scholarly journals Populism and exclusionary narratives: The ‘other’ in Podemos’ 2014 European Union election campaign

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 552-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Sanders ◽  
María Jesús Molina Hurtado ◽  
Jessica Zoragastua

Populist political parties have become a key feature of the European political landscape. In addition to claiming to be identified with the people, many of these parties are characterized by exclusionary narratives which centre on groups such as immigrants and religious minorities, a feature considered by many analysts as specific to right-wing populism. Left-wing populism is frequently defined as sharing right-wing populism’s identification with the people and its anti-elitism but not its attachment to exclusionary narratives. This study joins other recent work in challenging that assumption, providing evidence for the contention that anti-elitism is also a form of excluding populist communication. Using Van Dijk’s methodological approach to the analysis of the discursive positioning of ‘Us/Them’ and elements of Burke’s dramatistic pentad, this article examines the party and electoral communication of Podemos, the self-described, left-wing populist Spanish political party, from its foundation in January 2014 up until the close of the European Union parliamentary election campaign in May 2014. The study shows that an exclusionary narrative was integral to Podemos’ campaign communication in that a group of people identified as the caste ( la casta) constituted the stigmatized out-group in contraposition to the in-group of the ‘people’ which included immigrants and the leaders of Podemos. This suggests that populist parties or politicians of all ideological stripes may be characterized by exclusionary and stigmatizing narratives.

2017 ◽  
pp. 88-100
Author(s):  
Justyna Miecznikowska

The election of the head of state in Austria in 2016 was in many ways a breakthrough and its course was surprising. Norbert Hofer, a right-wing populist candidate of the Freedom Party of Austria, made it to the second round of presidential election. Technical problems related to the organisation of the presidential election postponed the final decision until December 2016. The aim of this article is to present the main elements of the populist narrative propagated by the FPÖ during the election campaign. The party reached for a well-known arsenal of means, trying to convince voters to their candidate. It underlined the protection of national identity, the defence of the interests of Austria in the European Union, declarations of strengthening the position of president and the inclusion of the people in the governing through direct democracy. The populist rhetoric recurred as well to its permanent elements: criticism of the establishment and the conspiracy theory of the Austrian elite aiming to prevent or postpone the victory of a FPÖ candidate.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimiter Toshkov

What are the political consequences of immigration? Theoretically, the mechanisms of intergroup contact and outgroup threat can lead to contradictory effects, and it remains uncertain which one would prevail in different contexts. In this article I study the impact of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on support for Eurosceptic parties between 2004 and 2019 in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Italy and Portugal. I find that higher levels of immigration from CEE are systematically related to higher voting shares cast for right-wing Eurosceptic parties at the local level in all of these countries, net of the influence of non-Western immigration. In most countries, the effects are also robust to including a rich set of local-level socio-economic controls. These effects can be found in elections for the European Parliament as well as in national elections. The effects have not diminished over the past 15 years and are most visible in mid-sized localities. The effect on left-wing Euroscepticism is positive in the Netherlands, but negative in Denmark, Sweden and Italy. These results highlight the tension between free movement and political support for European integration. Even in the European Union, immigration from other member states can trigger hostile political reactions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 99-132
Author(s):  
E. V. Khakhalkina ◽  
K. P. Andreev ◽  
A. V. Munko

The European Union undergoes several qualitative transformations. Today it faces major demographic changes, the distance between the EU and national states is growing because of Brexit and high rates of immigration to Europe. The configuration of mainstream parties is also transforming in an unpredictable way. All these processes bring the phenomenon of right-wing populism to the forefront of political life of the European Union. This phenomenon was an answer both to internal andexternal challenges. The aim of the article is to identify the components of right-wing populism using the examples of some memberstates, to show its threats and risks, as well as ways to minimize the impact of this phenomenon on all aspects of the EU life. To achieve this goal, party programs (primarily right-wing populist ones), national and European elections data, materials from the Eurobarometer and other public opinion services, speeches and interviews of leading politicians, and other materials are used. The methodological approach is based on the principles of interdisciplinarity. The authors used comparative-typological, functional and structural methods. The problems of immigration and Islamophobia in the EU are explained with the help of the civilizational concept of A.J. Toynbee. The structure of the article provides the study of the phenomenon of right-wing populism through such indicators as separation of elites from the population (including European democracy and lack of democracy), immigration (and Islamophobia), as well as the EU identity. The article provides a detailed analysis of the member- state cases including the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, the countries of Eastern Europe and others. The authors conclude that right-wing populism has dual nature, its significance in individual countries of the European Union increases, and it is deeply integrated into the party and parliamentary mechanism of European democracies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 99-125
Author(s):  
Kent Jones

This chapter discusses the role Europe’s long history of conflict over geography, religion, and national identity, as well as its aristocratic traditions, on modern European populism. The Brexit referendum gave direct electoral voice to the accumulated resentments of populist forces in the United Kingdom against EU rules administered by what its supporters regarded as an elite bureaucracy in Brussels. Their concerns, mainly over budgetary and regulatory issues, overrode the prospect of losing trade benefits from the EU single market. Elsewhere in the European Union populist parties continue to be active, and many of them are Euroskeptic, based largely on immigration and monetary issues. Many right-wing and left-wing populist parties in particular tend to favor protectionism, but will not be in a position to challenge centralized EU trade policy until they gain power in large EU countries. The UK exit from the European Union will weaken a prominent pro-trade voice in the EU Council of Ministers.


Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 026339572093853
Author(s):  
Juan Roch

This article seeks to shine a light on the diversity of populist discourses about Europe and the European Union (EU). It is built upon the existing literature on populist Euroscepticism to elaborate on two underexplored aspects of the relationship between populist discourses and EU contestation. First, it explores the variable and even ambivalent representations of the EU and its main political processes exhibited by populist actors. Second, it focuses on the precise relationship between populism and the representations of the EU to determine whether there is a hierarchical relation, reciprocal influence, or they function as separated ideational ensembles. This research takes a corpus-assisted approach to discourse analysis that is based on the exploration of manifestos and party leadership speeches between 2013 and 2017 of Podemos in Spain, a left-wing populist party, and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, a right-wing populist party. The findings reveal that the populist discourse has variable effects on the forms of EU contestation depending on its centrality and that ambivalence is a crucial feature to capture the forms of EU contestation of populist parties. Finally, the article draws several theoretical implications for the research on populism and EU contestation.


Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 187 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 217-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miklós Rosta ◽  
László Tóth

AbstractIn the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming stabilized. Italy and Hungary are two notable examples of these processes. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where a coalition of purely populist parties won an election, while Hungary has the most mature autocracy in the European Union. By using survey methodology, we examined the preferences of Hungarian and Italian students regarding the values of liberal democracy. We seek answers to the questions whether there are any significant differences between the proportion of Hungarian students and Italian students who identify themselves with the values of liberal democracy and which of these values of liberal democracy they consider to be protected values. Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support either right-wing or left-wing populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. We found that Italian students adhere more strongly to liberal democratic values, while Hungarians are more open to left-wing and right-wing populism. Our results confirm that in Hungary, because of the values that many people hold, conditions are conducive for establishing a sustainable autocracy, while in Italy, the demand for such a system is much weaker.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Paulo Vila Maior

The results of the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections cast an unprecedented challenge for the European Union (EU). Growing popularity of right-wing and left-wing, populist and radical political parties and the rising number of members of the parliament materialise the challenge. The article explores the seismic effects of the reconfiguration of the political landscape for European integration. The rising number of populist and radical political parties’ members of the parliament might weaken the political centre of gravity in the EP. Since the EP plays an important role on the legislative process of the EU, populist and radical parties’ Euroscepticism (if not their standpoint against the EU) might pervade the EP and threaten the EU with the prospect of setback, or at least stagnation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-118
Author(s):  
Filip Ilkowski

The article presents the analysis of activities and ideological motivations of politicians and political formations connected to those parts of non-Labour British left, that appealed during the 2016 referendum to vote for leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom. It points to key ideological pillars of this heterogenic political milieu with its common and divergent elements. The thesis is put forward in the text that, as in the case of Labour politicians, also among the left-wing outside the Labour Party, we can point to two ideological and political poles that decide to opt for leaving the EU by the UK: socialist universalism and national-identity particularism. Their key determinant was the views on immigration control, also affecting their attitude to cooperation with the anti-EU right-wing political milieu.


2020 ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Jadwiga Nadolska

The purpose of the article is to diagnose the causes of the increased interest shown by Poles in the European parliamentary election in 2019. From 2014 to 2019, Poles’ participation in elections to the European Parliament went up from 23.83% to 45.68%. Drawing on Europe salience theory and second-order election theory, I set out to determine whether changes in Poles’ attitudes towards the European Union led to this almost twofold increase in turnout from 2014 to 2019, or whether this trend was mainly attributable to the election cycle, that is, the coincidence in 2019 of both European and domestic parliamentary elections. My research involved an analysis of survey data (CBOS, Eurobarometr), statistical data, and the course of the European parliamentary election campaign. During the analysis, it turned out that in the years 2014–2019 there were no significant changes in how the European Union and its institutions were perceived by Poles that could explain the dramatic increase in interest in the European election. What had the greatest impact on voter behaviour was the fact that the European election was held just several months before an election to the Polish parliament. The Polish political parties treated the European election in May as a test of support in the nation election to be held in the autumn – as a ‘quasi-first round.’ The European election campaign was heavily covered by the media, and focused on domestic issues (building up Poland’s welfare state). The ruling party’s announcement of numerous social reforms and a desire to influence the result of the ‘May round’ mobilised an above-average number of Poles to take an active part in the European election.


Author(s):  
Ewa Połońska-Kimunguyi

AbstractThis paper looks at how the British media addressed the issue of migration in Europe between 2015 and 2018, four years when the topic was high on news and political agendas, due to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and the UK’s debate on Britain’s relationship with the European Union and free movement of people. Based on a sample of 400 articles from two national newspapers, The Guardian and The Times, the paper compares the content and discourse between the left-wing and right-wing press. The paper argues that media representations turn refugees into ‘migrants’ and portray them as either a threat to the national economy and security or as passive victims of distant circumstances. The study historicizes these media narratives and reveals that the discourse they employ advances the racialised mix of knowledge and historical amnesia and reproduces the age-old hierarchies of the colonial system which divided humans into superior and inferior species. Migrant voice is largely missing from the coverage. History, that could explain the causes of ‘migration’, the distant conflicts and Britain’s role in them, is also nowhere to be found. The paper considers the exclusion of history and migrant voices from stories told to the British audience and reflects on their domestic and international implications.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document