Moving beyond Brown: Race and Education After Parents v. Seattle School District No. 1

2011 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamel K. Donnor
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Students Of Color ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Community Schools ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Educational Advancement ◽  
Quality Learning ◽  
The U.S

Background By a 5–4 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared that voluntary public school integration programs were unconstitutional. Citing the prospective harm that students and their families might incur from being denied admission to the high school of their choice, the Supreme Court declared that the plaintiffs, Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS), had a valid claim of injury by asserting a interest in not being forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions. Purpose The goal of the article is to discuss how conceptions of harm and fairness as articulated in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 privilege the self-interests of White students and families over the educational needs of students of color. Research Design This article is a document analysis. Conclusions By referencing the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision of 1954 (Brown I) to buttress its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that programmatic efforts to ensure students of color access to quality learning environments are inherently ominous. The dilemma moving forward for policy makers and scholars concerned with the educational advancement of students of color is not to develop new ways to integrate America's public schools or reconcile the gaps in the Supreme Court's logic, but rather to craft programs and policies for students of color around the human development and workforce needs of the global economy.

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017): The U.S. Supreme Court and Special Education

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 321-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela M. T. Prince ◽  
Mitchell L. Yell ◽  
Antonis Katsiyannis
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Public Education ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Students With Disabilities ◽  
Free Appropriate Public Education ◽  
Disabilities Education Act ◽  
Education Act ◽  
The U.S

On March 22, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District. This case addressed the question how much educational benefit are public schools required to provide to students with disabilities under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to confer a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The purpose of this legal update is to provide a brief overview of court developments regarding FAPE, summarize Endrew, and provide implications for practice.

scholarly journals Student Speech and Social Media: The Supreme Court Finally Enters the Fray

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Extracurricular Activities ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
American Military ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Cyber Speech

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.

Democracy Now? Race, Education, and Black Self-Determination

2011 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-830
Author(s):  
Adrienne D. Dixson
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Educational Equity ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The United States ◽  
Community Schools ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
School Assignment

Background/Context The Supreme Court's June 2007 decision on the Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (PICS) provides an important context for school districts and educational policy makers as they consider the role of race in school assignment. The PICS decision has been described as essentially “undoing” the 1954 Supreme Court decision in the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case that ended de jure racial segregation. Purpose/Objective/Research Question/Focus of Study Given the rhetoric that education in the United States is the “great equalizer,” this conceptual article considers how the PICS decisions impact notions of educational equity and self-determination for African Americans. Research Design This article provides a conceptual analysis of the PICS decision and educational equity. Conclusions/Recommendations The author recommends that despite the PICS decision, school administrators and policy makers continue to consider how race impacts school assignment to ensure that public schools are democratic institutions that are racially and educationally equitable.

In Search of Religious Liberty

2020 ◽  
pp. 99-120
Author(s):  
Bruce J. Dierenfield ◽  
David A. Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Catholic School ◽  
Public School District ◽  
Civil Libertarian ◽  
Lemon Test ◽  
Essential Service ◽  
The U.S

This chapter discusses the origins of the Zobrests’ lawsuit against their public school district in Tucson, which refused on constitutional grounds to pay for Jim’s sign language interpreter in a Catholic school. For the Zobrests, federal disability laws and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause entitled Jim to have this essential service. What follows is an analysis of the zigzag line of thinking employed by the U.S. Supreme Court as it grappled with church-state issues in the twentieth century prior to its consideration of the Zobrest case. For years, two titans of constitutional law—Catholic neoconservative William Bentley Ball and civil libertarian Leo Pfeffer—battled over what was legally permissible with regard to freedom of religion. Ultimately, the court enunciated a controversial Lemon Test to address this thorny area of its jurisprudence.

Secular Schools? Religious Practices in New York and Viginia Public Schools Since World War II

1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-388
Author(s):  
Bruce J. Dierenfield
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
New York ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Church And State ◽  
World War ◽  
State Relations ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
The U.S

Scholars examining the controversy over church-state relations in the modern era have concentrated almost exclusively on its constitutional aspects. This is to be expected since the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down epic decisions that have drawn an increasingly sharper picture of the First Amendment's guideline concerning the government's involvement in religion. The Court did, in fact, lead the way in establishing or reestablishing the doctrine called “separation of church and state.” But the Court touched off a furious debate within the states that has intermittently yet persistently influenced public policy since the early 1960s. It is time that scholars examine more closely the participants outside of the Court.

The Muddled Distinction Between De Jure and De Facto Segregation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise C. Boddie
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School Districts ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Community Schools ◽  
Jefferson County ◽  
Legal Narratives ◽  
De Jure Segregation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared unconstitutional voluntary, race-based plans to integrate public schools in Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington. The decisionrested on a critical distinction in constitutional law between “de jure” segregation—resulting from purposeful discrimination by the government—and “de facto” racial imbalance derived from unintentional or “fortuitous” actions by state and private entities. The Court held that de facto school districts could not voluntarily assign students to schools according to their race for purposes of promoting integration. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer argued the “futility” of the de jure–de facto distinction, contending that both districts should have been afforded the constitutional flexibility to pursue voluntary remedies that address racial imbalance in their schools. This chapter takes up Justice Breyer’s dissent to explore the complicated origins of school segregation outside the South and the federal cases that adjudicated its constitutionality. Its central contribution is to recover the often confusing legal narratives about segregation in the period after Brown and how federal courts struggled to discern the constitutional boundaries between de jure and de facto discrimination. The chapter briefly describes the constitutional turns that facilitated the Court’s decision in Parents Involved, including the advent of the intent requirement in equal protection and “colorblindness” doctrine, which treats any use of race as presumptively unconstitutional, regardless of its integrative purpose.

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