Correlates of Public Attitudes toward the Umbrella Movement

Author(s):  
Stan Hok-Wui Wong

From the start, the Umbrella Movement failed to win overwhelming public support. Why would many Hong Kong people not endorse a civil disobedience movement aimed at dismantling the exclusionary political order and bringing forth democracy? Based on an original public opinion survey collected during the movement, this article provides preliminary answers to these questions. I find that those who disapproved of the movement are no less politically informed. Instead, three factors were strong predictors of disapproval of the movement: (1) satisfaction with the performance of the chief executive; (2) distrust of democracy as a solution to Hong Kong’s problems; and (3) concern about the negative impact of the protest on the rule of law.

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


Author(s):  
Zoe Ang ◽  
Benjamin S. Noble ◽  
Andrew Reeves

In times of crisis, citizens look to their leaders for aid and assistance. In the democratic context, the focal figure is likely the chief executive accountable to the whole of the nation. With a specific focus on the American president and the incidences of natural hazards, public opinion and governmental response to these crises are analyzed. While one may expect such a universal actor to aid each according to their need, new scholarship finds that voter behavior and electoral institutions incentivize the president to support only a small slice of the electorate. Empowered by federal disaster relief legislation in the 1950s, the president targets electorally valuable voters when disbursing aid or allocating resources in response to disaster damage. Voters in those areas respond myopically and tend to vote for the incumbent for reasons ranging from economic to emotional. Thus, elites anticipate voter reactions and strategically respond to disasters to mitigate blame or punishment for the event and capitalize on an opportunity for electoral gains.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Leticia Bode ◽  
Jessica S. C. Ng

Abstract Introduction Under austerity, governments shift responsibilities for social welfare to individuals. Such responsibilization can be intertwined with pre-existing social stigmas, with sexually stigmatized individuals blamed more for health problems due to “irresponsible” sexual behavior. To understand how sexual stigma affects attitudes on government healthcare expenditures, we examine public support for government-provisioned PrEP in England at a time when media narratives cast the drug as an expensive benefit for a small, irresponsible social group and the National Health Service’s long-term sustainability was in doubt. Methods This paper uses data from an original survey (N = 738) conducted in September 2016, when public opinion should be most sensitive to sexual stigma. A survey experiment tests how the way beneficiaries of PrEP were described affected support for NHS provision of it. Contrary to expectations, we found that support was high (mean = 3.86 on a scale of 1 to 5) irrespective of language used or beneficiary group mentioned. Differences between conditions were negligible. Discussion Sexual stigma does not diminish support for government-funded PrEP, which may be due to reverence for the NHS; resistance to responsibilization generally; or just to HIV, with the public influenced by sympathy and counter-messaging. Social policy implications Having misjudged public attitudes, it may be difficult for the government to continue to justify not funding PrEP; the political rationale for contracting out its provision is unnecessary and flawed. With public opinion resilient to responsibilization narratives and sexual stigma even under austerity, welfare retrenchment may be more difficult than social policymakers presume.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Golby ◽  
Peter Feaver ◽  
Kyle Dropp

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon I. Smithey ◽  
Mary Fran T. Malone

Abstract Crime poses a formidable obstacle to democratization in many parts of the developing world. New democracies in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa face some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Politicians, citizens, and policy-makers have raised the alarm about the growing tide of criminality. Public insecurity, coupled with inefficient and often corrupt justice systems, makes democratization uncertain. Even if new democracies do not revert to dictatorship, the quality of democracy may suffer if crime continues to rise. One particularly vulnerable component of democracy is the rule of law, as public insecurity may fuel support for extra-legal justice, and a willingness to disregard the law while aggressively pursuing suspected criminals. To test these relationships, we assess the ways in which criminal victimization, as well as fear of crime, affect citizen support for the rule of law. We utilize public opinion data collected in select countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa through two widely used sources – the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the Afrobarometer surveys.


2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1007-1032 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAY YEP

AbstractThe rule of law has always been cherished as one of the key institutions central to the successful transformation of Hong Kong from ‘a barren rock’ into a global city. The colonial administration's respect for the principles of the rule of law, however, has been tested by sporadic political turbulence during the 150 years of British rule. Due process of law and other key principles of English laws have been compromised by political expediency when the colonizers felt threatened by challenges from various sources. The 1967 Riots was one of those difficult times. Despite the facade of public support for firmness against disturbances enjoyed by the colonial government, the exercise of some of these emergency powers, particularly the powers to detain and deport, remained highly controversial. With normalization of the Anglo-Chinese relationship in mind, the confrontation prisoners constituted a stumbling block for renewing the friendship with Beijing. The various attempts made by London at pressurizing the Hong Kong government for early release of these prisoners attest to the prevalence of political expediency over the respect for the rule of law under colonial rule.


Author(s):  
Zuzana Ringlerova

The European Union (EU) is a supranational political system that unites more than twenty-five European countries. European integration began to facilitate economic cooperation. Over time, it evolved into both an economic and political union. The progress in European integration accelerated in the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the European Union was established in 1993 and assumed more political power. The process of establishing the European Union was slowed by the results of a referendum in Denmark, which at first did not approve the treaty establishing the EU. This referendum made it clear that public support for European integration could no longer be taken for granted and that public attitudes toward the EU are crucial for the European Union’s future development. In other words, the era of permissive consensus ended and it became clear that public opinion has become a powerful force in the development of European integration. Since then, public opinion has had a clear influence on the direction of European integration in a number of ways. Examples of this influence include the rejection of the single European currency in Sweden, the failure of the Constitution for Europe, and, most notably, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU. Public opinion has influenced European politics in other ways as well. For example, national political elites, acting at the European level, are constrained in their decisions by public opinion at home. The importance of understanding public opinion toward the EU has given rise to a lively research program. In their quest to understand citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, researchers first had to conceptualize the key concepts in this field, in particular the meaning of public support for the EU. Following this, scholars began to investigate why people support or oppose the European Union, which became the most widely studied topic in this field. In addition, studies have examined public support for specific European policies, determinants of voting in EU-related referendums, public support for EU membership in countries outside the EU, and the extent to which public opinion matters for policymaking in the EU. All these topics are included in this annotated bibliography. The section devoted to General Introductions and Review Articles lists review articles and textbook chapters that provide a quick overview of the topic as a whole. The next section, What Is Public Support for the EU and How Do We Explain It?, digs deeper into the concept of public support for the EU, asking how the concept is defined and what explains support for the EU. The following three sections deal with public opinion toward specific EU policies (Public Opinion toward Specific EU Policies), public support for the EU in nonmember states (Public Support for the EU in Candidate Countries and Other Nonmember States), and the question of public opinion’s influence on policymaking in the EU (Does Public Opinion Matter for Policymaking in the EU?). The second-to-last section is devoted to referendums on European matters (Referendums: Explaining the People’s Vote, Explaining Brexit). The last section (Data Sources) looks at data sources that can be used in the study of public attitudes toward the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Guardino ◽  
Suzanne Mettler

In this article, we explore how specific policy information shapes public opinion toward the “hidden welfare state” of tax expenditures. These politically and socioeconomically consequential policies—most of which bestow their greatest benefits on upper-income people—are complex and opaque, and scholars’ understanding of citizen attitudes toward them is limited. In response, we use a randomized, general population, online survey experiment to test the effects of providing people with varying amounts and kinds of information about three policies. We find that learning the basic design and rationale of key tax expenditures tends to increase public support for them. However, when informed of the distributive effects of the two policies that favor upper-income people, subjects become much less supportive of these policies. Moreover, policy-specific information appears to help subjects align their preferences with their immediate material interests. Learning the upward tilt of tax expenditures especially makes lower- and middle-income people less supportive of the policies. Our results suggest that if political elites, government administrators and news media routinely offered clear information about tax expenditures, public opinion toward the hidden welfare state would be more firmly grounded. By virtue of their design, these policies discourage public awareness of their mechanisms and distributive effects. Still, greater informational outreach regarding complicated and arcane tax expenditures could bolster public accountability for government actions that favor economically narrow and privileged segments of the population.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-120
Author(s):  
Diego Esparza ◽  
Antonio Ugues

Pandemic violence and criminality are anathema to a democratic society. And yet, in Latin America, both operate side by side. Illicit activity has propagated precisely because the democratic states of the region have been ineffective at establishing and maintaining the rule of law via public security mechanisms like the police. This ineffectiveness has significant consequences for public support of police forces. Hence, an important question for students of state-building and democratisation is: What factors explain public perceptions of the police? We argue that police forces that are local and unprofessional will be less trusted and viewed as less effective than their more centralised and professional counterparts of state and federal police. In short, we find that centralisation and professionalisation mitigate the impact of crime victimisation and police corruption on the public opinion of the police in Mexico. These findings are drawn from an analysis of the National Survey of Victimisation and Perceptions of Public Security (ENVIPE) in Mexico for 2012 and 2018.


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