Self-Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Priority Rule ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Richard Arneson

AbstractThe lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity in John Rawls’s justice as fairness, which has been sharply criticized by Larry Alexander and Richard Arneson among others, is left almost entirely undefended in Rawls’s works. I argue here that this priority rule can be successfully defended against its critics despite Rawls’s own doubts about it. Using the few textual clues he provides, I speculatively reconstruct his defense of this rule, showing that it can be grounded on our interest in self-realization through work. This reconstructed defense makes liberal use of concepts already present in A Theory of Justice, including the Aristotelian Principle (which motivates the achievement of increasing virtuosity) and the Humboldtian concept of social union (which provides the context for the development of such virtuosity). I also show that this commitment to self-realization, far from violating the priority of right in Rawls’s theory, stems directly from his underlying commitment to autonomy, which is the very foundation of the moral law in his doctrine of right. The reconstituted defense of this priority rule not only strengthens the case for justice as fairness but also has important and controversial implications for public policy.

scholarly journals Dilemmas of Rawlsian Opportunity

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Gomberg
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Just Society

In A Theory of Justice and elsewhere John Rawls writes that the basic structure of any society affects the life prospects of those growing up in different ‘starting places,’ yet his conception of equal opportunity seems to require that one's opportunities not be affected by the class position of one's birth. Here I explicate this apparent contradiction and reconcile these assertions. In Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity children from working-class families have lesser opportunity to attain advantaged positions.Rawls's view cannot be easily revised to allow equal prospects for all children. Within the framework of Rawls's understanding of a just society, he is right to say that his own conception of fair equality of opportunity allows deep inequalities in life prospects.

Two limits to the application of Rawls’s concepts of autonomy and the difference principle in contemporary philosophy of education

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-311
Author(s):  
Zdenko Kodelja
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Profound Influence ◽  
Famous Book ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference

The concept of justice that Rawls discussed in his famous book “A Theory of Justice” has had a profound influence on contemporary political and moral philosophy, as well as, to some extent, philosophy of education. Many philosophers of education have applied or criticized Rawls’s concepts – above all the concepts of autonomy, the person, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – which he developed as an essential part of his theory of justice. In this paper I will discuss very briefly only one of the problems that philosophers of education face when applying his concepts of the autonomous person and the difference principle. The essence of this problem is expressed in the question of whether or not to respect the limits of the applicability of these concepts set by Rawls himself.

Comment on Gavin Kerr

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

AbstractIn this comment I challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

The Revisionist Difference Principle

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Social ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Intuitive Idea ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

John Rawls's famous difference principle is capable of at least four distinct statements, each of which occurs inA Theory of Justice.According to what I shall term the Crude Principle it is a necessary and sufficient condition for the justice of an institutional scheme which expands social and economic inequality that, subject to the satisfaction of more weighty principles, it increases the level of advantage of the least advantaged. Expressing this principle Rawls writes that,Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate.

The State’s Role in Ensuring Fair Income Distribution in Vietnam Today: Some Issues from the Theory of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020

Fair Equality of Opportunity

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 197-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry A. Alexander ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

Justice as Fairness: For Groups?

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Homogeneous State ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Almost All

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEFFREY EDWARD GREEN
Keyword(s):  
Economic Impact ◽  
Distinct Group ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
System Of Inequalities ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Heuristic Device ◽  
Proposed Regulation ◽  
Influential Theory ◽  
Liberal Thought

This article aims to correct the widespread imbalance in contemporary liberal thought, which makes explicit appeal to the “least advantaged” without parallel attention to the “most advantaged” as a distinct group in need of regulatory attention. Rawls's influential theory of justice is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this imbalance, but I show how a Rawlsian framework nonetheless provides three justifications for why implementers of liberal justice—above all, legislators—should regulate the economic prospects of a polity's richest citizens: as a heuristic device for ensuring that a system of inequalities not reach a level at which inequalities cease being mutually advantageous, as protection against excessive inequalities threatening civic liberty, and as redress for a liberal society's inability to fully realize fair equality of opportunity with regard to education and politics. Against the objection that such arguments amount to a defense of envy, insofar as they support policies that in certain instances impose economic costs on the most advantaged with negative or neutral economic impact on the rest of society, I attend to Rawls's often overlooked distinction between irrational and reasonable forms of envy, showing that any envy involved in the proposed regulation of the most advantaged falls within this latter category.

Philosophers-Citizens

In Our Name ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Beerbohm
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Life Of The Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter challenges an account of citizenship that treats us as political philosophers or perennial deliberators and instead proposes the model of the philosopher-citizen who exhibits a computationally intense life of the mind. It first describes the ideal of the philosopher-citizen before considering how a theory of justice is to be employed by well-intentioned citizens by taking into account the views of John Rawls. It argues that the model of the philosopher-citizens tends to be monistic, collapsing the diversity of moral achievements that citizens can make in a democracy, and that this ideal should be separated from an account of the citizen's decision-making obligations. The chapter also examines the principles for citizens and for representatives in the context of Justice as Fairness and concludes by outlining the essential assumptions of a nonideal democratic theory.

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