Freedom’s Poses

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-727
Author(s):  
Lori Jo Marso

Kathy Ferguson’s anarchist women enact walking as freedom’s pose. In my response, I ask how the way we imagine poses and postures, comporting our bodies this way or that, alone or together, shapes the way we practice freedom. I worry that the focus on walking, a dominant and frequent metaphor for freedom in many diverse political registers, occludes our ability to see freedom in other poses, registers, and spaces. I argue that highlighting walking as freedom’s preferred pose hovers too close to the replication of the posture (and maybe the perspective too?) of the masculine self. These moves, and this movement, make it harder to discover other sites and kinds of freedom, and to fully appreciate contingency, non-necessity, and the unexpected possibilities available in every encounter. Drawing on the work of Adriana Cavarero, Simone de Beauvoir, and Hannah Arendt, I explore postures of inclination—Beauvoir’s housewives stooped over pots and pans—and consciously chosen inactivity—Arendt lying on her daybed thinking. These postures and poses open up our ability to see freedom in the encounter, an affective and agonistic freedom enacted only with others, and too easily hidden or missed.

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Silvia Angeli

This article proposes a reading of Sarah Polley’s Stories We Tell (2012) through the work of Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero. Far from being a simple homage to her late mother Diane, Polley’s film is a ‘polyphonic tale’, a complex and multi-layered narrative which allows for an exploration of the many functions of (cinematic) storytelling. Highlighting the close link between relating narratives and personal identity, the film sheds light on both the innate desire for biography that characterizes us as human beings and the complex and dynamic relationship between storytellers and listeners. The way we tell stories affects the narrator(s), their audience and the fabric of the story itself in a process that ensures both continuity and change. Referring to Arendt’s notion of political storytelling, I conclude by suggesting that Stories We Tell, like the Greek polis, functions as an ‘organized remembrance’, a community whose purpose is to preserve fragile human deeds and words from oblivion.


Caderno CRH ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 020015
Author(s):  
Ingrid Cyfer

<div class="trans-abstract"><p class="sec">Neste artigo, proponho uma análise do filme Eu, Mamãe e os Meninos (Les garçons et Guillaume, à table! Direção: Guillaume Gallienne. França, 2013) tendo-se em vista uma perspectiva política e relacional das conexões entre psicanálise, narrativa e processo de subjetivação. Minha inspiração para isso está no modo como Judith Butler articula essas dimensões em seu livro Relatar a Si Mesmo: Crítica da Violência Ética ([2005], 2015), no qual a autora propõe uma teoria da formação do sujeito em que a concepção de narrativa de Hannah Arendt cumpre um papel fundamental, depois de ser reformulada pela concepção de self narrável de Adriana Cavarero e combinada à metapsicologia relacional de Jean Laplanche. Desse modo, meu objetivo é convidar Butler e Arendt ao cinema para depois discutir a relação entre narrativa, psicanálise e subjetivação tendo em vista o vínculo entre ética e política que a estória que o personagem Guillaume nos conta sobre quem é pode inspirar.</p><p><strong>Palavras-Chave: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Judith Butler; Subjetivação; Psicanálise; Narrativa</p></div><div class="trans-abstract"><p class="sec"><span>JUDITH BUTLER AND HANNAH ARENDT GO TO THE MOVIES: narrative, psychoanalysis and subjectification in the film Me, Myself and Mum</span></p><p class="sec">ABSTRACT</p><p>In this article, I propose an analysis of the film Me, Myself and Mum (Les garçons et Guillaume, à table! Directed by Guillaume Gallienne. France 2013) with a view to a political and relational perspective of the connections between psychoanalysis, narrative and subjectivation process. My inspiration for this is in the way Judith Butler articulates these dimensions in her book Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). In this work, Butler proposes a theory of the formation of the subject in which Hannah Arendt’s conception of narrative plays a fundamental role, after being reformulated by Adriana Cavarero’s conception of narrable self and combined with Jean Laplanche’s relational metapsychology. In this text, my goal is to invite Butler and Arendt to the movies to later discuss the relationship between narrative, psychoanalysis and subjectivity in view of the link between ethics and politics that the story in which Guillaume tells us about who he is can inspire.</p><p><strong>Key words: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Judith Butler; Subjectivation; Psychoanalysis; Narrative</p></div><div class="trans-abstract"><p class="sec"><span>JUDITH BUTLER ET HANNAH ARENDT VONT AU CINÉMA: narration, psychanalyse et subjectivation dan le film Les Garçons et Guillaume, à table!</span></p><p class="sec">ABSTRACT</p><p>Dans cet article, je propose une analyse du film Les Garçons et Guillaume, à la Table (Realisation Guillaume Galliene, France, 2013) en vue d’une perspective politique et relationnelle des liens entre psychanalyse, narration et processus de subjectivation. Mon inspiration pour cela réside dans la façon dont Judith Butler articule ces dimensions dans son livre Le Récit de Soi (2005). Dans ce travail, Butler propose une théorie de la formation du sujet dans laquelle la conception de la narration d’Hannah Arendt joue un rôle fondamental, après avoir été reformulée par la conception d’Adriana Cavarero du soi narrable et combinée avec la métapsychologie relationnelle de Jean Laplanche. Dans ce texte, mon objectif est d’inviter Butler et Arendt au cinéma pour discuter plus tard de la relation entre narration, psychanalyse et subjectivité au vu du lien entre éthique et politique que l’histoire dans laquelle Guillaume nous raconte qui il est peut inspirer.</p><p><strong>Key words: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Judith Butler; Subjectivation; Psychanalyse; Narrative</p></div>


Author(s):  
Elinor Mason

Feminist philosophy is philosophy that is aimed at understanding and challenging the oppression of women. Feminist philosophy examines issues that are traditionally found in practical ethics and political philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language. In fact, feminist concerns can appear in almost all areas of traditional philosophy. Feminist philosophy is thus not a kind of philosophy; rather, it is unified by its focus on issues of concern to feminists. Feminist philosophers question the structures and institutions that regulate our lives. When Mary Wollstonecraft was writing in 1792, the institutions excluded and subordinated women explicitly. Wollstonecraft, as the title of her book (A Vindication of the Rights of Woman) makes clear, was extending the enlightenment idea that men have basic human rights, to women. Wollstonecraft argued that women should not be seen as importantly different from men: there may be differences due to different upbringing, but, Wollstonecraft argues, there is no reason to think men and women differ in important ways, and women should be given the same education and opportunities as men. What seemed radical in 1792 may not seem radical now. Yet gender inequality persists. Thus philosophers must look beyond the formal rules and laws to the underlying structures that cause and perpetuate oppression. The feminist philosopher is always asking, ‘is there some element of this practice that depends on gender in some way?’ Feminist philosophers examine and critique the way we structure our families and reproduction, the cultural practices we engage in, such as prostitution and pornography, the way we think, and speak and value each other as knowers and thinkers. In order to examine these issues the feminist philosopher may need an improved conceptual toolbox: we need to understand such complex concepts as intersectionality, false consciousness, and of course, gender itself. Is gender biologically determined – is it something natural and immutable, or is it socially constructed? As Simone de Beauvoir puts it, ‘one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’. Feminist philosophers tend to argue that gender is all (or mostly) socially constructed, that it is something we invent rather than discover. Gender is nonetheless an important part of our world, and feminist philosophy aims to understand how it works.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (121) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Geraldo Adriano Emery Pereira

Este texto detém-se sobre um tema polêmico no contexto da obra da filósofa Hannah Arendt – a faculdade do juízo. A análise gira em torno da demonstração do modo como as peculiaridades da crítica do gosto kantiana são apropriadas por Arendt, numa leitura política desta faculdade. O artigo ensaia num primeiro momento uma apresentação do juízo de gosto; em seguida aponta os elementos que são apropriados por Arendt e sua leitura política. Deste modo se apresenta uma justificativa teórica para a apropriação arendtiana da faculdade do juízo de gosto kantiana, mostrando que, apesar de seu caráter “sui generis” ela é capaz de revelar aspectos importantes da própria realidade política.Abstract: This paper draws attention to a polemic subject in the context of the work of the philosopher Hannah Arendt – The faculty of judgement. The analysis brings into focus the way the characteristics of KantÊs critique of taste have been used by Arendt in a political interpretation of that faculty. After explaining the Kantian judgement of taste, the paper points out the elements which have been appropriated by Arendt and shows her political reading of them. It proposes so a theoretical justification of the Arendtian use of Kant´s analysis of judgement of taste, making clear that, in spite of its „sui generis‰ character, it is able to uncover important aspects of political reality itself. 


Author(s):  
Megan M. Burke

The author argues that the exclusion of the indefinite article in Borde and Malovany-Chevallier’s translation of “the famous sentence” in The Second Sex obscures Beauvoir’s phenomenological account of feminine existence. While it is best to understand the recent translation as an informed, interpretative reading of Beauvoir, this essay suggests that reading the end of the sentence as “becoming a woman” undoes the common Anglo-American reading of Simone de Beauvoir as a social constructionist (for example, in the work of Judith Butler). This undoing is important for the way readers become oriented to Beauvoir’s phenomenological commitments. Thus the inclusion of the “a” gestures to a phenomenological sensibility. There is a sphere within the lived experience of femininity that the exclusion cannot capture.


Derrida Today ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Lechte

After beginning by situating the author's (possible) relation to Derrida's expression, ‘democracy to come’, the article proceeds from the position that Derrida's phrase is to be understood as part of a political intervention. Indeed, the inseparability of democracy and deconstruction confirms this. After setting out some of the pertinent features of ‘democracy to come’ – seen, in part, in the General Will – the notion of political community in the thought of Hannah Arendt is brought into question, if not deconstructed. Political community as presented by Arendt is seen to limit the inclusiveness of democracy. In the final section, the article suggests that Agamben's critique of the very structure of the nation-state opens the way for a renewal of the notion of the human in the ‘community to come’.


Author(s):  
Simon Morgan Wortham
Keyword(s):  

This chapter concentrates on violence and civility in the work of Étienne Balibar. Is his concept of ‘anti-violence’ able to negotiate a lesser violence that preserves the possibility of civility, or is fated only to redistribute the modalities of violence, including revolutionary ‘counter-violence’ and pacifist ‘non-violence’, in a way that risks the greater violence of managed oppression and exploitation? Through references to the work of Hannah Arendt that connect their two ‘texts’, this chapter turns from Balibar’s writings to the work of Jean-François Lyotard, notably the short essay ‘The Other’s Rights’, in order to assess whether Lyotard’s thought offers pathways beyond the seemingly irresolvable paradoxes of ‘anti-violence’. Along the way, the chapter contemplates the debts of both these thinkers to the psychoanalytic corpus. If reconceptualising violence in its contemporary guises involves transformative re-engagement with psychoanalytic ideas and arguments, I suggest that Balibar’s thought inherits and assumes a resistance of psychoanalysis that may also be a resistance of psychoanalysis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-130
Author(s):  
ELISABETA ZELINKA

Abstract The thesis of the present paper is to investigate the reasons why it may become difficult for the 20th century Western woman to avoid feeling trapped within her status of motherhood and to transcend her immanence as a woman. Simone de Beauvoir argues in The Second Sex, Part V, chapter XVII (“The Mother”) that the modern Western woman proves unable to transgress her own immanence. What are the three factors that stand in the way of the woman's existential telos? What is the natural consequence of her Snow White-type of imprisonment? Will she impose the same pattern of panoptic surveillance upon her own offspring?


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document