scholarly journals The Reflection Effect in Memory-Based Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 1439-1451
Author(s):  
Regina A. Weilbächer ◽  
Peter M. Kraemer ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Pattern ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Reflection Effect ◽  
Aversive Stimuli ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Uncertain Outcomes

Previous research has indicated a bias in memory-based decision-making, with people preferring options that they remember better. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this memory bias remain elusive. Here, we propose that choosing poorly remembered options is conceptually similar to choosing options with uncertain outcomes. We predicted that the memory bias would be reduced when options had negative subjective value, analogous to the reflection effect, according to which uncertainty aversion is stronger in gains than in losses. In two preregistered experiments ( N = 36 each), participants made memory-based decisions between appetitive and aversive stimuli. People preferred better-remembered options in the gain domain, but this behavioral pattern reversed in the loss domain. This effect was not related to participants’ ambiguity or risk attitudes, as measured in a separate task. Our results increase the understanding of memory-based decision-making and connect this emerging field to well-established research on decisions under uncertainty.

scholarly journals The reflection effect in memory-based decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regina Agnes Weilbächer ◽  
Peter Maximilian Kraemer ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Episodic Memory ◽  
Behavioral Pattern ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Reflection Effect ◽  
Aversive Stimuli ◽  
Decisions Under Risk ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Uncertain Outcomes

Previous research has shown that episodic memory influences decisions, with peopleexhibiting too strong preferences for remembered over forgotten options. However, thecognitive mechanisms underlying this memory bias remain elusive. Here, we propose thatchoosing forgotten (or poorly remembered) options is conceptually similar to choosingoptions with uncertain outcomes. Following this rationale, we predicted that the memorybias is reduced when options have negative subjective value – analogous to the reflectioneffect, according to which uncertainty aversion is stronger in gains than in losses. In twopreregistered experiments, participants made memory-based decisions between sets ofappetitive or aversive stimuli. As predicted, people preferred remembered over forgottenoptions in the gain domain, but this behavioral pattern reversed in the loss domain. Ourresults contribute to an increasing understanding of the role of memory in decision makingand connect this emerging field to the well-established research on decisions under risk anduncertainty.

scholarly journals Preprint: Altered subjective reward valuation among drug-deprived heavy marijuana users: Aversion to uncertainty

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn R. Hefner ◽  
Mark J. Starr ◽  
John Joseph Curtin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Illicit Drug ◽  
Drugs Of Abuse ◽  
Marijuana Use ◽  
The United States ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Neuroadaptive Changes ◽  
Reward Valuation ◽  
Cardinal Feature

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States and its use is rising. Nonetheless, scientific efforts to clarify the risk for addiction and other harm associated with marijuana use have been lacking. Maladaptive decision-making is a cardinal feature of addiction that is likely to emerge in heavy users. In particular, distorted subjective reward valuation related to homeostatic or allostatic processes has been implicated for many drugs of abuse. Selective changes in responses to uncertainty have been observed in response to intoxication and deprivation from various drugs of abuse. To assess for these potential neuroadaptive changes in reward valuation associated with marijuana deprivation, we examined the subjective value of uncertain and certain rewards among deprived and non-deprived heavy marijuana users in a behavioral economics decision-making task. Deprived users displayed reduced valuation of uncertain rewards, particularly when these rewards were more objectively valuable. This uncertainty aversion increased with increasing quantity of marijuana use. These results suggest comparable decision-making vulnerability from marijuana use as other drugs of abuse, and highlights targets for intervention.

Cognitive Mechanisms in Decision-Making in Patients With Mild Alzheimer Disease

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Ramón Alameda-Bailén ◽  
María Pilar Salguero-Alcañiz ◽  
Ana Merchán-Clavellino ◽  
Susana Paíno-Quesada
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Alzheimer Disease ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms

scholarly journals Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of decision making in joint action: A human–robot interaction study

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 846-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Estela Bicho ◽  
Wolfram Erlhagen ◽  
Luis Louro ◽  
Eliana Costa e Silva
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Human Robot Interaction ◽  
Interaction Study ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Robot Interaction

scholarly journals Should I stay or should I go? Evidence accumulation drives decision making in human drivers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
David Abbink ◽  
Gustav Markkula
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Naturalistic Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Constraints ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Out Of Sample

Laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. Yet it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in simple, isolated decisions in the lab are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving. Here we aim to address the gap between modern cognitive models of decision making and studies of naturalistic decision making in drivers, which so far have provided only limited insight into the underlying cognitive processes. We investigate drivers' decision making during unprotected left turns, and model the cognitive process driving these decisions. Our model builds on the classical drift-diffusion model, and emphasizes, first, the drift rate linked to the relevant perceptual quantities dynamically sampled from the environment, and, second, collapsing decision boundaries reflecting the dynamic constraints imposed on the decision maker’s response by the environment. We show that the model explains the observed decision outcomes and response times, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions, effectively providing a way to predict human drivers’ behavior in real time. Our results reveal the cognitive mechanisms of gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help us to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.

scholarly journals Cognitive mechanisms underlying subjective value of past and future events: Modeling systematic reversals of temporal value asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Kvam ◽  
Matthew Baldwin ◽  
Erin Corwin Westgate
Keyword(s):  
Intertemporal Choice ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Common Finding ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Difference Model ◽  
Psychological Traits ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Future Outcomes

People discount both future outcomes that could happen and past outcomes that could have happened according to how far away they are in time. A common finding is that future outcomes are often preferred to past ones when the payoffs and temporal distance (how long ago / until they occur) are matched, referred to as temporal value asymmetry. In this paper, we examine the consistency of this effect by examining the effect of manipulating the magnitude and delays of past and future payoffs on participants' choices, and challenge the claim that differences in value are primarily due to differences in discounting rates for past and future events. We find reversals of the temporal value asymmetry when payoffs are low and when temporal distance is large, suggesting that people have different sensitivity to the magnitude of past and future payoffs. We show that these effects can be accommodated in an direct difference model of intertemporal choice but not in the most common discounting models (hyperboloid), suggesting that both temporal distance and payoff magnitude carry independent influences on the subjective value of past and future outcomes. Finally, we explore how these tendencies to represent past and future outcome values are related to one another and to individual differences in personality and psychological traits, showing how these measures cluster according to whether they measure processes related to past/future events, payoffs/delays, and whether they are behavioral/self-report measures.

scholarly journals Communication in Action: Planning and Interpreting Communicative Demonstrations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark K Ho ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman ◽  
Michael L. Littman ◽  
Joseph L. Austerweil
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Physical Environment ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Intentional Behavior ◽  
The World ◽  
Communication Culture

Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others' behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the physical environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer's mental representations. Our framework (1) extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, (2) captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and (3) helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators' actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the socio-cognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality.

scholarly journals Cognitive bias, decision styles, and risk attitudes in decision making and DSS

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gloria Phillips-Wren ◽  
Daniel J. Power ◽  
Manuel Mora
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Bias ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Decision Styles

scholarly journals Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) Are More Averse to Social Than Nonsocial Risk

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Calcutt ◽  
Darby Proctor ◽  
Sarah M. Berman ◽  
Frans B. M. de Waal
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Pan Troglodytes ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Social Risk ◽  
Risky Decision ◽  
Emotional Factors ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Tit For Tat

Social risk is a domain of risk in which the costs, benefits, and uncertainty of an action depend on the behavior of another individual. Humans overvalue the costs of a socially risky decision when compared with that of purely economic risk. Here, we played a trust game with 8 female captive chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) to determine whether this bias exists in one of our closest living relatives. A correlation between an individual’s social- and nonsocial-risk attitudes indicated stable individual variation, yet the chimpanzees were more averse to social than nonsocial risk. This indicates differences between social and economic decision making and emotional factors in social risk taking. In another experiment using the same paradigm, subjects played with several partners with whom they had varying relationships. Preexisting relationships did not impact the subjects’ choices. Instead, the apes used a tit-for-tat strategy and were influenced by the outcome of early interactions with a partner.

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