Portugal

2021 ◽  
pp. 675-691
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Fernandes ◽  
Miguel Won
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Sharp Increase ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Positive Effect

In this chapter, we examine the Portuguese case whose institutional design makes it a paradigm of party-centered legislative debates. Together with the closed-list proportional representation electoral system, the rules-induced centrality of parties in legislative organization creates strong incentives for party leaders to keep tabs on party members on the floor. In this chapter, we describe the formal and informal rules of legislative debate in Portugal. Using an original data set from 1999 through 2019, our empirical analysis yields three key results. First, women continue to be sidelined from floor access, not only in the opportunities to take the floor but also in the length of speeches they deliver. Second, seniority has a positive effect in increasing the likelihood of taking the floor. Third, our results point out to a sharp increase in the likelihood of taking the floor and making long speeches, which corroborates our general theoretical expectations in the volume.

scholarly journals Making Sense of an Unstable Legislature: Committee Assignments in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1946–2001

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-64
Author(s):  
Silvina Lilian Danesi ◽  
Ludovic Rheault
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Committee Assignments ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

Latin American legislatures have gone largely unstudied, with the functioning of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies prior to the 1980s being an entirely unexplored subject. This paper fills that gap by examining the organization of the Chamber, with particular focus on its standing committee system from 1946 to 2001. We assess the portability of two U.S.-based theoretical approaches to legislative organization by applying them to committee assignments. An original data set of Argentine deputies was constructed and a way of measuring political power in committees was devised for this study. Despite weak democratic governments, military interventions, and changes to the electoral system, we find that ruling parties have consistently influenced the committee system, shaping its structure and securing an over-proportion of their deputies in key committee positions. These results support the applicability of the U.S. originated Cartel Theory of legislative organization to understanding and studying legislatures outside that country.

scholarly journals Do party primaries punish women? Revisiting the trade-off between the inclusion of party members and the selection of women as party leaders

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882198896
Author(s):  
Javier Astudillo ◽  
Andreu Paneque
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Mixed Gender ◽  
Selection Of

This paper examines the effect of party primaries on women’s chances of winning a leadership contest in eight Western parliamentary countries since 1985. By doing so, we revisit an ongoing debate about a possible trade-off between the democratic values of ‘inclusion’ of party members and ‘representation’ of excluded groups that this type of selection method may involve. Using an original data set consisting of 608 candidates who participated in 168 leadership mixed-gender contests at the national or regional level, we show that female candidates perform worse under party primaries. This finding holds even after controlling for the type of candidate competing. We therefore sustain the argument that this leadership selection mechanism, in its current format, involves a trade-off between ‘inclusion’ and ‘representation’.

New Zealand

2021 ◽  
pp. 613-632
Author(s):  
Moritz Osnabrügge
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Ethnic Minorities ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Parliamentary Debates ◽  
Female Politicians ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This chapter studies debate participation in New Zealand’s parliament from 1996 to 2002. New Zealand has a mixed-member proportional electoral system and a multiparty system. Its parliamentary rules and procedures give parties considerable control over the allocation of speaking time in debates and questions during question times. The empirical analysis, based on 125,088 speeches, studies the number of speeches that parliamentarians delivered and the number of words they spoke during two legislative periods. I find that ministers and party leaders participate significantly more and use more words in parliamentary debates than other parliamentarians. I also show that female politicians and ethnic minorities are less likely to participate.

scholarly journals Mapping the Trade and Environment Nexus: Insights from a New Data Set

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Frédéric Morin ◽  
Andreas Dür ◽  
Lisa Lechner
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Policy Innovation ◽  
Import Competition ◽  
Environmental Standards ◽  
Trade And Environment ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Regime Effectiveness ◽  
Environment And Trade

Environment and trade are increasingly linked through preferential trade agreements. Despite the encompassing nature of environmental provisions in trade agreements, studies on causes and consequences of the trade and environment linkage are scarce. A main cause hindering research in this area is the lack of data. In this research note, we introduce an original data set (TREND) on environmental provisions found in 630 trade agreements signed between 1947 and 2016—the most comprehensive data set in terms of both variables coded and agreements covered. We illustrate the data set’s usefulness by assessing the question of why countries include environmental provisions in trade agreements. Are trade negotiations opportunities to promote stringent environmental standards? Or are environmental provisions window dressing covering protectionist interests? We find evidence that democracies, countries that face import competition, and countries that care about the environment are more likely to include environmental provisions in trade agreements. The database is of particular relevance for research on international institutional design, policy innovation, regime complexity, policy diffusion, and regime effectiveness.

scholarly journals International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tana Johnson ◽  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Model Case ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
International Bureaucracy ◽  
Design Preferences

AbstractBureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess limited discretion in institutional design; sometimes, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, because of states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original data set.

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Parallel System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Effects of Ballot Type and District Magnitude on Local Public Goods Bill-Initiation Behavior: Evidence from Honduras

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292090588
Author(s):  
Juan Muñoz-Portillo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
High Poverty ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Small Magnitude ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Seeking Behavior

An influential literature predicts that incentives to provide local public goods are conditioned by how electoral systems expose a legislator to the need to seek a personal vote. Carey and Shugart theorize that district magnitude and ballot type interact affecting the legislators’ personal vote-seeking behavior. Another literature challenges the idea that electoral systems affect the behavior of legislators, particularly in highly clientelist settings, usually associated with high poverty. I empirically evaluate these arguments on an original data set of local goods bills presented by legislators of the National Congress of Honduras between 1990 and 2009. Honduras changed its electoral system from closed-list to open-list in 2004 while keeping its district magnitude constant. The results suggest that the Ballot Type × District Magnitude interaction does not affect the behavior of legislators in small magnitude constituencies, where poverty is more significant. However, support for the hypotheses is found in the largest, more developed constituency where M is equal to twenty-three seats.

Faith and experience

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 370-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Felipe Mantilla
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Set Covering ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Authoritarian Politics ◽  
Electoral Performance ◽  
Positive Effect

How does a history of participation in secular authoritarian regimes shape the trajectory of religious political parties after transitions to democracy? This article examines the contrasting experiences of Catholic political parties in Latin America in order to assess whether and under what conditions pre-transition participation has a positive effect on post-transition electoral performance. It develops a theoretical account that emphasizes the relative costs and benefits of participation in secular authoritarian politics for religious parties. Empirically, it uses an original data set covering 22 Catholic parties that participated in 104 elections across Latin America as well as in-depth case studies of Mexico and Peru. It finds that Catholic parties that participated in authoritarian politics were more likely to emerge as significant players after transition, but that this effect is contingent on the competitiveness of the authoritarian regime.

Diversity and Power: Selection Method and Its Impacts on State Executive Descriptive Representation

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-233
Author(s):  
Sarina Rhinehart ◽  
Matthew J. Geras
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Minorities ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Selection Method ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Leadership Positions ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Executive Leaders ◽  
Racial And Ethnic Minorities

This article explores diversity within top leadership positions in state governments, specifically, the role that position selection method plays in promoting the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities into positions of power. We hypothesize that minorities will be more likely to serve in appointed positions as governors consider diversity in making appointments and less likely to serve in elected positions due to the additional hurdles for candidates of color. Using an original data set of state executive leaders from 2001 to 2017 from all 50 states, we find evidence that institutional design influences levels of diversity among state executive leaders. Racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to be appointed than elected to state executive leadership positions. In addition, we find that Democratic governors are more likely than Republican governors to appoint minorities. Ultimately, this evidence is important for understanding how institutional design can have consequences for descriptive representation, specifically for groups that have been historically excluded from political life.

The Politics of Legislative Debates

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Original Material ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Presidential Democracies ◽  
Comprehensive Study

Legislative debates make democracy and representation work. Political actors engage in legislative debates to make their voice heard to voters. Parties use debates to shore up their brand. This book makes the most comprehensive study of legislative debates thus far, looking at the politics of legislative debates in thirty-three liberal democracies in Europe, North America and Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. The book begins with theoretical chapters focused on the key concepts in the study of legislative debates. Michael Laver, Slapin and Proksch, and Taylor examine the politics of legislative debates in parliamentary and presidential democracies. Subsequently, Goplerud makes a critical review of the methodological challenges in the study of legislative debates. Schwalbach and Rauh further discuss the difficulties in the comparative empirical study of debates. Country-chapters offer a wealth of original material organized around structured sections. Each chapter begins with a detailed discussion of the institutional design, focusing on the electoral system, legislative organization, and party parties, to which a section on the formal and informal rules of legislative debates ensues. Next, each country-chapter focuses on analyzing the determinants of floor access, with a particular emphasis on the role of gender, seniority, and legislative party positions, among others. In the concluding chapter, the editors explore comparative patterns and point out to multiple research avenues opened by this edited volume.

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