Partisan media, untrustworthy news sites, and political misperceptions

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144482110333
Author(s):  
Brian E Weeks ◽  
Ericka Menchen-Trevino ◽  
Christopher Calabrese ◽  
Andreu Casas ◽  
Magdalena Wojcieszak

This study investigates the potential role both untrustworthy and partisan websites play in misinforming audiences by testing whether actual exposure to these sites is associated with political misperceptions. Using a sample of American adult social media users, we match data from individuals’ Internet browser histories with a survey measuring the accuracy of political beliefs. We find that visits to partisan websites are at times related to misperceptions consistent with the political bias of the site. However, we do not find strong evidence that untrustworthy websites consistently relate to false beliefs. There is also little evidence that visits to less partisan, centrist news sites are associated with more accurate political beliefs about these issues, suggesting that exposure to politically neutral news is not necessarily the antidote to misinformation. Results suggest that focusing on partisan news sites—rather than untrustworthy sites—may be fruitful to understanding how media contribute to political misperceptions.

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (09) ◽  
pp. 13669-13672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Jiang ◽  
Ronald E. Robertson ◽  
Christo Wilson

Content moderation, the AI-human hybrid process of removing (toxic) content from social media to promote community health, has attracted increasing attention from lawmakers due to allegations of political bias. Hitherto, this allegation has been made based on anecdotes rather than logical reasoning and empirical evidence, which motivates us to audit its validity. In this paper, we first introduce two formal criteria to measure bias (i.e., independence and separation) and their contextual meanings in content moderation, and then use YouTube as a lens to investigate if the political leaning of a video plays a role in the moderation decision for its associated comments. Our results show that when justifiable target variables (e.g., hate speech and extremeness) are controlled with propensity scoring, the likelihood of comment moderation is equal across left- and right-leaning videos.


Author(s):  
Emily Van Duyn

Republicans and Democrats increasingly distrust, avoid, and wish harm upon those from the other party. To make matters worse, they also increasingly reside among like-minded others and are part of social groups that share their political beliefs. All of this can make expressing a dissenting political opinion hard. Yet digital and social media have given people new spaces for political discourse and community, and more control over who knows their political beliefs and who does not. With Democracy Lives in Darkness, Van Duyn looks at what these changes in the political and media landscape mean for democracy. She uncovers and follows a secret political organization in rural Texas over the entire Trump presidency. The group, which organized out of fear of their conservative community in 2016, has a confidentiality agreement, an email listserv and secret Facebook group, and meets in secret every month. By building relationships with members, she explores how and why they hide their beliefs and what this does for their own political behavior and for their community. Drawing on research from communication, political science, and sociology along with survey data on secret political expression, Van Duyn finds that polarization has led even average partisans to hide their political beliefs from others. And although intensifying polarization will likely make political secrecy more common, she argues that this secrecy is not just evidence that democracy is hurting, but that it is still alive, that people persist in the face of opposition, and that this matters if democracy is to survive.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Chen ◽  
Diogo Pacheco ◽  
Kai-Cheng Yang ◽  
Filippo Menczer

AbstractSocial media platforms attempting to curb abuse and misinformation have been accused of political bias. We deploy neutral social bots who start following different news sources on Twitter, and track them to probe distinct biases emerging from platform mechanisms versus user interactions. We find no strong or consistent evidence of political bias in the news feed. Despite this, the news and information to which U.S. Twitter users are exposed depend strongly on the political leaning of their early connections. The interactions of conservative accounts are skewed toward the right, whereas liberal accounts are exposed to moderate content shifting their experience toward the political center. Partisan accounts, especially conservative ones, tend to receive more followers and follow more automated accounts. Conservative accounts also find themselves in denser communities and are exposed to more low-credibility content.


Author(s):  
Brian E. Weeks ◽  
R. Kelly Garrett

Society’s turn to social media as a primary source of news and political information means that journalists’ goal of accurately informing the public is now challenged by user-created and shared content that is misleading, inaccurate, or blatantly false. In this chapter it is argued that emotions exacerbate the problem and make it more likely that people are exposed to false information, share it, and believe it. The chapter begins by reviewing the relevant conceptualizations of emotion before turning to a discussion of emotions’ influence at various stages in this process. First, the chapter illustrates how emotions bias what news and information people seek and are exposed to in social media, including misinformation. Second, the chapter describes the various ways in which emotions affect how people engage news in social media, including sharing, and its consequences for false beliefs. The chapter ends by demonstrating how the emotional character of social media can lead to inaccurate political beliefs.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Guimarães ◽  
Fabrício Benevenuto

News consumption is increasingly done on social media websites. In this environment, all types of entities and people present themselves as news sources. These new outlets might focus on specific audiences, and some exhibit the news less objectively. Facebook is one of these platforms, which categorizes an extensive group of pages as a kind of news media. To analyze this phenomenon, it is crucial to characterize all pages that disseminate information in this ecosystem. Our main objective is to create an in-depth diagnostic of news stories and opinions, focusing on Brazilian Facebook. Our contributions are: (i) a new method to measure the political bias of Facebook pages on a given country, and (ii) a detailed characterization of a comprehensive sample of these pages.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-24
Author(s):  
Matt Sheedy

The Occupy movement was an unprecedented social formation that spread to approximate 82 countries around the globe in the fall of 2011 via social media through the use of myths, symbols and rituals that were performed in public space and quickly drew widespread mainstream attention. In this paper I argue that the movement offers a unique instance of how discourse functions in the construction of society and I show how the shared discourses of Occupy were taken-up and shaped in relation to the political opportunity structures and interests of those involved based on my own fieldwork at Occupy Winnipeg. I also argue that the Occupy movement provides an example of how we might substantively attempt to classify “religion” by looking at how it embodied certain metaphysical claims while contrasting it with the beliefs and practices of more conventionally defined “religious” communities.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Pereira ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel ◽  
Elizabeth Ann Harris

Political misinformation, often called “fake news”, represents a threat to our democracies because it impedes citizens from being appropriately informed. Evidence suggests that fake news spreads more rapidly than real news—especially when it contains political content. The present article tests three competing theoretical accounts that have been proposed to explain the rise and spread of political (fake) news: (1) the ideology hypothesis— people prefer news that bolsters their values and worldviews; (2) the confirmation bias hypothesis—people prefer news that fits their pre-existing stereotypical knowledge; and (3) the political identity hypothesis—people prefer news that allows their political in-group to fulfill certain social goals. We conducted three experiments in which American participants read news that concerned behaviors perpetrated by their political in-group or out-group and measured the extent to which they believed the news (Exp. 1, Exp. 2, Exp. 3), and were willing to share the news on social media (Exp. 2 and 3). Results revealed that Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group, supporting a political identity hypothesis. However, although belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, we also found that Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake new. We discuss the implications for theoretical explanations of political beliefs and application of these concepts in in polarized political system.


Author(s):  
Philip Habel ◽  
Yannis Theocharis

In the last decade, big data, and social media in particular, have seen increased popularity among citizens, organizations, politicians, and other elites—which in turn has created new and promising avenues for scholars studying long-standing questions of communication flows and influence. Studies of social media play a prominent role in our evolving understanding of the supply and demand sides of the political process, including the novel strategies adopted by elites to persuade and mobilize publics, as well as the ways in which citizens react, interact with elites and others, and utilize platforms to persuade audiences. While recognizing some challenges, this chapter speaks to the myriad of opportunities that social media data afford for evaluating questions of mobilization and persuasion, ultimately bringing us closer to a more complete understanding Lasswell’s (1948) famous maxim: “who, says what, in which channel, to whom, [and] with what effect.”


Author(s):  
Kevin Munger ◽  
Patrick J. Egan ◽  
Jonathan Nagler ◽  
Jonathan Ronen ◽  
Joshua Tucker

Abstract Does social media educate voters, or mislead them? This study measures changes in political knowledge among a panel of voters surveyed during the 2015 UK general election campaign while monitoring the political information to which they were exposed on the Twitter social media platform. The study's panel design permits identification of the effect of information exposure on changes in political knowledge. Twitter use led to higher levels of knowledge about politics and public affairs, as information from news media improved knowledge of politically relevant facts, and messages sent by political parties increased knowledge of party platforms. But in a troubling demonstration of campaigns' ability to manipulate knowledge, messages from the parties also shifted voters' assessments of the economy and immigration in directions favorable to the parties' platforms, leaving some voters with beliefs further from the truth at the end of the campaign than they were at its beginning.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-305
Author(s):  
Keri Cronin ◽  
Tim Fowler ◽  
Douglas Hagar

Abstract In 2012, Tuxedo Stan, a domestic long-hair cat, “ran for mayor” of Halifax, Nova Scotia, and a year later Stan’s brother, Earl Grey, “ran for premier” of Nova Scotia. What separated Stan and Earl Grey (who ran under the banner of the Tuxedo Party) from other politically minded felines was that the Tuxedo Party campaigns were not stunt or joke campaigns. While the cats could obviously not take office, the two campaigns were nonetheless political advocacy campaigns, with a clearly articulated message to make life better for feral and stray cats. This paper argues that the Tuxedo Party successfully elevated the issue onto the political agenda through their savvy mix of social media, and the use of positive imagery of cats in their campaigns.


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