Public Opinion and Crisis Behavior in a Nuclearized South Asia

Author(s):  
Christopher Clary ◽  
Sameer Lalwani ◽  
Niloufer Siddiqui

Abstract Research on public opinion and crisis behavior has focused largely on pressures felt by leaders who have initiated a crisis, not on leaders in target states responding to adversary provocation. Our survey experiment involving 1,823 respondents in Punjab, Pakistan, finds public support for escalating rather than de-escalating in response to such provocation. It shows how public pressures can encourage conflict even in instances where a leader has engaged in no prior effort to generate audience costs following crisis onset. Survey respondents were more likely to support escalatory decisions if they were made by a military, rather than civilian, leader, although we do not find that military leaders receive more support in de-escalatory decisions. Finally, while we demonstrate that leaders can mitigate the costs of de-escalating by highlighting the dangers of conflict, they still incur opportunity costs in foregone public support when they opt to de-escalate rather than escalate a crisis.

Author(s):  
Michael Tomz ◽  
Jessica L P Weeks

Abstract How do military alliances affect public support for war to defend victims of aggression? We offer the first experimental evidence on this fundamental question. Our experiments revealed that alliance commitments greatly increased the American public's willingness to intervene abroad. Alliances shaped public opinion by increasing public fears about the reputational costs of nonintervention and by heightening the perceived moral obligation to intervene out of concerns for fairness and loyalty. Finally, although alliances swayed public opinion across a wide range of circumstances, they made the biggest difference when the costs of intervention were high, the stakes of intervention were low, and the country needing aid was not a democracy. Thus, alliances can create pressure for war even when honoring the commitment would be extremely inconvenient, which could help explain why democratic allies tend to be so reliable. These findings shed new light on the consequences of alliances and other international legal commitments, the role of morality in foreign policy, and ongoing debates about domestic audience costs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Golby ◽  
Peter Feaver ◽  
Kyle Dropp

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.


Author(s):  
Lucy Barnes ◽  
Timothy Hicks

Abstract In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomic policy returned to the political agenda, and the influence of Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus rose (and then fell) in expert circles. Much less is known, however, about whether and when Keynesian prescriptions for countercyclical spending have any support among the general public. We use a survey experiment, fielded twice, to recover the extent to which UK respondents hold such countercyclical attitudes. Our results indicate that public opinion was countercyclical—Keynesian—in 2016. We then use Eurobarometer data to estimate the same basic parameter for the population for the period 2010–2017. The observational results validate our experimental findings for the later period, but also provide evidence that the UK population held procyclical views at the start of the period. Thus, there appear to be important dynamics in public opinion on a key macroeconomic policy issue.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Barnes ◽  
Timothy Hicks

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomic policy returned to the political agenda, and the influence of Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus rose (and then fell) in expert circles. Much less is known, however, about whether and when Keynesian prescriptions for countercyclical spending have any support among the general public. We use a survey experiment, fielded twice, to recover the extent to which UK respondents hold such countercyclical attitudes. Our results indicate that public opinion was countercyclical — Keynesian — in 2016. We then use Eurobarometer data to estimate the same basic parameter for the population for the period 2010-2017. The observational results validate our experimental findings for the later period, but also provide evidence that the UK population held procyclical views at the start of the period. Thus, there appear to be important dynamics in public opinion on a key macroeconomic policy issue.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lala Muradova ◽  
Ross James Gildea

How does the oil wealth of a potential target state affect the likelihood of the US public favoring the use of military force? Recent studies suggest that public opinion on foreign policy is responsive to the core characteristics of target states, such as regime type and majority religion. This article advances this research agenda by examining the effects of intra-regime heterogeneity in respect of an important characteristic of target states: their oil wealth. To examine the relationship between oil wealth and US public opinion on war, we fielded a conjoint experiment with US citizens. Respondents chose between hypothetical pairs of target states that varied across seven different intra-regime characteristics. We found that that the oil wealth of a target exerts a statistically significant (albeit small) effect on public support for the use of force, independent of the effects of other regime characteristics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 446-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan M Blauwkamp ◽  
Charles M Rowling ◽  
William Pettit

In December 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report on CIA detention and interrogation practices from 2002–2009. Several survey organizations then released polls that appeared to show a majority of Americans supportive of the CIA program, prompting such news headlines as ‘Polls Show a Majority of Americans Support Torture’ and ‘Let’s Not Kid Ourselves: Most Americans are Fine with Torture’. The authors of this article were skeptical of these conclusions. They therefore conducted a survey experiment in which they explored whether slight variations in how this issue is framed – e.g. referencing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, linking the policy to the George W Bush administration, identifying the specific tactics used on detainees or emphasizing the broader consequences for American interests abroad – impact public support for torture. They found that respondents can be primed to express slim support or substantial opposition to the policy based on which of these considerations are called to mind.


Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

The European Union (EU) is facing one of the rockiest periods in its existence. At no time in its history has it looked so economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under assault by Eurosceptic parties. The unprecedented levels of integration in recent decades have led to increased public contestation, yet at the same the EU is more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before. This book examines the role of public opinion in the European integration process. It develops a novel theory of public opinion that stresses the deep interconnectedness between people’s views about European and national politics. It suggests that public opinion cannot simply be characterized as either Eurosceptic or not, but rather that it consists of different types. This is important because these types coincide with fundamentally different views about the way the EU should be reformed and which policy priorities should be pursued. These types also have very different consequences for behaviour in elections and referendums. Euroscepticism is such a diverse phenomenon because the Eurozone crisis has exacerbated the structural imbalances within the EU. As the economic and political fates of member states have diverged, people’s experiences with and evaluations of the EU and national political systems have also grown further apart. The heterogeneity in public preferences that this book has uncovered makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Andersen ◽  
Anthony Heath ◽  
David Weakliem

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between public support for wage differentials and actual income inequality using data from the World Values Surveys. The distribution of income is more equal in nations where public opinion is more egalitarian. There is some evidence that the opinions of people with higher incomes are more influential than those of people with low incomes. Although the estimated relationship is stronger in democracies, it is present even under non-democratic governments, and the hypothesis that effects are equal cannot be rejected. We consider the possibility of reciprocal causation by means of an instrumental variables analysis, which yields no evidence that income distribution affects opinion.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document