Effects of Ballot Type and District Magnitude on Local Public Goods Bill-Initiation Behavior: Evidence from Honduras

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292090588
Author(s):  
Juan Muñoz-Portillo

An influential literature predicts that incentives to provide local public goods are conditioned by how electoral systems expose a legislator to the need to seek a personal vote. Carey and Shugart theorize that district magnitude and ballot type interact affecting the legislators’ personal vote-seeking behavior. Another literature challenges the idea that electoral systems affect the behavior of legislators, particularly in highly clientelist settings, usually associated with high poverty. I empirically evaluate these arguments on an original data set of local goods bills presented by legislators of the National Congress of Honduras between 1990 and 2009. Honduras changed its electoral system from closed-list to open-list in 2004 while keeping its district magnitude constant. The results suggest that the Ballot Type × District Magnitude interaction does not affect the behavior of legislators in small magnitude constituencies, where poverty is more significant. However, support for the hypotheses is found in the largest, more developed constituency where M is equal to twenty-three seats.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen ◽  
Irina Ciornei

A growing number of countries have granted their emigrant citizens the right to vote in homeland elections from afar. Yet, there is little understanding of the extent to which emigration issues are visible in the subsequent legislative processes of policymaking and representation. Based on an original data set of parliamentary activities in Spain, Italy, France and Romania, this article analyses why political parties pay attention to emigrants. To that end, we propose a conceptual framework which draws on both theories of issue salience and substantive representation. Bridging these two frameworks allows us bring in both parties (salience) and constituencies (representation) in the analysis of the linkage between electorates and parliaments at a transnational level. We test a series of hypotheses and find that parties are more likely to focus on emigration issues the stronger their electoral incentives and in the context of electoral systems allowing the emigrants to elect special emigrant representatives.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-64
Author(s):  
Silvina Lilian Danesi ◽  
Ludovic Rheault

Latin American legislatures have gone largely unstudied, with the functioning of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies prior to the 1980s being an entirely unexplored subject. This paper fills that gap by examining the organization of the Chamber, with particular focus on its standing committee system from 1946 to 2001. We assess the portability of two U.S.-based theoretical approaches to legislative organization by applying them to committee assignments. An original data set of Argentine deputies was constructed and a way of measuring political power in committees was devised for this study. Despite weak democratic governments, military interventions, and changes to the electoral system, we find that ruling parties have consistently influenced the committee system, shaping its structure and securing an over-proportion of their deputies in key committee positions. These results support the applicability of the U.S. originated Cartel Theory of legislative organization to understanding and studying legislatures outside that country.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
Sandra Bermúdez ◽  
Marc Guinjoan ◽  
Kelly Rowe ◽  
Pablo Simón

How party strategies vary by electoral system remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies diverge between districted electoral systems and systems using a single national district. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts or the strength of parties’ local organizations. Our results show that only the frequency of visits to districts by large parties are clearly affected by electoral systems and, more specifically, by the number of districts and district population.


2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Benoit

A ranking exists in electoral systems research of different electoral formulas—the mathematical functions governing the conversion of votes into legislative seats—in terms of both proportionality of seats and votes and favorability to the largest party. I reexamine this issue with new methods and new evidence, attempting to cross-validate previous rankings using a larger and more controlled data set and more precise parametric methods than have been applied previously. The results by and large confirm previous knowledge but also illuminate several important new facets obscured in previous investigations. For example, at common ranges of district magnitude (from 5 to 15 seats), it is shown that electoral formula may matter at least as much as district magnitude in shaping proportionality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 675-691
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Fernandes ◽  
Miguel Won

In this chapter, we examine the Portuguese case whose institutional design makes it a paradigm of party-centered legislative debates. Together with the closed-list proportional representation electoral system, the rules-induced centrality of parties in legislative organization creates strong incentives for party leaders to keep tabs on party members on the floor. In this chapter, we describe the formal and informal rules of legislative debate in Portugal. Using an original data set from 1999 through 2019, our empirical analysis yields three key results. First, women continue to be sidelined from floor access, not only in the opportunities to take the floor but also in the length of speeches they deliver. Second, seniority has a positive effect in increasing the likelihood of taking the floor. Third, our results point out to a sharp increase in the likelihood of taking the floor and making long speeches, which corroborates our general theoretical expectations in the volume.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stockemer ◽  
Aksel Sundström

Middle-aged to senior men of the ethnic majority and higher income groups are generally overrepresented in parliaments. While research on group representation has examined issues of gender, economic standing, and, more recently, ethnicity, few studies examine age groups. We argue that the design of political institutions influences the share of young adults in parliaments across nations and hypothesize that the electoral system type, age candidacy requirements, and quotas influence the share of younger deputies in national parliaments. Analyzing an original data set with a global cross-national sample, we find that proportional representation and giving candidates the right to stand in elections as early as possible (i.e. at the age of 18) matter. In contrast, quota provisions for youths are currently too selectively applied to increase the percentage of young deputies in parliament.


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