When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?

Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1005-1019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be undermining the values on which its legitimacy rests. In this paper, I suggest how this apparent paradox might be resolved. I argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also obligated to criticize publicly those beliefs. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—coercive and expressive—I contend that such criticism should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus “expressive” in two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens of the value of the entitlements that underlie them.


Author(s):  
Sri Endah Wahyuningsih ◽  

As a state of law as well as a democratic state, Indonesia guarantees and protects the right to freely express opinions and the right to organize in society. This in the end becomes the basis for every member of the community to be free to establish an Ormas. The freedom to establish these mass organizations in its development is not controlled due to the absence of real government control and supervision. This has resulted in many mass organizations being born into thugs and illegal organizations. This study aims to analyse the current system of supervision of mass organizations in Indonesia, the weaknesses in the current implementation of mass organizations, and the ideal reconstruction of a system of supervision of mass organizations capable of realizing a just law of mass organizations. The research in this dissertation uses the sociological juridical method. As for the results of the research conducted, it can be found that the current implementation of normative supervision has not been effective, as evidenced by the large number of problematic and prohibited mass organizations, weaknesses in the supervision of mass organizations in the community due to a legal vacuum in the regulation of supervision of mass organizations, so it is necessary to reconstruct values by conducting supervision and education. regarding the goals of mass organizations and the goals of the state and nation as well as legal reconstruction in the form of adding provisions for the supervision of mass organizations in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 16 of 2017.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Ilse Gomes Silva

Resumo: O artigo tem como objetivo levantar elementos para a análise da ação do Estado brasileiro diante das manifestações de junho de 2013 e compreender o processo de criminalização dos movimentos sociais. As manifestações de junho de 2013, em todo o território brasileiro, denunciaram a precarização das condições de vida da população e a forma violenta do Estado tratar a classe trabalhadora quando ousa reivindicar seus direitos. Diversos movimentos sociais estão nas ruas exercendo o direito à participação política e pressionando as instituições da democracia. A reação violenta do Estado brasileiro a estas manifestações indicam que direitos duramente conquistados, como a liberdade de expressão e organização, estão ameaçados, o que coloca em risco a participação política da classe trabalhadora e, consequentemente, a democracia.Palavras-chave: Poder político, autoritarismo, movimentos sociais, democracia.DEMOCRACY AND CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN BRAZIL: the manifestations on june 2013Abstract: The article aims to identify elements for the Brazilian state action on the analysis of the manifestations on June 2013 and understand the process of criminalization of social movements. The manifestations on June 2013, in all of Brazil, denounced the deterioration of people’s living conditions and the violent way the state treat the working class when it dares to claim their rights. Diverse social movements are on the streets exercising the right to political participation and exerting pressure on institutions of democracy. The violent reaction of the Brazilian state to these demonstrations indicate that hard-won rights such as freedom of expression and organization, are threatened, which endangers the political participation of the working class and hence democracy.Key words: Political power, authoritarianism, social movements, democracy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-169
Author(s):  
Teresa M. Bejan

AbstractThe classical liberal doctrine of free expression asserts the priority of speech as an extension of the freedom of thought. Yet its critics argue that freedom of expression, itself, demands the suppression of the so-called “silencing speech” of racists, sexists, and so on, as a threat to the equal expressive rights of others. This essay argues that the claim to free expression must be distinguished from claims to equal speech. The former asserts an equal right to express one’s thoughts without interference; the latter the right to address others, and to receive a hearing and consideration from them, in turn. I explore the theory of equal speech in light of the ancient Athenian practice of isegoria and argue that the equality demanded is not distributive but relational: an equal speaker’s voice should be counted as “on a par” with others. This ideal better captures critics’ concerns about silencing speech than do their appeals to free expression. Insofar as epistemic and status-harms provide grounds for the suppression and exclusion of some speech and speakers, the ideal of equal speech is more closely connected with the freedom of association than of thought. Noticing this draws attention to the continuing—and potentially problematic—importance of exclusion in constituting effective sites of equal speech today.


Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.


Author(s):  
Steven Wheatley

Researchers on “democracy” in international law have to make an important methodological choice: They can examine the “democracy norm” from the perspective only of international law (state practice, treaty norms, international law texts, etc.) or they can locate their research within a wider body of social science literature, in particular considering the normative conception of democracy in political theory (electoral, deliberative, consociational, etc.) and the practice of democracy and democracy promotion identified in political science. The latter is recommended since the idea of democracy in international law did not emerge ex nihilo. To be meaningful, it seems reasonable to conclude that the international law conception of democracy must maintain its family relationship with the idea of democracy that has emerged in political thought and practice over time—after all no agreed definition of democracy exists in international law. For researchers engaged in a critique of doctrine and practice from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, more in-depth reading will be required and reading of the original materials is essential. This article introduces researchers to the key writings in the English language on democracy in international law and relevant readings that inform the debates in international law in cognate disciplines. While certain democratic elements can be found in international doctrine and practice over time, “democracy” as an identifiable principle of the international law order can be dated back to the 1990s and the ending of the Cold War. While the status and content of the “democracy norm” in international law remains contested, the influence of democratic ideals can be seen in a number of areas relating to legitimate political authority at the level of the state and, increasingly, the (democratic) legitimacy of international organizations and institutions. The principle of democracy is seen to have an influence in the functioning of international law and the practice of international relations and international governance: establishing a criterion for legitimate and lawful government, giving form to the right of peoples to political self-determination, providing a context for the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and establishing the basis for peaceable and nonpeaceable interstate relations. Moreover, following the globalization and fragmentation of governance functions, concern has grown increasingly with respect to the “democratic deficit” experienced by citizens at the level of the state, leading to proposals for the democratization of global governance and a literature that examines the extent to which a democratic state should accept the authority of nondemocratic international law norms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gulzhan Uskenbayeva

<p class="22">We investigate a new approach to the construction of vector Lyapunov functions. An approach to the construction of Lyapunov functions as vector functions is developed based on a geometrical interpretation of the second method of Lyapunov. The negative of the gradient is determined from the components of the time derivative of the state vector (i.e., the right-hand side of the state equation). The region of stability of a closed-loop linear, stationary system with uncertain parameters is governed by inequalities in the matrix elements of the closed-loop system. This study developed a method for analysing the robust stability of SISO and MIMO linear systems in canonical forms.</p>


Moldoscopie ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludmila Oleinic ◽  

The establishment of a democratic state, an open society in which the citizen is the subject of social-political processes and feels safe, represent in essence a complex process. The main role in achieving these objectives largely depends by the state, by the public power, which is essentially obliged to create the right conditions and mechanisms for the involvement of all progressive forces in the construction of the new edifice. In this vein, the factor of awareness of the state’s correlation with national security is very important in order to make proposed objectives work. As a result, in order to increase the effectiveness the state focuses on reporting and accommodating to modern European standards and principles on the activity, organization and functioning of political processes and institutions in society as a whole in correlation with assuring national security issues.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

This chapter focuses on democratic persuasion. Although democratic persuasion stresses the importance of an active role for the legitimate state in promoting democratic values, value democracy does not abandon all accounts of neutrality in thinking about freedom of expression. The Supreme Court's doctrine of viewpoint neutrality is appropriate as a standard for limiting state coercion. Viewpoint neutrality means that all viewpoints, regardless of their content, should be protected by freedom of expression, provided they are not direct threats to individuals. However, while viewpoint neutrality is appropriate as a standard for applying the right of free expression to citizens, it is misplaced as a guide to determining the state's own expression and what it should say. The chapter argues that the state should be non-neutral in its persuasive and expressive roles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Alejandra Gonza

Article 13 of the American Convention was designed to provide robust guarantees for the freedom of thought and expression. Early Inter-American case law conceived freedom of speech as a primary means to control state power and provided strong protection to varied expression. This included ideas and information considered “offensive, shocking, unsettling or disturbing for the state or to any sector of the population.” In fact, the Court was the first international tribunal to recognize the right to access to state-held information as part of the protection of freedom of expression.


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