The Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance v. The BOG: And the Winner Is…?

Hypatia ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 94-109
Author(s):  
Melinda Vadas

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

AmeriQuests ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Percy DeWitt

David M. O’Brien’s Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the Supreme Court serves as a significant contribution to the field of First Amendment Law by offering an overview of crucial issues and, moreover, by emphasizing the outlook for the future of free speech. O’Brien’s credentials position him favorably for the task; he was a judicial fellow and research associate with the Supreme Court, he has written numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court, and he is currently the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. Considering the daunting task of compiling a succinct account and analysis of the history of free speech in the United States, Professor O’Brien does well to allow readers to better understand the complexities of free speech policy in the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-530
Author(s):  
Sonia M. Suter

AbstractThe Supreme Court and lower courts have not articulated a clear or consistent framework for First Amendment analysis of speech restrictions in health care and with respect to abortion. After offering a coherent doctrine for analysis of speech restrictions in the doctor-patient relationship, this piece demonstrates how potential legislation restricting patient access to information from reproductive testing intended to limit “undesirable” reproductive choices would violate the First Amendment.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This essay, which introduces a symposium on “The Expanding First Amendment” considers when, many Americans perceive that their capacity to speak freely is increasingly being imperiled in ways for which they have no legal recourse even though the Supreme Court has expanded the domain of communicative activity covered by the First Amendment’s “speech” protection and has limited in other ways the capacity of government to regulate communication based on content. The essay attributes the paradox in significant measure to the rise of private digital platforms as venues for public expression. At the same time that digital technologies (along with print, broadcast, and cable) provide unprecedented opportunities for people to share provocative views, many people may find that they enter public debate only at risk of unleashing a torrent of personal attack that may be a source of embarrassment and worse.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jud Campbell

Free speech doctrine generally protects only expression, leaving regulations of nonexpressive conduct beyond the First Amendment’s scope. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that abridgments of the freedom of speech “may operate at different points in the speech process.” This notion of protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates speech touches on many of the most contentious issues in First Amendment law— restrictions on photography and audiovisual recording, limits on campaign contributions, putative newsgathering privileges for journalists, compelled subsidization of speech, and associational rights, to name just a few. Scholars, however, have generally approached these topics in isolation, typically focusing on downstream effects on speech as the touchstone for First Amendment coverage. The usual conclusion is that the Supreme Court’s decisions are in disarray. This Article argues that key features of doctrine are easily overlooked when employing a granular focus on particular rights. Instead, the Article presents an overarching framework that brings together, descriptively and normatively, otherwise disparate strands of free speech law. The guiding principle of this framework is that First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on whether the government uses a rule that targets speech (e.g., a special tax on newspapers), not on whether expression is indirectly burdened by particular applications of otherwise constitutional rules (e.g., a child labor law applied to newspapers). Applications of this “anti-targeting” principle vary by context, but the general concept offers a surprisingly comprehensive account of most Supreme Court decisions. Tracing the development of the anti-targeting principle also reveals an underappreciated shift in the way that the Court has dealt with claims based on nonexpressive conduct. This historical argument shows that the reasoning in many of the Court’s foundational cases—including Buckley v. Valeo, Branzburg v. Hayes, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees—is now out of step with current doctrine.


Soft Power ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-346
Author(s):  
Vitulia Ivone

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, a 5–4 vote holding that the state of California cannot compel pregnancy-resource centers to advertise for the state’s abortion services. This decision represents a considerable victory for both the right to free speech and the conscience rights of pro-life Americans. The case concerned California’s Reproductive FACT Act, which mandated that both licensed and unlicensed women’s-health clinics (crisis-pregnancy or pregnancy-resource centers) not performing abortions had to provide a pre-written notice to clients. Though the law related specifically to abortion, free speech was the fundamental issue at stake. This paper analyzes the history of abortion in US legislation and the perspective of one of its fundamental civil rights.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Of all the areas of twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence, that of free speech has had the most dramatic transformation. From a state of insignificance, the First Amendment has been applied against the states in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and made the basis for invalidating restrictions on the expressive activities of political and religious minorities, corporations, contributors to political campaigns, and commercial advertisers.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

Chapter 3 examines the Free Speech Clause’s interactions with its First Amendment cousins—the Assembly Clause, Press Clause, and Petition Clause. It explains how and why the Supreme Court collapsed these distinctive rights into a general “Free Expression Clause” that is governed primarily by free speech doctrines and principles. The chapter examines in detail the events and influences that led each clause to be subordinated to or supplanted by the Free Speech Clause. It explains the negative consequences of free speech expansionism, for the non-speech rights and the freedom of speech. The chapter considers existing proposals for recovering or reviving the Assembly, Press, and Petition Clauses, but argues that we must rethink and expand the project. We need to work toward a First Amendment pluralism that not only disaggregates the elements of the fictional “Free Expression Clause,” but also reconnects once and still “cognate” rights of speech, assembly, press, and petition.


Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174387212110301
Author(s):  
Adam Sitze

This essay takes up the relation between free speech and academic freedom by inquiring into the problem of academic conscience. Its claim is that academic conscience originates in a certain kind of unmourned loss. To substantiate this claim, it comments on a text written by Hannah Arendt in 1958, one year after the Supreme Court for the first time recognized academic freedom as a First Amendment right. It concludes by explaining the reason why we should understand these two freedoms in terms of academic conscience: the more we comprehend the vicissitudes unique to academic conscience, the more we can comprehend how it risks closing down the same space it inaugurates and, at best, holds open.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Wade Franklin Richardson

Free Speech Beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment addresses a straightforward, and seemingly simple, question—why is it that certain art forms that do not communicate a specific, clearly articulated message, are considered “speech” and, thus, are covered under the First Amendment?  Written by three authors, this work is divided into an introduction, three main chapters, and a concluding chapter.  In Chapter One, Alan Chen discusses instrumental music under the First Amendment, while in Chapter Two, Mark V. Tushnet focuses on nonrepresentational art and the First Amendment, and Joseph Blocher explores the relationship between nonsense and the First Amendment in Chapter Three (as the Supreme Court has declared nonsense poetry such as Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” to be protected under the First Amendment.)  While the authors make some headway in trying to justify First Amendment protection for these art forms (and for the concept of nonsense), their primary goal seems to be to make the argument that this is an important area of legal scholarship that has been underexplored, and to encourage further study and work in this area. 


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