scholarly journals Income Tax Compliance Cost of Corporations in India, 2000–01

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-30
Author(s):  
Arindam Das-Gupta

This is the first study of compliance costs of income taxation of corporations in India. Compliance costs are the costs of meeting obligations under the income tax law and in planning to save taxes. Opportunity costs such as when tax refunds are delayed are also included. Social compliance costs, gross versus net private costs, and mandatory versus voluntary cost can be distinguished. Gross private compliance costs include both legal and illegal expenses (such as bribes paid), employee costs, the cost of tax advice, and also other non-labour expenses. Estimates in this paper are for the year 2000-01 based on a postal survey of 45 companies throughout India in August-September 2001. Estimated gross compliance costs, excluding bribe costs, are between 5.6 and 14.5 per cent of corporation tax revenues. These are similar to estimates for other countries near the lower limit but are a cause for concern near the upper limit. Tax deductibility of legal expenses and cash flow benefits from the timing difference between taxable income and payment of tax result in net compliance costs between minus 0.7 and plus 0.6 per cent of corporation tax revenue. Both gross and net compliance costs are regressive. Among other findings, five are noteworthy: First, around 25 per cent of sampled companies knowingly paid excess tax (median value: 46%) since tax evasion penalty cannot be levied under Indian law if assessed taxes have already been paid. Second, 70 per cent of companies, especially small companies, used external assistance to prepare tax returns accounting for 39 per cent of the legal compliance costs. Third, voluntary costs associated with tax planning contribute 19 to 43 per cent of total compliance costs. Fourth, the average sample company had 10 to 11 assessment years locked in disputes for tax or penalty in addition to around two years for which assessments were incomplete. Statistical analysis suggested that one extra disputed assessment year raises legal compliance costs by 5.7 per cent. Fifth, it was found to be fairly common for incorrect application of tax laws by tax officials in areas where they have high discretion to cause tax assessments to be revisited. Among reform suggestions is streamlining of 22 legal and procedural �hot spots� which add to compliance costs. Since the response rate was a disappointing 1.15 per cent, the stratified random sample design degenerated into a convenience sample with over-representation of large firms and under-representation of loss-making and zero-profit companies. Therefore, results should be viewed as preliminary and tentative. Other problems are that there were only qualitative questions about in-house cost components; assumed opportunity cost of funds to value cash flow benefits were used; and, as in earlier studies, there can possibly be a bias due to incorrect apportionment of fixed costs and the value of time of company management

BESTUUR ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Siti Rahma Novikasari ◽  
Duc Quang Ly ◽  
Kerry Gershaneck

<p>Government Regulation No. 46/2013 has not been optimal in providing legal compliance on taxation for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), especially in Yogyakarta. This policy was evaluated and amended with Government Regulation No. 23/2018. The amendment in tax policy for MSME actors was this research background to examine: First, how does the final income tax policy impact MSME taxpayers' compliance in Yogyakarta? Second, what are the legal compliance constraints of MSME taxpayers? The method used in this research was a juridical empirical, supported with the statute and conceptual approach. The results showed that the amendment in the final income tax tariff policy from 1% to 0.5%, as well as provide legal certainty of the timeframe of taxation had a positive impact on increasing taxpayer compliance. There was an increase in the number of taxpayers to 41,000 in 2019, or an increase of 15.5% compared to the number of taxpayers in 2017. However, tariff reduction has not been the answer to taxpayer non-compliance, the Regional Office of the Directorate General of Taxes of the Special Region of Yogyakarta still found tax avoidance. Tax compliance constraints were also caused by taxpayers' distrust of the government, poor tax morale, and tax knowledge. The government needs to conduct a cooperative compliance approach in taxation policies based on trust and dialogue between taxpayers and the government to improve MSME taxpayer compliance.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Tax Compliance; Final Income Tax Regulation; Micro; Small; Medium Enterprises.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 097226612110588
Author(s):  
S. Vishnuhadevi

This article surveys the existing literature on the compliance and administrative costs of VAT incurred by the businesses and the governments respectively. The review focuses on the concepts and components of VAT operating costs, the link between the tax compliance costs and the tax compliance decision, factors associated with compliance costs and the steps taken by various countries to mitigate these costs. The major studies of VAT compliance cost since 1980 and the methodologies adopted are summarised. The review of the studies shows that the VAT compliance costs are higher and significant in both absolute money terms and relative to tax revenue in developed as well as developing countries than the administrative costs and the compliance costs are highly regressive in nature which disproportionately affects the small businesses. Further, the psychological costs are underexplored in the VAT compliance cost literature due to the difficulty in measuring them. This article also highlights the understudied area of VAT compliance costs in India and the importance of exploring the compliance burden in India.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 925-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay Blaufus ◽  
Frank Hechtner ◽  
Janine K. Jarzembski

Using a survey of more than 18,000 taxpayers in North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), we estimate the income tax compliance costs of German households and study the determinants of these costs. We find that taxpayers need between 9.13 and 10.23 hours and spend €106 to meet their income tax obligations. The average total burden is between €228 (lower bound estimate) and €321 (upper bound estimate). The aggregate cost burden ranges between 2.03 percent and 2.92 percent of the German income tax revenues of tax year 2015. Although these costs have decreased significantly over recent years (mainly for self-preparers without self-employment income), international comparisons illustrate that the German burden is still located in the upper middle. The five most important cost drivers that increase individual costs are the use of tax advice, the appeal procedure, income, return complexity, and education. We cannot confirm that e-filing reduces taxpayers’ compliance costs.


2020 ◽  
pp. 016001762094281
Author(s):  
Julio López-Laborda ◽  
Jaime Vallés-Giménez ◽  
Anabel Zárate-Marco

This article quantifies personal income tax compliance by regions for the first time in Spain and identifies the factors explaining differences in tax compliance between regions, an aspect that has scarcely been analyzed in the literature. To this end, and in addition to the dynamic and spatial components considered by Alm and Yunus, this article considers the variables included in the classical tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo, as well as tax morale and political-institutional variables, including those linked to the country’s fiscal decentralization. The results obtained confirm, on one hand, those reached in the very extensive literature studying tax evasion from the individual perspective (including the importance of the dynamic element) and, on the other, the relevance of the spatial component in explaining tax compliance, so that greater or lesser tax compliance is partly explained by factors such as the tax behavior of neighbors or how those neighbors are treated by the public sector.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blaine Robbins ◽  
Edgar Kiser

In order to collect the revenue necessary to fund public goods, a state is often required to both deter tax evasion and encourage voluntary tax compliance on the part of its citizens. While most prior research has focused on explaining tax evasion with standard economic model parameters, there has been growing interest in identifying the determinants of voluntary compliance. We build on this work by proposing a legitimacy-based model of tax compliance that accounts for why some citizens voluntarily comply with their tax obligations and others do not. To test our model, we develop and administer a survey experiment of income tax evasion to a large random sample of undergraduate students. We also investigate the extent to which design-based method effects bias our results, such as order effects, complexity effects, and missing information effects. Substantively, results strongly support the standard economic model of deterrence and weakly support the legitimacy-based model of voluntary compliance. Methodologically, we find no evidence of order effects, weak evidence of complexity effects, and suggestive evidence of missing information effects.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-120
Author(s):  
Anna Kochanova ◽  
Zahid Hasnain ◽  
Bradley Larson

Abstract Using cross-country data on e-government systems, this paper analyzes whether e-filing of taxes and e-procurement implementation improves the capacity of governments to raise and spend fiscal resources through lowering tax compliance costs, improving tax collection and public procurement competitiveness, and reducing corruption. Adopting e-filing systems reduces tax compliance costs as measured by the time to prepare and pay taxes, the likelihood and frequency of firms being visited by a tax official, and the perception of tax administration as an obstacle to firms’ operation and growth. E-filing is also associated with a moderate increase in the income tax revenue to GDP ratio. The results for e-procurement are weaker, with the number of firms securing or attempting to secure a government contract increasing only in countries with higher levels of development and better institutions. There is no strong relationship between e-government and corruption.


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