Utilitarianism

2020 ◽  
pp. 232-255
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Widespread View

While Hutcheson and Hume present a utilitarian outlook, Mill and Sidgwick offer a systematic defence of it. They argue: (1) Utilitarianism makes sense of ordinary moral beliefs, so that anyone who takes these beliefs seriously has good reason to be a utilitarian. The utilitarian principle is the primary principle that explains the approximate truth of the secondary principles—ordinary moral rules. Apparent exceptions to utilitarianism—e.g., principles about justice and rights—can be reconciled with it. The hedonist theory of value—suitably interpreted—can explain the widespread view that pleasure is not the only good. (2) Utilitarianism follows from basic principles of practical reason, so that anyone who questions ordinary moral beliefs still has good reason to be a utilitarian. Once we understand that rational concern for our own interest requires us to aim at our own greatest good, without caring more or less about different times, we see that rational concern for everyone’s interest requires us to maximize the total good, without caring about whether this or that person gets more of it.

Rational Rules and Normative Propriety

2021 ◽  
pp. 164-191
Author(s):  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Learning ◽  
Ecological Rationality ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Moral Rules

To what extent are our moral beliefs rational? This chapter argues that the statistical learning accounts offered in Part II provide reason to think that many central beliefs about socio-moral rules are acquired through rational processes and that this confers on the beliefs an essential kind of rational credential. The beliefs are doxastically rational. However, even if the beliefs about the rules are doxastically rational, the rules themselves might be counterproductive for achieving our ends. Another way to evaluate the propriety of a rule is in terms of ecological rationality, that is, how well the rule works given our minds and environments. This chapter articulates a number of factors that contribute to the ecological rationality of a rule, and argues that act-based rules are plausibly are more ecologically rational than consequence-based rules.

Values

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Aesthetic Value ◽  
Organic Unities ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Sentient Beings ◽  
Subjective States ◽  
Extrinsic Values

The theory of value has three main traditions: subjectivism, which holds that the only valuable goods are subjective states of sentient beings; objectivism, which claims that while values must be human-related, they exist independently of us; and Neo-Kantian rationalism, which suggests that value is postulated on the basis of practical reason. Central distinctions in the theory of value are between subjective and objective values, instrumental and final values, intrinsic and extrinsic values, organic unities and the idea of an ultimate or architectonic value. There are also distinctions drawn between different types of value, such as moral and aesthetic value.

Normativity and emotional vulnerability

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Ethical Behaviour ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Complex Relation ◽  
Emotional Vulnerability ◽  
Theory Of Value

Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral value, hence also denying that they may have any role to play in moral agency and moral thinking. In what follows, I will offer a Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a diversified and complex relation between reason and sensibility.

4. Principles for right action

2018 ◽  
pp. 44-60
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Broad Theory ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Theory Of Value

Environmental ethics cannot escape from considering what ought or ought not to be done, and how this is to be decided or discovered. ‘Principles for right action’ reflects on how to understand moral principles. It considers different contract theories of ethics, concluding that they continue to fail to ensure equity between generations and between species. Virtue ethics may be a more promising approach, but well-chosen, justifiable moral rules are essential. Rules and duties, and beneficial practices, traits, and actions are also discussed. The approach that is the more consistent, most fruitful, and best serves the needs of future generations seems to be consequentialism, allied to a broad theory of value.

Practical Reason, Value and Action

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Hills
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Theory Of Value

AbstractHow should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but ultimately this is in addition to, rather than a substitute for, relating practical reason to value as well. I set out three different conceptions of action and corresponding success conditions, and explain how each is linked to a particular conception of practical reason and, in two cases, to a theory of value too. My goal is to describe these different accounts, rather than to defend any in particular, though I will suggest that some are more satisfactory than others.

Nielsen, Ethics and God

1978 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osmond G. Ramberan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Moral Insight ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Will

One of the central claims of most religious people (especially those in the Judeo-Christian tradition) is that morality is based upon religion or, more specifically, on a belief in God. A morality which is not God-centred not only cannot provide a genuine basis for moral beliefs but is really and truly groundless. For without a belief in the sovereignty of God, there can be no genuine adequate foundation for moral beliefs. In his recent book, Ethics Without God, Kai Nielsen claims that this view is grossly mistaken. According to Nielsen, morality cannot be based on religion because moral claims cannot be derived from religious (non-moral) cosmological claims such as ‘God is Creator’, or ‘God exists’. ‘God wills X’, ‘God commands X’, do not entail ‘X ought to be done’, or ‘I ought to do X’. It is perfectly in order for someone to say that God wills (commands) X, but is X good? It is also perfectly in order for someone to say that God commands me to do X, but why should I obey God? Surely it cannot be because God is powerful and, if I do not obey his commands, he will punish me. It may be prudent and expedient to obey God because I am afraid of punishment, but this is surely not a morally good reason for obeying him. Moral obligations follow God's commands only if it is assumed that God is morally perfect or that he is good or that his commands are right (p. 5). But I cannot know that God is good without an understanding of what it is for something to be good. To be sure, ‘God is good’, is a truth of language, but in order to understand it we must have a prior understanding of goodness- an understanding which is ‘logically prior to, and independent of, any understanding or acknowledgement of God’ (p. 11). Moreover, Nielsen argues, the religious quest is a quest to find a being that is ‘worthy of worship’, but it is by our own moral insight that we decide that any being, any Z, is ‘worthy of worship’. The decision that there is a Z such that Z is worthy of worship is a moral judgment which is in no way dependent upon the will of God. But more than this, ‘God’, in ‘God is worthy of worship’, is, in most cases, used analytically so that anyone who is brought to say ‘My God’, or ‘My Lord and my God’, is using ‘God’ evaluatively and by implication making a moral judgment - a moral judgment which is logically prior to the will or command of God. This leads Nielsen to conclude:

scholarly journals Deduction of Freedom vs Deduction of Experience in Kant’s Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80
Author(s):  
Valeriy E. Semyonov
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Transcendental Reduction ◽  
Methodological Basis ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Critical Methods

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction of pure concepts of understanding (deduction of experience) and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason (deduction of freedom). The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental (formal) idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”.

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