self-determination. This new-found enthusiasm is surprising if not ironic, since it comes at a time at which genocidal ethno-nationalist conflicts (in the Balkans, in Rwanda and Burundi, etc.) might seem to lend credence to the view that the doctrine that every nation should have its own state is both impractical and dangerous, and that the nationalist mentality is often racist, xenophobic, exclusionary, and morally regressive. In this essay I will question the wisdom of this new-found enthusiasm for national self-determination. I will probe what I shall call the Strong National Self-Determination Thesis (or, more briefly, the Strong Thesis). This is the assertion that every nation as such has a right to some substantial degree of self-government and there is a presumption that every nation as such has a right to its own independent state (where this includes the right to secede from another state). I call this the Strong Thesis because it is more robust than the thesis that nations have a right to some form of self-government.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Ian Denhez

For decades, armed groups in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda have been attempting to overthrow the Angolan government and establish an independent state. However, since their military struggle has not succeeded, what, if any, basis for secession can Cabinda claim under international law? This article argues that while Cabindan nationalists can draw upon a number of effective legal arguments justifying independence, the enclave ultimately has a better claim not to full independence, but rather to autonomy within Angola. This is demonstrated by considering and refuting three major legal arguments used by proponents of Cabindan independence. After a brief review of the relevant legal concepts and Cabindan history, the first argument to be examined is that Cabinda’s distinct historical status voids Angola’s uti possidetis claim to Cabinda. Following this will be a review of the claim that political abuses and the denial to the Cabindan people of a plebiscite on independence grant Cabinda the right to ‘external’ self-determination. The final argument to be examined is that the scale of the misappropriation of Cabinda’s oil wealth by Angola and foreign companies justifies independence, given the enclave’s present lack of economic self-determination. The article ultimately concludes that although Cabinda had a stronger case for secession during the Angolan civil war, recent political and economic changes have weakened Cabinda’s claims under international law.


2019 ◽  
pp. 105-134
Author(s):  
John P. Enyeart

At the end of World War II, Louis Adamic joined other antifascists in arguing that although the Axis Powers would be defeated, its fascist ethic would live on. A true democratic victory included committing to racial and ethnic justice at home and abroad, expanding workers’ rights, and establishing the right of nations to self-determination. Adamic attempted to advance his beliefs by working on former vice president Henry Wallace’s 1948 bid for president on the Progressive party ticket, going on lecture tours with Paul Robeson, and battling anticommunists, especially Catholics. Adamic’s ties to Josip Broz Tito and W. E. B. DuBois as well as his broader anticolonialist outlook, which included his view that white supremacy threatened the world, are key features of this chapter.


Author(s):  
Kirsten Brink Mosey

As part of a collective thinking project, article proposes that all Black Canadians move to Nova Scotia to set up a decolonial, anti-racist, non-patriarchal, abolitionist settlement. Recognizing the denial of the right to collective self-determination for Black Canadians, this article explores how Black Canadians can work in solidarity with Indigenous solidarity movements to correct the injustices of settler-colonialism. 


Author(s):  
В.Д. Дзидзоев

В статье рассматривается, сложная проблема национального самоопределения народов. В современном международном праве, как известно, признаются два кардинально противоположных подхода к решению данной про блемы. Первый подход связан с территориальной целостностью государств, ко торая признается международным правом и уставом ООН, а второй с правом нации на самоопределение вплоть до отделения и возникновения нового незави симого государства. В то же время от влиятельных государств земного шара, а не от международного права зависит, признавать то или иное вновь образо вавшееся государство или не признавать. Классическим примером в этом плане служит Республика Косово, чью независимость признали США и другие государ ства, а независимость Абхазии и Южной Осетии признала РФ и еще несколько государств. The article deals with the complex problem of national selfdetermination of peoples. Modern international law, as we know, recognizes two radically opposite approaches to the solution of this problem. The rst approach is related to the territorial integrity of States, which is recognized by international law and the UN Charter, and the second to the right of a nation to selfdetermination up to the separation and emergence of a new independent state. At the same time, it is up to the in uential States of the world, not international law, to recognize a newly formed state or not to recognize it. Classic examples in this regard are the Republic of Kosovo, separated with the help of the United States, great Britain and other States from Serbia, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separated from Georgia. The independence of Kosovo was recognized by the USA and other States, and the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was recognized by Russia and some other States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Heath Wellman

AbstractThis essay critically assesses Anna Stilz's argument in Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration that legitimate states have a right to do wrong. I concede that individuals enjoy a claim against external interference when they commit suberogatory acts, but I deny that the right to do wrong extends to acts that would violate the rights of others. If this is correct, then one must do more than merely invoke an individual's right to do wrong if one hopes to vindicate a legitimate state's right to commit injustices. Of course, there may be distinctive features of legitimate states that explain why they enjoy moral protections that individuals lack, but I argue that the value of collective self-determination is not up to this task. And even if these arguments fail, self-determination would at most explain why legitimate states enjoy a right to commit injustices against their own citizens; it would provide them no moral protection when they violate the rights of outsiders.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-118
Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

This chapter turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate territorial jurisdiction over a population of rightful occupants. What gives a state the right to rule a specific territory and group of people? I hold that a state has a right to rule a territory and population if and only if it: (i) protects certain essential private rights for all its subjects and respects these rights in outsiders and (ii) it reflects the shared will of its population as to how—and by whom—they should be ruled. To gain the right to rule, a state must serve the second and third core values that underpin the states system: basic justice and collective self-determination. The chapter offers a specific account of the interest in collective self-determination, which it calls “the political autonomy theory.”


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document