scholarly journals Alternative Legacies of Authoritarianism: Pro-dictator Bias in Ideology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions corresponding to those of the dictator depending on their experiences during and after transition. In countries with negotiated transitions and stronger former ruling parties, these successors could continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship with inherited advantages from the past and by invoking nostalgia through consistent reference to previous authoritarian achievements. I test this hypothesis with variables measuring successor party strength and the type of regime transition by combining individual-level survey data and country-level data. The findings emphasize the role of post-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in former authoritarian societies.

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Onraet ◽  
Jasper Van Assche ◽  
Arne Roets ◽  
Tessa Haesevoets ◽  
Alain Van Hiel

In the present study, we investigated the much debated “happiness gap” between conservatives and liberals, approaching the issue from a multilevel person × context perspective. More specifically, we investigated whether this relationship depends on country-level threat. We used individual-level data for right-wing attitudes and psychological well-being from 94 large, representative samples collected worldwide (total N = 137,890) and objective indicators of country-level threat as the contextual variable. Our results suggest that, especially in countries characterized by high levels of threat, individuals with right-wing attitudes experienced greater well-being than individuals with left-wing attitudes. In countries with a low level of threat, this relationship was considerably weaker or even absent. Our findings corroborate the view that right-wing attitudes may serve a self-protective function, helping individuals to manage and cope with threat.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisha Holland ◽  
Margaret E. Peters ◽  
Yang-Yang Zhou

Do perceived political views of migrants affect their treatment? For existing studies of migrant reception largely conducted in the Global North, the overlap between ethnicity and partisanship has made it difficult to disentangle political fears from other status and identity concerns. We leverage a case in which migrants come from a similar ethno-linguistic background to explore the role of political fears. Drawing on an original face-to-face survey with over 1,000 Colombians and 1,600 Venezuelans in Colombia, we find that Colombians view Venezuelan migrants as left-wing even though actual Venezuelan migrants are more right-wing than their Colombian hosts. These political misperceptions are consequential: we find that Colombians strongly oppose the settlement of left-wing migrants in their communities. Our research implies that societies can construct out-groups along political lines when the ethnic and cultural bases for migrant exclusion are weaker.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (Supplement_4) ◽  
Author(s):  
I Backhaus ◽  
S Kino ◽  
G La Torre ◽  
I Kawachi

Abstract Background Individuals who hew to a conservative political ideology have been previously reported to have better self-rated health compared to liberals. No studies have examined whether the correlation between right-wing ideology and health also holds for populism, a brand of politics that is gaining momentum throughout the world. We tested whether the association still holds for right-wing populists. Methods We analysed data from 24617 respondents nested within 18 European countries included in the 2016 European Social Survey. Multilevel analyses were conducted to assess the relationship between political ideology and self-rated health, adjusting for other individual covariates (happiness and social capital) and country-level characteristics (democracy type). Results Individuals who voted for right-wing populist parties were 43% more likely to report fair/poor health compared to traditional conservatives (OR = 1.43, 95% confidence interval 1.23 to 1.67). The association was attenuated after controlling for individual-level variables, including happiness and access to social capital (OR = 1.21, confidence interval 1.03 to 1.42). Higher levels of social capital (informal networks, OR = 0.40, 95% confidence interval 0.29 to 0.56; trust, OR = 0.82, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.92) and happiness (OR = 0.18, 95% confidence interval 0.15 to 0.22) were protectively correlated with fair/poor self-rated health. Conclusions Individuals voting for right-wing populist parties report worse health compared to conservatives. It remains unclear whether ideology is just a marker for health-related practices, or whether the values and beliefs associated with a particular brand of ideology leads to worse health. Key messages There is a significant association between voting for right-wing populist parties and self-rated poor health. Social capital was protectively correlated with self-rated health calling for renewed attention on the effects of social capital on political ideology and health.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Cavaillé ◽  
Anja Neundorf

AbstractDo voters update their attitudes toward economic issues in line with their material self-interest? The consensus among students of public opinion is that material self-interest plays a very limited role and that competing non-material factors, such as partisanship or ideological predispositions, do most of the heavy lifting. This paper moves beyond comparing the role of material and non-material factors. Instead, we examine how these factors combine to shape policy preferences. Specifically, we propose a friendly amendment to Zaller’s influential model according to which attitudinal change results from the interaction between changes in elite messaging on the one hand and individual political predispositions on the other. In Zaller’s model, partisanship and ideological predispositions help explain why some resist and others embrace new elite messaging. We hypothesize that material self-interest also conditions the effect of elite messaging. Using British individual-level panel data collected over more than a decade, we show that material hardship predicts who, among left-wing voters, resist new right-wing partisan cues. Our results highlights the incremental impact of material self-interest on economic attitudes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 874-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul H. P. Hanel ◽  
Natalia Zarzeczna ◽  
Geoffrey Haddock

Members of extreme political groups are usually perceived as more homogeneous than moderates. We investigated whether members of the general public who share the same political ideology would exhibit different levels of heterogeneity in terms of human values across 20 European countries and Israel. We directly compared the variability across moderate-, left-, and right-wing groups. Our findings suggest that the values of more extreme (left-wing or right-wing) supporters are usually more heterogeneous than those with more moderate views. We replicated this finding for politics-related variables such as attitudes toward immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions. We also found that country-level variables (income, religiosity, and parasite stress level) did not moderate the pattern of value variability. Overall, our results suggest that endorsing the same political ideology is not necessarily associated with sharing the same values, especially in the case of common citizens holding extreme political attitudes.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989990
Author(s):  
Burcu Tekeş ◽  
E. Olcay Imamoğlu ◽  
Fatih Özdemir ◽  
Bengi Öner-Özkan

The aims of this study were to test: (a) the association of political orientations with morality orientations, specified by moral foundations theory, on a sample of young adults from Turkey, representing a collectivistic culture; and (b) the statistically mediating roles of needs for cognition and recognition in the links between political orientation and morality endorsements. According to the results (a) right-wing orientation and need for recognition were associated with all the three binding foundations (i.e., in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity); (b) right-wing orientation was associated with binding foundations also indirectly via the role of need for recognition; (c) regarding individualizing foundations, left-wing orientation and need for cognition were associated with fairness/reciprocity, whereas only gender was associated with harm/care; and (d) left-wing orientation was associated with fairness dimension also indirectly via the role of need for cognition. The cultural relevance of moral foundations theory as well as the roles of needs for cognition and recognition are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Anna Miglietta ◽  
Barbara Loera

We analyzed the relationship between modern forms of populism and citizen support for exclusive welfare policies and proposals, and we focused on support for left-wing- and right-wing-oriented welfare policies enacted or proposed during the Lega Nord (LN)–Five Star Movement (FSM) government in Italy (2018–2019). In light of the theoretical perspective of political ideology as motivated by social cognition, we examined citizens’ support for the two policies considering adherence to populist attitudes, agreement on the criteria useful to define ingroup membership, and personal values. We also took into account the role of cognitive sophistication in populism avoidance. A total of 785 Italian adults (F = 56.6; mean age = 35.8) completed an online survey in the summer of 2019 based on the following: support for populist policies and proposals, political ideologies and positioning, personal values, and ingroup boundaries. We used correlation and regression analyses. The results highlight the relationships between populism and political conservatism. Populism was related to the vertical and horizontal borders defining the “people”; cognitive sophistication was not a relevant driver. We identified some facilitating factors that could promote adherence to and support for public policies inspired by the values of the right or of the left, without a true ideological connotation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterize leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful. This article posits that a sound discussion of who hawks and doves in foreign policy are requires an engagement with research on political leadership. It promises a less superficial understanding of the dichotomy of hawks and doves, and uses leadership trait analysis to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. The article profiles Israel’s prime ministers since the end of the Cold War, where in a high security environment, these words are most often used to describe its domestic and foreign matters and its cooperative and conflictual actions. This article’s findings encourage an unpacking of these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful to highlight, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawks think simpler and are more doubtful of others than doves, this article finds. Future research, the article suggests, will benefit from looking deeper than simple, dichotomous use of this analogy, and exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements of hawks and doves in foreign policy.


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