Determinants of the Onset of Militarized Conflicts

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-59
Author(s):  
Hyung Min Kim

Classical liberals such as Immanuel Kant have argued that expanding political participation and increasing economic interdependence would promote peace among states. The purpose of this paper is to use a game theoretical method to explore both pillars of the “liberal peace” hypothesis, one of the most frequently studied determinants of the onset of militarized conflicts. The paper focuses on two important contributions from related literature: Crescenzi's (2000) proposition that the linkage between economic interdependence and political conflict is unstable or more complex than the current theory of international bargaining suggests and Fearon's (1994) argument that relative audience costs (either domestic or international) matter in the international crisis situation (a political “war of attrition”). After revising Crescenzi's (2000) economic exit model using Fearon's (1994) audience cost argument, four different equilibriums in the international bargaining model emerged: the economic exit equilibrium, the constraint equilibrium, the bargaining power equilibrium, and the escalation equilibrium. This paper also provides seven examples of the bargaining game to demonstrate how these four equilibriums emerged.

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801878711
Author(s):  
Akisato Suzuki

Does the state of the domestic economy change the size of the effect of audience costs? As public opinion research has shown, citizens assess the performance of their leaders based not only on foreign policy, but also on the domestic economy. Thus, if leaders are subject to audience costs, they should be even less able to afford failure in an international crisis when the economy is performing badly than when the economy is doing well. As a result, such leaders should be even more able to make their threats credible and, therefore, are more likely to be successful in coercive diplomacy. This novel prediction finds no empirical support in a replication study using Moon and Souva (2016). I discuss possible reasons for this result and avenues for further research.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Gelpi ◽  
Michael Griesdorf

We attempt to explain when and why democratic states will prevail in international crises. We review several of the prominent theories about democratic political structures and derive hypotheses from each framework about crisis outcomes. These hypotheses are tested against the population of 422 international crises between 1918 and 1994. Our findings provide further evidence that the democratic peace is not a spurious result of common interests. Moreover, we also begin the difficult task of differentiating among the many theories of the democratic peace. In particular, we find strong evidence that democratic political structures are important because of their ability to generate domestic audience costs. Our findings also support the argument that democratic political structures encourage leaders to select international conflicts that they will win.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mina E. Tanious

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent the economic interdependence can affect the likelihood of conflict between States. Specially, over the past few decades, there has been a huge interest in the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict. Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the possibility of war by increasing the weight of trading over the alternative of aggression; interdependent states would rather trade than invade; realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Design/methodology/approach This paper highlights the content and level of economic interdependence between China and the USA since the beginning of China’s economic reform in 1979 and examines the impact of economic interdependence between them on their relationship toward Taiwan since 1995 and the probability of conflict. Findings Economic interdependence is proved to significantly decrease the onset of conflict between the two parties. This can be shown by comparing the number of armed conflicts during the pre-interdependence period to the number of armed conflicts after the economic interdependence there was an overage of 0.79 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)/year, compared to 0.26 MIDs/year following China’s economic reforms; also, the length of the hostilities was longer during the pre-interdependence period (with an average of 11.13 months versus 5.33 months). Originality/Value This means that economic interdependence does not completely prevent the outbreak of international conflicts, but it also plays a major role in influencing the conflict in terms of the conflict’s intensity, the use of armed force and the number of conflicts that occur between the economic interdependence states.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Carment

On July 29 1987, after 20 years of sustained inter-communal conflict and under great political pressure and war weariness, leaders of the government of Sri Lanka signed an Accord with the Indian government which hady at Sri Lanka s request, intervened in Sri Lanka's military and political conflict. The Accord aimed at the cessation of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs signalled a decisional shift among Sri Lanka's leaders from a policy of resolving the conflict by military means to one of seeking political accommodation with the Tamil separatists. However, the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and previous attempts by the Indian government to air drop supplies to Tamil rebels signalled the beginning of international crisis between India and Sri Lanka. This paper traces the events and decisional flow of Sri Lanka s elites from the pre-crisis period ofl983 to crisis abatement in 1990 in an attempt to understand the events and patterns of behaviour that led to an international crisis between Sri Lanka and India and more generally to elucidate the relationship between domestic ethnic conflict and international crisis. This paper argues that Sri Lanka entered into an international crisis precisely because of internal threats to its political integrity engendered by its domestic ethnic conflict. First, the theoretical literature is explored, allowing for a fuller exploration of the linkages between international crisis and ethnic conflict. Second, the perceptions of Sri Lanka's decision-maker s in response to increasing Indian involvement during the pre-crisis and crisis period are assessed. Third an analysis of SriLankan decision-making process is weighed against patterns of coping found in the theoretical literature. Fourth and finally, implications for further research are explored, specifically the role that ethnic conflicts play in triggering international crises and the implications that has for the management of ethnic conflicts by regional hegemons.


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