Sideways at the entrance of the cave: A pluralist footnote to Plato

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-402
Author(s):  
Alessandro Ferrara
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Special Version ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Polity

The idea of a ‘true’ account of pluralism is ultimately contradictory. Liberal political philosophers often fell prey to a special version of this fallacy by presupposing that there might be only one correct argument for justifying the acceptance of pluralism as the core of a liberal democratic polity. Avoiding this trap, Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ has offered a more sophisticated view of reasonable pluralism as linked with the ‘burdens of judgement’. His philosophical agenda, however, left some questions underexplored: What is the relation of pluralism to relativism? How can a conception of pluralism (epistemic, moral and political) avoid being either one view among others with no special claim to truth, or a foundationalist claim? If pluralism is a fact, in what sense can it bind us? These questions – crucial for grasping the distinctiveness of ‘political’ liberalism – are addressed by revisiting Plato’s simile of the cave, in order to make it accommodate the groundbreaking Rawlsian notion of the ‘reasonable’.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Special Concern ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
Democratic Societies

The introduction acknowledges that although liberalism promises equality for all citizens, liberal democratic societies fall short of this ideal in many ways. Of special concern is the inequality that members of socially subordinated groups endure despite the guarantee of formal equality. Liberal theorists have not yet adequately shown that liberalism can address such group based subordination and can secure substantive equality for all. The introduction explains that the aim of this book is to show that at least one version of liberalism—political liberalism—is a feminist liberalism and that the core commitments of this view restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. An overview of each chapter is provided.

From Relative Autonomy to Consensual Development: The Case of South Korea

1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 630-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tat Yan Kong
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Developmental State ◽  
Economic Success ◽  
Relative Autonomy ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
Societal Actors ◽  
Rapid Industrialization ◽  
Autonomous State ◽  
Economic Leadership

The success of the autonomous state in promoting rapid industrialization in South Korea from 1961 to 1987 is usually seen in terms of the state's capacity to coerce reluctant societal actors into productive economic pursuits. The economic sluggishness associated with some autonomous states suggests that any explanation of Korean economic success also needs to mention the factors that constrained bureaucratic abuse and the methods by which societal motivation behind the industrialization effort was maintained over three decades. Democratization has accentuated the capacity of societal actors to challenge the state's economic leadership but has not resulted in the emergence of an economic free for all. While similarities exist, Korea will experience greater difficulty in realizing the synthesis between developmental state and liberal-democratic polity (consensual development) that characterized postwar Japanese development.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

USTAVNI IDENTITET I VIDOVDANSKI USTAV

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladan Petrov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
The Core ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
National Question ◽  
Insurmountable Obstacle ◽  
Constitutional Identity

With this paper the author completes his analysis of the reference historical constitutions and its influence on the constitutional identity of modern Serbia. Reffering to the effects of constitutional identity "outside" (preservation of state sovereignty) and "inside" (the "core" of the constitution), the author analyzes the functional failures and substantive controversies of the Vidovdan Constitution. Inconsistent normative solutions of this constitution, a deep socio-political crisis and an unresolved national question in the newly created state were an insurmountable obstacle to building the national constitutional identity. However, the symbolism of the date of adoption of the Constitution and the fact that, at least formally, it was the last classical constitution of the liberal-democratic type until the 1990s and the entry into force of the 1990 Serbian Constitution, make the Vidovdan Constitution a reference text for studying the constitutional identity of modern Serbia.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

Defending Administrative Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-262
Author(s):  
Paul Daly
Keyword(s):  
Future Development ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Core ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Interpretive Analysis ◽  
System P ◽  
Democratic System

This concluding chapter has two objectives. First, to demonstrate the robustness of the interpretation of contemporary administrative law presented in the preceding chapters, underscoring how useful this interpretive analysis is to understanding the law of judicial review of administrative action and guiding its future development. Second, the chapter defends the legitimacy of the core features of judicial review of administrative action, as these have been developed over the years by judges. In achieving these two objectives, the chapter relies on the criteria for testing the robustness of legal theories set out by Professor Stephen Smith in Contract Theory: fit, transparency, coherence and morality. The interpretation of contemporary administrative law described in this book fits the decided cases, it is reasonably transparent, it is coherent and it rests on recognisably moral foundations. In short, to conclude, contemporary administrative law facilitates the flourishing of individuals, of public administration and of the liberal democratic system.

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