Values, self and other-regarding behavior in the dictator game

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Tao ◽  
Wing-tung Au
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Other Regarding

The Equal Moral Weight of Self- and Other-Regarding Acts

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Andre
Keyword(s):  
Self And Other ◽  
Other Regarding

Self-regarding acts are frequently classified as non-moral; even more frequently, they are assumed to have less moral weight than parallel other-regarding acts. I argue briefly against the first claim, and at greater length against the second. Our intuitions about the lesser moral weight of self-regarding acts arise from imperfectly recognized, and morally relevant, differences between acts which are ordinarily described in misleadingly parallel phrases. ‘Love of self,’ for instance, and ‘love of another’ are not symmetrical attitudes, in spite of the symmetrical grammar. More obviously, one cannot steal from, lie to, nor force oneself in the same way one can do these things to others. I conclude, therefore, that difference in moral weight never stems merely from a difference in the person concerned (myself or another), but rather from differences between the actions themselves; furthermore, that whatever it is wrong to do to a willing other, it is wrong to do to oneself.

Self and Other-Regarding Reinforcement Learning in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (9) ◽  
pp. S441
Author(s):  
Shengchuang Feng ◽  
George Christopoulos ◽  
Julia Julien ◽  
Pearl Chiu ◽  
Brooks King-Casas
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ◽  
Traumatic Stress ◽  
Stress Disorder ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
Other Regarding

scholarly journals Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dino J. Levy
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Neural Responses ◽  
Potential Harm ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Potential Value ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Potential Losses ◽  
Other Regarding

Abstract Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes—valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

Paternalism and Social Policy

1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
The State ◽  
Social Policies ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
The Government ◽  
Other Regarding

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the notion of paternalism, and its application to the evaluation of social policies. It attempts first to define the concept, using Mill's distinction between self- and other-regarding actions. A paternalistic policy is one in which the government renders a self-regarding action less eligible for a citizen, with the intention of benefiting the citizen in question. This concept is then applied to the analysis of redistribution by means of social policy measures. Two questions are discussed: (a) whether any redistribution must be paternalist, and (b) whether redistribution in kind is more paternalist than redistribution in cash. It is argued that paternalism need not be the explanation for the policy in either case. Finally three criteria are specified in terms of which paternalistic interventions by the state might be assessed as justified or not.

Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takehiro Ito ◽  
Akihiro Suzuki ◽  
Toru Takemoto ◽  
Kazuhito Ogawa ◽  
Hiromasa Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Recipient Group ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Other Regarding

Abstract We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

scholarly journals Spousal Dictator Game: Household Decisions and Other-Regarding Preferences

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Matthew Gnagey ◽  
Therese Grijalva ◽  
Rong Rong
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Household Income ◽  
Married Couples ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Factors Associated ◽  
Household Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Using a laboratory experiment, we collected data on dictator giving among student strangers and married couples in a suburban area in the United States. Confirming common belief and prior empirical evidence, we find that giving among spouses is greater than giving among anonymous students. We further investigated factors associated with spousal giving which may provide insight for the development of future theories, or into explaining other-regarding preferences. Our data shows that giving is positively associated with who manages household money and controls household income. This result is robust after controlling for each spouse’s personal income and using various econometric specifications. The results suggest that spousal giving may be due to household economic roles in addition to other-regarding preferences.

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