Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Golby ◽  
Peter Feaver ◽  
Kyle Dropp

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


1995 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 534-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

This article argues that the problems identified in the literature on public choice should critically affect our research on public opinion and our understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. While a robust literature has emerged around social choice issues in political science, there has been remarkably little appreciation for these problems in the literature on public opinion in general and on public opinion and foreign policy in particular. The potential importance of social choice problems for understanding the nature and role of public opinion in foreign policy making is demonstrated through an examination of American public attitudes about military intervention abroad. In particular, drawing on several common descriptions of the underlying dimensionality of public attitudes on major foreign policy issues, it is shown that there may be important intransitivities in the ordering of public preferences at the aggregate level on policy choices such as those considered by American decision makers in the period leading up to the Gulf War. Without new approaches to public-opinion polling that take these problems into consideration, it will be difficult to make credible claims about the role of public opinion in theforeignpolicy process.


Author(s):  
Stan Hok-Wui Wong

From the start, the Umbrella Movement failed to win overwhelming public support. Why would many Hong Kong people not endorse a civil disobedience movement aimed at dismantling the exclusionary political order and bringing forth democracy? Based on an original public opinion survey collected during the movement, this article provides preliminary answers to these questions. I find that those who disapproved of the movement are no less politically informed. Instead, three factors were strong predictors of disapproval of the movement: (1) satisfaction with the performance of the chief executive; (2) distrust of democracy as a solution to Hong Kong’s problems; and (3) concern about the negative impact of the protest on the rule of law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Leticia Bode ◽  
Jessica S. C. Ng

Abstract Introduction Under austerity, governments shift responsibilities for social welfare to individuals. Such responsibilization can be intertwined with pre-existing social stigmas, with sexually stigmatized individuals blamed more for health problems due to “irresponsible” sexual behavior. To understand how sexual stigma affects attitudes on government healthcare expenditures, we examine public support for government-provisioned PrEP in England at a time when media narratives cast the drug as an expensive benefit for a small, irresponsible social group and the National Health Service’s long-term sustainability was in doubt. Methods This paper uses data from an original survey (N = 738) conducted in September 2016, when public opinion should be most sensitive to sexual stigma. A survey experiment tests how the way beneficiaries of PrEP were described affected support for NHS provision of it. Contrary to expectations, we found that support was high (mean = 3.86 on a scale of 1 to 5) irrespective of language used or beneficiary group mentioned. Differences between conditions were negligible. Discussion Sexual stigma does not diminish support for government-funded PrEP, which may be due to reverence for the NHS; resistance to responsibilization generally; or just to HIV, with the public influenced by sympathy and counter-messaging. Social policy implications Having misjudged public attitudes, it may be difficult for the government to continue to justify not funding PrEP; the political rationale for contracting out its provision is unnecessary and flawed. With public opinion resilient to responsibilization narratives and sexual stigma even under austerity, welfare retrenchment may be more difficult than social policymakers presume.


Author(s):  
Zuzana Ringlerova

The European Union (EU) is a supranational political system that unites more than twenty-five European countries. European integration began to facilitate economic cooperation. Over time, it evolved into both an economic and political union. The progress in European integration accelerated in the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the European Union was established in 1993 and assumed more political power. The process of establishing the European Union was slowed by the results of a referendum in Denmark, which at first did not approve the treaty establishing the EU. This referendum made it clear that public support for European integration could no longer be taken for granted and that public attitudes toward the EU are crucial for the European Union’s future development. In other words, the era of permissive consensus ended and it became clear that public opinion has become a powerful force in the development of European integration. Since then, public opinion has had a clear influence on the direction of European integration in a number of ways. Examples of this influence include the rejection of the single European currency in Sweden, the failure of the Constitution for Europe, and, most notably, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU. Public opinion has influenced European politics in other ways as well. For example, national political elites, acting at the European level, are constrained in their decisions by public opinion at home. The importance of understanding public opinion toward the EU has given rise to a lively research program. In their quest to understand citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, researchers first had to conceptualize the key concepts in this field, in particular the meaning of public support for the EU. Following this, scholars began to investigate why people support or oppose the European Union, which became the most widely studied topic in this field. In addition, studies have examined public support for specific European policies, determinants of voting in EU-related referendums, public support for EU membership in countries outside the EU, and the extent to which public opinion matters for policymaking in the EU. All these topics are included in this annotated bibliography. The section devoted to General Introductions and Review Articles lists review articles and textbook chapters that provide a quick overview of the topic as a whole. The next section, What Is Public Support for the EU and How Do We Explain It?, digs deeper into the concept of public support for the EU, asking how the concept is defined and what explains support for the EU. The following three sections deal with public opinion toward specific EU policies (Public Opinion toward Specific EU Policies), public support for the EU in nonmember states (Public Support for the EU in Candidate Countries and Other Nonmember States), and the question of public opinion’s influence on policymaking in the EU (Does Public Opinion Matter for Policymaking in the EU?). The second-to-last section is devoted to referendums on European matters (Referendums: Explaining the People’s Vote, Explaining Brexit). The last section (Data Sources) looks at data sources that can be used in the study of public attitudes toward the EU.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Smetana ◽  
Marek Albert Vranka

We present the results of two survey experiments on public support for nuclear, chemical, and conventional strikes. We examined how moral values of individuals interact with the approval of different kinds of strikes and with the effects of information about the ingroup and out-group fatalities. Our results show that while the public is more averse to the employment of chemical weapons than to the conduct of nuclear or conventional strikes, the overall relationship between strike approval and the individuals’ moral values does not differ across the three experimental treatments. In addition, we found that individuals’ scores in so-called “binding” moral values affect the sensitivity of the public for in-group fatalities. Findings of our paper contribute to the broader debates in the field about the strength and nature of the norms against the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and about the role of morality in the public attitudes to the use of military force.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Guardino ◽  
Suzanne Mettler

In this article, we explore how specific policy information shapes public opinion toward the “hidden welfare state” of tax expenditures. These politically and socioeconomically consequential policies—most of which bestow their greatest benefits on upper-income people—are complex and opaque, and scholars’ understanding of citizen attitudes toward them is limited. In response, we use a randomized, general population, online survey experiment to test the effects of providing people with varying amounts and kinds of information about three policies. We find that learning the basic design and rationale of key tax expenditures tends to increase public support for them. However, when informed of the distributive effects of the two policies that favor upper-income people, subjects become much less supportive of these policies. Moreover, policy-specific information appears to help subjects align their preferences with their immediate material interests. Learning the upward tilt of tax expenditures especially makes lower- and middle-income people less supportive of the policies. Our results suggest that if political elites, government administrators and news media routinely offered clear information about tax expenditures, public opinion toward the hidden welfare state would be more firmly grounded. By virtue of their design, these policies discourage public awareness of their mechanisms and distributive effects. Still, greater informational outreach regarding complicated and arcane tax expenditures could bolster public accountability for government actions that favor economically narrow and privileged segments of the population.


Author(s):  
Christopher Clary ◽  
Sameer Lalwani ◽  
Niloufer Siddiqui

Abstract Research on public opinion and crisis behavior has focused largely on pressures felt by leaders who have initiated a crisis, not on leaders in target states responding to adversary provocation. Our survey experiment involving 1,823 respondents in Punjab, Pakistan, finds public support for escalating rather than de-escalating in response to such provocation. It shows how public pressures can encourage conflict even in instances where a leader has engaged in no prior effort to generate audience costs following crisis onset. Survey respondents were more likely to support escalatory decisions if they were made by a military, rather than civilian, leader, although we do not find that military leaders receive more support in de-escalatory decisions. Finally, while we demonstrate that leaders can mitigate the costs of de-escalating by highlighting the dangers of conflict, they still incur opportunity costs in foregone public support when they opt to de-escalate rather than escalate a crisis.


Author(s):  
Olivia Smith ◽  
Ellen Daly ◽  
Charlotte Herriott ◽  
Dominic Willmott

The British state’s mechanism for compensating victim-survivors of sexual offences has been critiqued as retraumatising. However, a recent review preliminarily rejected calls to loosen the eligibility rules, stating that the current criteria reflect public attitudes. This article outlines the first empirical study of public opinion on the UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (CICS), drawing on data from over 2,000 survey participants. The findings show ambivalence among members of the public, but also reveal the current rules are not strongly supported and are in some cases highly unpopular. The article then examines some difficulties with relying on public opinion for criminal justice reform, and ultimately argues that there are stronger justifications for reforming the CICS than popularity with the public. Specifically, loosening the eligibility criteria would create more legitimate policy through the protection of core societal values such as fairness and dignity.<br /><br />Key Messages<br /><ul><li>Contrary to the British Ministry of Justice’s rhetoric, there is not strong public support for the current eligibility rules on the UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (CICS) for sexual offence victim-survivors.</li><br /><li>Women and younger people are more critical of the current CICS eligibility rules, but social grade did not impact public opinions.</li><br /><li>Relying on public opinion for CICS reform is problematic, as widening the eligibility is justifiable regardless of lay popularity.</li></ul>


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