Practical Reason, Value and Action

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Hills

AbstractHow should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but ultimately this is in addition to, rather than a substitute for, relating practical reason to value as well. I set out three different conceptions of action and corresponding success conditions, and explain how each is linked to a particular conception of practical reason and, in two cases, to a theory of value too. My goal is to describe these different accounts, rather than to defend any in particular, though I will suggest that some are more satisfactory than others.

Author(s):  
Alan Thomas

The theory of value has three main traditions: subjectivism, which holds that the only valuable goods are subjective states of sentient beings; objectivism, which claims that while values must be human-related, they exist independently of us; and Neo-Kantian rationalism, which suggests that value is postulated on the basis of practical reason. Central distinctions in the theory of value are between subjective and objective values, instrumental and final values, intrinsic and extrinsic values, organic unities and the idea of an ultimate or architectonic value. There are also distinctions drawn between different types of value, such as moral and aesthetic value.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral value, hence also denying that they may have any role to play in moral agency and moral thinking. In what follows, I will offer a Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a diversified and complex relation between reason and sensibility.


2020 ◽  
pp. 232-255
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

While Hutcheson and Hume present a utilitarian outlook, Mill and Sidgwick offer a systematic defence of it. They argue: (1) Utilitarianism makes sense of ordinary moral beliefs, so that anyone who takes these beliefs seriously has good reason to be a utilitarian. The utilitarian principle is the primary principle that explains the approximate truth of the secondary principles—ordinary moral rules. Apparent exceptions to utilitarianism—e.g., principles about justice and rights—can be reconciled with it. The hedonist theory of value—suitably interpreted—can explain the widespread view that pleasure is not the only good. (2) Utilitarianism follows from basic principles of practical reason, so that anyone who questions ordinary moral beliefs still has good reason to be a utilitarian. Once we understand that rational concern for our own interest requires us to aim at our own greatest good, without caring more or less about different times, we see that rational concern for everyone’s interest requires us to maximize the total good, without caring about whether this or that person gets more of it.


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Reisenzein ◽  
Irina Mchitarjan

According to Heider, some of his ideas about common-sense psychology presented in The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations ( Heider, 1958 ) originally came from his academic teacher, Alexius Meinong. However, Heider makes no reference to Meinong in his book. To clarify Meinong’s influence on Heider, we compare Heider’s explication of common-sense psychology with Meinong’s writings, in particular those on ethics. Our results confirm that Heider’s common-sense psychology is informed by Meinong’s psychological analyses in several respects: Heider adopts aspects of Meinong’s theory of emotion, his theory of value, and his theory of responsibility attribution. In addition, Heider more or less continues Meinong’s method of psychological inquiry. Thus, even without Meinong’s name attached, many aspects of Meinong’s psychology found their way into today’s social psychology via Heider. Unknowingly, some of us have been Meinongians all along.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Itmam Aulia Rakhman

Ath-Thusi uses Aristotle's understanding of the practical reason of the theory of surgery. According to Ath-Thusi, the cause of deviation is anything excessive. Thus, the unbalanced state of the soul is caused by the advantages, disadvantages, or morbidity of the mind. Diversity in a society is a necessity, a household, as the smallest community of a complex society and full of differences, it is certainly necessary to be based on the building of togetherness and mutual respect between one another. This article will describe the creative ideas of Khawajah Nashiruddin Ath-Thusi related to the philosophy of the household in order to answer the present-day problematic of the family.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


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