Dangerous feelings: Checkpoints and the perception of hostile intent

Between 2006 and 2007 an average of one Iraqi civilian was killed or injured at a coalition checkpoint each day. In many cases, civilians were shot because soldiers had misinterpreted their behaviour as hostile or as a demonstration of hostile intent. In other words, the soldiers responsible thought that they were acting in self-defence against an imminent threat. Some analysts have argued that these killings can be explained by ambiguities in the rules of engagement, but such explanations wrongly assume that the decision to kill is a purely rational calculation. Drawing upon the work of Sara Ahmed, William Connolly and George Yancy, I will argue that the interpretation of hostile intent and the decision to use lethal force are affective judgements rather than purely conscious decisions and, as such, are shaped by feelings, moods and intuitions. Moreover, I will argue that these judgements are never entirely neutral but clouded by a set of pre-existing assumptions that mark certain bodies as dangerous before they even have a chance to act. Drawing upon an archive of incident reports filed in the aftermath of these shootings and interviews with former soldiers, this article will show how seemingly innocuous behaviours were so readily mistaken for hostile acts with decidedly deadly consequences for the local population.

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Vulnerable Civilians: Coalition Checkpoints and the Perception of Hostile Intent

Vulnerability and the Politics of Care ◽

10.5871/bacad/9780197266830.003.0007 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 108-125

Author(s):

Thomas Gregory

Keyword(s):

Lethal Force ◽

Hostile Intent ◽

Muscle Memory

This chapter examines civilian casualties at coalition checkpoints in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the decision to use lethal force against individuals considered to be hostile. Drawing on the testimony of American soldiers, this chapter argues that the decision to use lethal force can be seen as an affective judgement, with soldiers often resorting to ‘muscle memory’ as they sought to identify potential threats amidst the chaos and confusion of war. It will argue that these affective judgements do not occur within a cultural vacuum but are animated and informed by a set of background assumptions that mark certain populations as dangerous, threatening and hostile before they even arrive on the scene. To understand what made civilians so vulnerable to death and injury at coalition checkpoints, it will be necessary to inquire into the affective schemes of intelligibility that render certain lives disposable and certain bodies profoundly injurable in war.

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Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence ◽

10.1017/s0841820900001727 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 143-165 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Jeremy Horder

Keyword(s):

Common Law ◽

Moral Imperative ◽

Lethal Force ◽

Unjust Threat ◽

Personal Sacrifice ◽

The Relationship ◽

Self Defence ◽

What Matters

The distinctions that may be drawn between self-defence, necessity and duress are interesting as a matter of theory, but may also be important in practice. In some jurisdictions, for example, duress and necessity are no defence to murder whereas self-defence is a defence available in principle to all crimes. In such jurisdictions, in homicide cases, the point at which one reaches the boundaries of self-defence and enters upon the terrain of necessity may thus be of crucial significance. Drawing on Suzanne Uniacke’s theory of self-defence, I would like to suggest that each defence can be distinguished by a different key issue. In necessity cases, the key issue is the moral imperative to act: what matters is whether in the circumstances it was morally imperative to act, even if this might involve the commission of wrongdoing, in order to negate or avoid some other evil. In duress cases, the key issue is the personal sacrifice D is being asked to make: should D be expected to make the personal sacrifice involved in refusing to give in to a coercive threat, rather than avoid implementation of the coercive threat by doing wrong? In self-defence cases, the key issue is D’s legal permission to act: where V unjustly represented a threat to D (normally, although not exclusively, through his—V’s—conduct), the question is whether necessary and proportionate steps were taken by D to negate or avoid the threat. For, D has a legal permission to take necessary and proportionate steps to negate or avoid an unjust threat, even if (exceptionally) these involve the use of lethal force. So baldly stated, the differences between the defences may seem obvious. Few common law jurisdictions, and few commentators, however, have appreciated the full significance of the differences, as we shall shortly see.

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Rules of Engagement and Self-Defence

Rules of Engagement and the International Law of Military Operations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198853886.003.0004 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 73-102

Author(s):

J.F.R. Boddens Hosang

Keyword(s):

The Political ◽

The European Union ◽

Legal Basis ◽

Military Operations ◽

Specific Detail ◽

The North ◽

Hostile Intent ◽

The Military ◽

Individual Perspective ◽

Self Defence

This chapter discusses the interaction between (the law of) self-defence and the rules of engagement (ROE), and how they play out against the military, and subsequently the political objectives of governments. It analyses the various forms of self-defence, from a national to individual perspective, including unit self-defence and force protection, and examines the legal basis and framework for each type of self-defence. The chapter goes on to analyse how these frameworks interact with, and influence, the ROE for military operations, discussing the concepts and applications of Hostile Act and Hostile Intent as followed by the North America Treaty Organization and the European Union in specific detail.

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Justifying the use of firearms by policemen and soldiers: a response to the Home Office's review of the law on the use of lethal force

Legal Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1748-121x.1998.tb00077.x ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 18 (4) ◽

pp. 486-509 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Jonathan Rogers

Keyword(s):

Excessive Force ◽

Home Office ◽

The Public ◽

Lethal Force ◽

Criminal Suspect ◽

Statutory Authority ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Law ◽

Prevention Of Crime ◽

Self Defence

In January 1995, during the furore over the murder conviction of Private Lee Clegg, the Home Office announced a review of the law of murder as the House of Lords had declared it to be. In March 1996 the Report of the Inter-Departmental Review of the Law on the Use of Lethal Force in Self-Defence or the Prevention of Crime was completed and, if not exactly ‘published’, then at least available to interested members of the public. The review was primarily concerned with the possibility of enacting a partial defence to murder, whereby a soldier or policemen who had used excessive force resulting in the death of a criminal suspect would be convicted only of manslaughter, but the Home Office also examined the possibility of giving statutory authority to the internal Army and police regulations upon the use of firearms, in order to clarify the concept of ‘reasonable force’. In the end, however, the Inter-Departmental Review (hereafter ‘the Review’) proposed no change to the law of murder nor of voluntary manslaughter, and neither did it propose any method of clarifying the concept of ‘reasonable force’.

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United Nations Security Council Practice in Relation to Use of Force in No-Fly Zones and Maritime Exclusion Zones

10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0012 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Rob McLaughlin

Keyword(s):

United Nations ◽

Security Council ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Use Of Force ◽

United Nations Security Council ◽

Lethal Force ◽

Law Of Armed Conflict ◽

Un Security Council ◽

The Law ◽

Self Defence

This chapter examines UN Security Council practice with respect to the use of force in no-fly zones and maritime exclusion zones. It considers whether the law governing the zone is based or not based on the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and whether the law on the use of force inside the zone is essentially the same as that outside it. It also assesses the effect of the Security Council’s act of declaring or acquiescing in the zone on the law that is normally applicable in the ocean or airspace enclosed by the zone. The chapter also analyses whether the Security Council can authorize the use of lethal force for the purpose of enforcing a mandate despite the absence of LOAC authorization. It discusses the notion of a ‘third paradigm’ for use of lethal force and the concept of ‘self-defence’ endorsed by the Security Council (and the UN more generally).

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