Measuring Constituency Ideology Using Bayesian Universal Kriging

2020 ◽  
pp. 153244002093019
Author(s):  
Jeff Gill
Keyword(s):  
Past Research ◽  
Statistical Technique ◽  
Universal Kriging ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
Validity Check ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
State Legislative ◽  
Zip Code

In this article, we develop and make available measures of public ideology in 2010 for the 50 American states, 435 congressional districts, and state legislative districts. We do this using the geospatial statistical technique of Bayesian universal kriging, which uses the locations of survey respondents, as well as population covariate values, to predict ideology for simulated citizens in districts across the country. In doing this, we improve on past research that uses the kriging technique for forecasting public opinion by incorporating Alaska and Hawaii, making the important distinction between ZIP codes and ZIP Code Tabulation Areas, and introducing more precise data from the 2010 Census. We show that our estimates of ideology at the state, congressional district, and state legislative district levels appropriately predict the ideology of legislators elected from these districts, serving as an external validity check.

The Unrealized Precedent of DAVIS V. BANDEMER

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Seabrook
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
The State ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
State Legislative

This chapter examines the involvement of the Supreme Court of the United States in litigation relating to partisan gerrymandering, paying particular attention to a case that attempted to apply the previously established Davis v. Bandemer precedent to congressional elections: Vieth v. Jubelirer. It begins with an overview of Badham v. Eu, which arose from the redrawing of California's congressional districts in the aftermath of the 1980 census and its most significant holding: that the Bandemer precedent, which had initially been applied to the drawing of state legislative districts only, also extends to the drawing of congressional districts. The chapter then considers the circumstances surrounding the Vieth case, in which the alleged political gerrymander concerned the reapportionment plan for the congressional districts in the state of Pennsylvania rather than those for the state assembly. It also analyzes the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Vieth, focusing on Justice Antonin Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurring opinion.

Silence of the Land: On the Historical Irrelevance of Territory to Congressional Districting and Political Representation in the United States

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rehfeld
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Representative Government ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
Communities Of Interest

Every ten years, the United States “constructs” itself politically. On a decennial basis, U.S. Congressional districts are quite literally drawn, physically constructing political representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of where one lives. Why does the United States do it this way? What justifies domicile as the sole criteria of constituency construction? These are the questions raised in this article. Contrary to many contemporary understandings of representation at the founding, I argue that there were no principled reasons for using domicile as the method of organizing for political representation. Even in 1787, the Congressional district was expected to be far too large to map onto existing communities of interest. Instead, territory should be understood as forming a habit of mind for the founders, even while it was necessary to achieve other democratic aims of representative government.

Congressional District Results

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
John R. Petrocik
Keyword(s):  
Contextual Information ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
Age Profile ◽  
Democratic Vote ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Political Variables

There are demographic and political factors beyond turnout that matter for elections. Congressional districts are sufficiently small and homogeneous to permit an examination of turnout in the context of relevant political and demographic variables. That controlled analysis is presented here. For the two most recent decades, this chapter uses data sets that include relevant demographic and political variables for each of the congressional districts, including the ethnicity of the electorate, its age profile, and district income to account for the effect of socioeconomic status on the Democratic vote share. This contextual information presses the analysis one level further. An estimation of the relationship between turnout and Democratic vote is strengthened when other factors that are known to influence support for the Democrats are considered and included in the models.

Anatomy of a Cartographic Surrogate: the Portrayal of Complex Electoral Boundaries in the Congressional District Atlas

2000 ◽  
pp. 66-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Monmonier
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
State Level ◽  
Voting Rights Act ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Edition ◽  
Complex Boundaries

Compiled and published by the Bureau of the Census, the Congressional District Atlas describes the boundaries of the nation’s 435 congressional districts. Since its inception in 1960, the atlas has grown in length from 103 to 1,272 pages. The most noteworthy increase, between the 1987 and 1993 editions, reflects judicial pressure to equalize district population within a state as well as Department of Justice efforts to maximize the number of minority-majority districts. Single-district states like Delaware and Wyoming still consume a single printed page, and because county boundaries are documented elsewhere, a singlepage map is usually adequate for states in which district boundaries do not split counties. By contrast, non-traditional borders winding through multiple counties require numerous large-scale maps efficiently formatted as telescopically nested insets. In the most recent edition, published in two volumes in 1993, Florida and Texas individually account for more pages than the entire first edition, and North Carolina’s 12th district, which the Supreme Court ridiculed in Shaw v. Reno, stretches across 30 separate pages. Because of this parsimonious portrayal of boundaries, the atlas affords a convenient state-level descriptor of geographic complexity: the ratio of map pages to seats in the House of Representatives. Cartographic and statistical analysis of this index reveals a concentration of complex boundaries in the Southeast and other areas in which the Voting Rights Act mandates preclearance by the Justice Department. Not surprisingly, the index is a near-perfect predictor of judicial challenges to race-based redistricting

Campaign and Contextual Influences on Voter Participation in State Legislative Elections

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT E. HOGAN
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Voter Participation ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Contextual Influences ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Campaign Effects ◽  
State Legislative Elections ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
State Legislative

Recent studies suggest that campaign mobilization factors such as candidate spending and electoral competition play a substantial role in influencing voter participation in elections. This analysis focuses on the relative influence of these campaign effects along with a variety of contextual features on district-level turnout in state legislative elections. Models testing a variety of variables across seven states in 1994 point to the overwhelming influence of socioeconomic and political context, with campaign mobilization effects contributing a much smaller degree of explanatory power. While some mobilization factors (such as campaign spending) have the potential to exert a strong impact on turnout, factors beyond the control of candidate campaigns are responsible for much of the observed variation in turnout across state legislative districts.

scholarly journals Rejoinder

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Aistrup
Keyword(s):  
Structural Characteristics ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Southern State ◽  
Social Events ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
State Legislative Elections ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
State Legislative

The commentary of our colleagues is appreciated. Even though this reply will not settle this controversy, it might provide a starting point for others wishing to examine this topic. The article had two major findings. The first is that there was a minimal Democratic bias in contested southern state legislative districts in the 1970s and 1980s. The second is that the Democrats appear to have used the switch from multimember districts (MMDs) to single-member districts (SMDs) to insulate themselves from large vote swings by lowering the swing ratio (responsiveness) of the electoral system. Krassa and Combs make two criticisms of this research: First, the grouping time periods together means the analysis includes the effects of other structural and social events, thus confounding the analysis of changes in the swing ratio and bias. They suggest a need to adopt a similar methodology to King and Gelman (1991), which controls for the structural characteristics in southern state legislative elections. Their second critique is the interpretation of a declining swing ratio protecting incumbents is incorrect. A more desirable situation for Democratic incumbents is to have a high swing ratio because it converts lower vote shares into a higher proportion of Democratically controlled districts. Bullock’s critique notes the findings are not generalizable to the affirmative action gerrymandering associated with the 1990s redistricting process. I begin by addressing the methodological critique of Krassa and Combs. Then I turn to the latter two questions involving the interpretation of our findings.

Redistricting and Electoral Competition in American Politics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Substantial Impact ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

Redistricting, or the process of redrawing congressional district boundaries, can be a highly contentious and political affair. Electoral competition within districts is dependent on both of the major American political parties being evenly balanced. Therefore, redistricting can enhance or diminish competition through how it distributes partisans across districts. Indeed, politicians have used this process to manipulate boundaries in their favor for centuries. In fact, the term most commonly used for exploiting the redistricting process for partisan gain—gerrymandering—was coined in 1812 as Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry signed legislation creating a map with heavily distorted districts, one of which resembled a salamander. Thus, the portmanteau “gerry-mander” was born. The misshapen districts produced the intended effect of facilitating greater electoral success for members of the governor’s party. Throughout history, Congress, the US Supreme Court, individual states, the American electorate, and an ever-evolving political environment have all impacted the construction of district maps. Additionally, each of these factors further influences the level of electoral competition within the district. Therefore, this work seeks to outline how redistricting can directly or indirectly influence electoral competition within congressional districts. Directly, different redistricting entities (legislatures, commissions, and courts) possess different motivations and constraints when drawing district lines, which can impact competition. Indirectly, redistricting can influence voting behavior and the incumbency advantage, which can also impact competition. This work also explores the tradeoff between representation and competition, the relationship between redistricting and polarization, what constitutes a gerrymander, and how durable redistricting plans are over time. Each can have a substantial impact on electoral competition, which in turn bears consequences for our understanding of the consequences of redistricting.

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