scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee de-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
The Individual

It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Participants made lower offers when making a collective vs individual decisions. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

Law and Prosocial Behavior

2014 ◽  
pp. 194-212
Author(s):  
Lynn Stout
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Experimental Games

This chapter examines the relevance of prosocial behavior to law. It begins by tracing the history of the homo economicus model of human behavior, its role in contemporary behavioral law and economics, and why the concept of utility does not solve the problem of the model. It then looks at the emergence of a behavioral economics approach to human behavior that incorporates the empirical reality of prosociality without undermining the predictive power of economic analysis. It also discusses the empirical methodology known as experimental gaming, focusing on the application of three experimental games—the social dilemma game, dictator game, and ultimatum game—to study when and how people will act prosocially. In particular, the article considers three basic lessons about human behavior offered by the social dilemma game, ultimatum game, and dictator game. In addition, it explores how prosocial behavior influences regulation, negligence rules, and contracting, along with corporate law. The chapter concludes by stressing the value of incorporating prosocial behavior into the analysis of legal and policy problems.

scholarly journals Patience, Cognitive Abilities, and Cognitive Effort: Survey and Experimental Evidence From a Developing Country

2021 ◽  
pp. 000276422199674
Author(s):  
Stefania Bortolotti ◽  
Thomas Dohmen ◽  
Hartmut Lehmann ◽  
Frauke Meyer ◽  
Norberto Pignatti ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Adult Population ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Math Ability ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Ability Measure ◽  
The Relationship

This study sheds light on the relationship between cognition and patience by documenting that the correlation between cognitive abilities and delay discounting is weaker for the same group of individuals if choices are incentivized. This study conjectures that higher cognitive effort, which induces higher involvement of the cognitive system, moderates the relationship between patience and cognition. For 107 participants drawn from the adult population in Tbilisi, this study examines the relationship between various measures of cognitive ability and that of patience. Specifically, we consider the relationship between the Cognitive Reflection Test, a numeracy test, self-reported math ability measure, enumerators’ assessments, and incentivized and hypothetical trade-offs between smaller-sooner and larger-later payments.

scholarly journals The cognitive ability and working memory framework: Interpreting cognitive reflection test results in the domain of the cognitive experiential theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayşegül Engin
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Measurement Tool ◽  
Full Potential ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Using Data

AbstractThe cognitive reflection test (hereafter, CRT) is a widely used tool in studies that deal with human decision-making and problem-solving. However, the interpretation of the results of the test remains an open discussion in extant literature. Despite the high predictive power, the characteristics of a decision-maker measured by the CRT remain unclear. This article suggests a novel and inclusive framework that relates the CRT to the cognitive experiential theory (hereafter, CET), which is a well-established dual-process theory. The framework explains the observed phenomena (e.g., individual decision-maker differences) using data from five laboratory experiments. The framework is inclusive because it provides possible explanations for the results in the published literature. The overall results support the argument that the CRT measures the efficiency of the resources of an individual’s working memory. In contrast, the rationality experientiality inventory (hereafter, REI) (a measurement tool of the cognitive experiential theory) captures an individual’s cognitive ability. The efficient use of the working memory leads to the full potential of decision-makers’ cognitive abilities in analytical tasks, thereby indicating that cognitive ability and working memory form a viable framework for studies in the disciplines behavioral operational research (hereafter, OR) and decision sciences.

scholarly journals Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Frederick
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
First Response

This paper introduces a three-item “Cognitive Reflection Test” (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The author will show that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory. Indeed, the relation is sometimes so strong that the preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability—an empirical fact begging for a theoretical explanation. The author examines the relation between CRT scores and two important decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. The CRT scores are then compared with other measures of cognitive ability or cognitive “style.” The CRT scores exhibit considerable difference between men and women and the article explores how this relates to sex differences in time and risk preferences. The final section addresses the interpretation of correlations between cognitive abilities and decision-making characteristics.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making a collective rather than an individual decision. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Do Underlying Risk Preferences explain Individuals’ Cognitive Ability?⁕ Evidence from a Sample of Pakistani Students

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-122
Author(s):  
Mariam Raheem ◽  
Ain ul Momina
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Empirical Economics ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Psychology Literature ◽  
Underlying Risk

Emerging research in empirical economics posits a question on the relation between underlying risk preferences and reflective cognitive ability. In an experimental setting, a preliminary sample of 260 participants undergo a series of incentivized choice experiments to elicit risk preferences and a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to obtain estimates of their reflective ability. We sidestep potential biases by using a Fechner error specification along with a contextualized version of the utility function. Individuals who are more likely to avoid risky outcomes have significantly lower scores on the CRT. The analysis validates a prominent relationship spanning the economics and psychology literature and suggests a potential direction of causal inference for future research.

scholarly journals The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 278 (1715) ◽  
pp. 2159-2164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank W. Marlowe ◽  
J. Colette Berbesque ◽  
Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Michael Gurven ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Complex Societies ◽  
Basic Emotion ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Third Person

We analyse generosity, second-party (‘spiteful’) punishment (2PP), and third-party (‘altruistic’) punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that ‘spiteful’ 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.

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