scholarly journals Alliances, signals of support, and military effort

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406612110338
Author(s):  
Matthew DiGiuseppe ◽  
Patrick E. Shea
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
Negligible Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Empirical Record

Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable; thus, only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on the external security of allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional signals, these reassured allies will have greater confidence that an ally will come to their aid. As a result, third-party aggressors are deterred and the demand for military spending will decrease. We test this argument with an analysis of US signals of support, alliance commitments, and military spending. We find that American alliances without additional signals of support have a negligible effect on military spending. Yet, we observe that alliances are negatively associated with military spending when signals of support are present. Additional tests indicate that alliance commitments, coupled with strong US signals, are also associated with lower military spending in the rivals of US allies. Our results potentially help explain the mixed evidence in the arms-versus-allies and burden-sharing literatures and further demonstrate that extra-alliance signals play an important role in the practice of International Relations.

scholarly journals Alliances, Signals of Support, and Military Effort

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiGiuseppe ◽  
Patrick Shea
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
Negligible Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Empirical Record

Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce their military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable, thus only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional signals, these reassured allies will have greater confidence that an ally will come to their aid. As a result, third party aggressors are deterred and the demand for military spending will decrease. We test this argument with an analysis of U.S. signals of support, alliance commitments, and military spending. We find that alliances without additional signals of support have a negligible effect on military spending. Yet, we observe that signals of support are negatively associated with military spending among U.S. allies. Additional tests indicate that strong U.S. signals, coupled with alliance commitments, are also associated with lower military spending in the rivals of U.S. allies. Our results potentially help explain the mixed evidence in the arms-versus-allies and burden-sharing literatures and further demonstrate that signals play an important role in the practice of international relations.

Who commits the most to NATO? It depends on how we measure commitment

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332098082
Author(s):  
Scott Cooper ◽  
Kendall W Stiles
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Key Indicator ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Out Of Area ◽  
Disproportionate Burden

Studies of NATO rely heavily on military spending as a fraction of GDP as the key indicator of members’ contribution to the alliance, but a growing number of scholars have challenged this approach. We suggest that each member’s public goods provision is a better measure of commitment to the alliance. In the case of post-Cold War NATO, out-of-area troop deployments (adjusted for population) constitute one of the strongest indicators of a state’s contribution to public goods. Providing troops for NATO missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the clearest signals of high commitment to the alliance. Using deployment data from 2004 to 2018, we show that there is evidence of disproportionate burden-sharing within the alliance. Countries like Slovenia, Denmark, the USA and UK contributed far more to NATO deployments than others like Turkey, Spain, Poland, and Portugal. We also use the data to begin examining possible causes of these disparities. We find that wealthier countries, countries that spend more on their militaries, and newer alliance members are more likely to contribute. Our indicator and first-cut model open avenues for further research on why some members demonstrate higher commitment to NATO than others.

Choosing anarchy: institutional alternatives and the global order

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moonhawk Kim ◽  
Scott Wolford
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
International System ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Political Units ◽  
Self Enforcement ◽  
Interaction Density

The international system may be anarchic, but anarchy is neither fixed nor inevitable. We analyze collective choices between anarchy, a system of inefficient self-enforcement, and external enforcement, where punishment is delegated to a third party at some upfront cost. In equilibrium, external enforcement (establishing governments) prevails when interaction density is high, the costs of integration are low, and violations are difficult to predict, but anarchy (drawing borders) prevails when at least one of these conditions fail. We explore the implications of this theory for the causal role of anarchy in international relations theory, the integration and disintegration of political units, and the limits and possibilities of cooperation through international institutions.

Linkages between Security and Economics in Japan

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Iida
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
The Other ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Policy Objectives

The linkages between security and economics are complex and have been discussed in the literature of various fields, thus defying simple classification and integration. This chapter presents a taxonomy that divides various topics into two sets of policies: policies pertaining to military power and those related to bargaining power. For example, defense spending and burden sharing in alliance, which are standard topics in the economics of defense, are categorized under the first set of policies. Export controls, which are usually discussed in entirely different contexts, are also categorized under this set. On the other hand, economic sanctions, which are a standard fare in international relations, are categorized under the second set of policies. This chapter presents the argument that security crises and dual-use technologies tie both sets of policies together. By seeking greater autonomy, Japan is engaging in a severe trade-off between strengthening their military forces and bargaining power and other foreign and economic policy objectives.

Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 645-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupen Cetinyan
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Extended Deterrence ◽  
Irrational Behavior ◽  
Minorities At Risk ◽  
External Intervention

Relatively weak ethnic groups mobilize and rebel against their governments just as frequently (or infrequently) as strong ones. However, such seemingly irrational behavior is not inconsistent with a rationalist approach to ethnic separatism. A bargaining model that treats all the relevant actors as strategic players suggests that power disparities between an ethnic minority and the state—including those based on a group's access to third-party intervention—should affect how the state treats the group but not the likelihood that the group rebels against the state. Greater mistreatment by the state should not be correlated with greater external intervention on a group's behalf. New empirical support for the model is drawn from the Minorities at Risk data set, and the discussion has implications for the field of international relations beyond ethnic conflict to extended deterrence more generally.

scholarly journals The Impact of US Military Spending on Public Debt in Europe (1992–2013): A Note

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul Caruso ◽  
Marco Di Domizio
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Panel Estimation ◽  
Dynamic Panel ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper investigates the relationship between the US military spending and public debt in a panel of European countries in the period 1992–2013. Under the established evidence of the interdependence between US and European military spending, we exploited a dynamic panel estimation. Findings show that the debt of European countries is: (1) positively associated with US military spending; (2) negatively associated with average military burden of other European countries.

Part A: Articles: International Criminal Courts: A Political View

1997 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Forsythe
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Final Evolution

This article addresses international criminal courts in the 1990s, against the background of a growth in third-party adjudication in international relations as a whole. Given lack of knowledge about the final evolution of three courts reviewed, the author is cautious in assessing whether the condition of international relations allows for successful criminal courts that achieve more good than bad. The UN ad hoc court for former Yugoslavia faced difficult obstacles during 1993–1996. The author believes Western parties were correct in not pressing for trials of certain political leaders, although the context could change. He is sceptical that the UN ad hoc court for Rwanda can break the cycle of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes region of Africa. He does not believe major military powers will actively support a UN standing criminal court, even should the General Assembly vote it into being. In conclusion, the author believes that States will continue to make inconsistent choices about what human rights policies, including support for criminal courts, should be pursued in different contexts. International relations, or even the community of liberal democracies, is not yet characterised by a situation in which systematic concern for individual responsibility under the rule of law trumps other policy considerations.

scholarly journals Negotiation and mediation as a means of peaceful settlement of international economic disputes

2021 ◽  
Vol 11/2 (-) ◽  
pp. 16-18
Author(s):  
Maksym KOZLOVSKYI
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Mediation Process ◽  
Compromise Solution ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Peaceful Settlement ◽  
The One

Introduction. Interstate interaction and integration, on the one hand, are the key to the successful functioning of humanity, and on the other hand, they provoke the emergence of international differences and conflicts, including those of an economic nature. Successful settlement of economic differences in accordance with the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes is a necessary condition for strengthening and developing international cooperation. The issue of peaceful settlement of economic disputes, including through the use of diplomatic means, has been studied by such authors as I.V. Grynchak, О.M. Malysheva, Z.V. Tropin, etc. The purpose of the paper is to determine the specifics of negotiation and mediation as political ways to resolve economic disputes peacefully. Results. In international legal doctrine, the most common is the division of peaceful means of resolving international disputes into diplomatic (political) and legal (judicial). The most common are negotiations, good services and mediation, international arbitration. International negotiations, as part of the system of international relations, on the one hand, feel their influence, acting as a tool in solving a range of foreign policy and, in some cases, domestic policy problems, on the other – themselves affect international relations, largely defining and shaping them. The difference between mediation and negotiation is that a third party intervenes in the dispute resolution process with the aim of reconciling the parties. At the same time, the role of the mediator is quite passive, the purpose of his activity is to establish a constructive dialogue between the conflicting states. Therefore, the result of applying this method in some cases can only be reduced to the resumption of negotiations. Conclusion. Negotiation and mediation are diplomatic (political) means of peaceful settlement of international economic disputes. Such means of resolving international economic disputes are used in the presence of a common will of the parties to resolve the conflict, and a common focus on finding a mutually beneficial and compromise solution to the dispute. A key difference between negotiation and mediation is the involvement of a third party in the mediation process, which helps the parties to reach an agreed and compromise solution.

The Czechoslovak national tragedy of the 1938 year

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-58
Author(s):  
Svetlana G. Mirzoeva ◽  
Elena Kh. Apazheva ◽  
Natalya S. Lavrova
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Slovak Republic ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Third Party ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
World War ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Second World

The article deals with the problem of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia, its political and economic development in the specified period. Particular attention is paid to the efforts of Czechoslovakia aimed at preventing the division of the country. The leadership of Czechoslovakia entered into international treaties, strengthened the state’s defenses, and modernized the army. The article also touches upon the international relations of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy on the further fate of Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 30s. XX century. The leadership of Czechoslovakia and its president Edvard Beneš felt the threat looming over the country from Germany, so they took certain steps to preserve the integrity of the Czechoslovak republic. The reform of the army began in the country, it was modernized, equipped with new equipment, weapons, aviation. A new line of fortifications was built along the borders. The diplomatic department of Czechoslovakia was also not idle. Consultations were constantly held with the USSR, Great Britain, France and Germany on the issue of preserving the country’s sovereignty, international treaties were concluded on assistance in the event of an attack by a third party. But, despite all these efforts, at the end of September 1938, Czechoslovakia was divided by force, the Sudetenland was torn away from it, fascist troops were brought into the country, and the leaders of the state were leaders of the fascist party. All these changes were enshrined in an international treaty - the Munich Agreement. Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain took part in its signing. Representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic were not even invited to the conference. The Czechoslovak side was familiarized with the terms of the agreement only after their adoption. Czechoslovakia could not in any way influence the decisions of Hitler, Mussolini, Deladier and Chamberlain. As a result, throughout the Second World War, Czechoslovakia existed as two separate parts: the Protecto-rate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovak Republic.

Conclusion

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Global War On Terror ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Conflict Escalation ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Alliance Politics ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Global War

This chapter reviews the historical and theoretical lessons highlighted by the book. It shows how disorganization and discord in alliance politics has made the maintenance of peace through coercive diplomacy in Asia very difficult. It considers two separate sets of dynamics among enemy alliances that carry theoretically important lessons for the study of international relations. The first set of dynamics relate to alliance coordination, problems of burden-sharing within an alliance, and unclear signaling in an alliance's coercive diplomacy. The second set of dynamics involves potentially differential levels of devotion to specific revisionist conflicts. The chapter concludes with a discussion of other cases of alliance disunity and conflict escalation to which the theoretical approaches offered here might apply, including pan-Arabism and the Six Day War of 1967, the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the global war on terror.

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