As mentioned in the previous chapter, many experiments on food irradiation in the 1950s were carried out with spent-fuel rods from nuclear reactors. Such fuel rods contain a mixture of many fission products, with greatly differing half-lives, emitting different types of radiation with different energies. The composition of fuel rods changes all the time because the radionuclides with short half-lives disappear quickly, whereas those with longer half-lives remain. Although fuel rods are primarily a source of gamma radiation (the less penetrating alpha and beta radiation are absorbed by the steel hull of the rods) they do give off some neutrons. Since the latter can produce radioactivity when they interact with matter such as food, fuel rods have not been used for irraditation of foods since the early 1960s. Because of their constantly varying composition, fuel rods also make dosimetry difficult, and this was another reason for abandoning their use. Individual constituents of spent fuel rods can be separated in reprocessing plants by chemical methods. One of the radionuclides obtainable in this way is Cs. With a half-life of 30 years and emission of gamma radiation (0.66 MeV) and beta radiation (0.51 MeV and 1.18 MeV), '^C s decays to stable '^B a (barium). After the ,37Cs is separated from the other constituents of the fission waste in the form of CsCl it is triply encapsulated in stainless steel containers because CsCl is soluble in water. If it leaked out it could cause contamination of the environment. As provided by the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) at Hanford, Washington, the 137Cs capsule is 400 mm in active length (500 mm in total length) and 67 mm in diameter. There are only a few reprocessing plants in the world and the capacity for extracting ,37Cs from spent fuel rods is very limited. Plans for building several commercial reprocessing facilities in the United States were canceled by Presi­ dent Carter’s 1977 decision that the United States would not engage in commer­ cial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. As a consequence, not much ,37Cs is available and there are not many gamma radiation facilities which use ,Cs. No

1995 ◽  
pp. 31-31
MRS Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (19) ◽  
pp. 991-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaristo J. Bonano ◽  
Elena A. Kalinina ◽  
Peter N. Swift

ABSTRACTCurrent practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.


Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a “Monitored Retrievable Storage” facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE’s goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility.


Author(s):  
Edward Wonder ◽  
David S. Duncan ◽  
Eric A. Howden

Technical activities to support licensing of dry spent nuclear fuel storage facilities are complex, with policy and regulatory requirements often being influenced by politics. Moreover, the process is often convoluted, with numerous and diverse stakeholders making the licensing activity a difficult exercise in consensus-reaching. The objective of this evaluation is to present alternatives to assist the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) in developing a licensing approach for a planned Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Because the RK lacks experience in licensing a facility of this type, there is considerable interest in knowing more about the approval process in other countries so that an effective, non-redundant method of licensing can be established. This evaluation is limited to a comparison of approaches from the United States, Germany, Russia, and Canada. For each country considered, the following areas were addressed: siting; fuel handling and cask loading; dry fuel storage; and transportation of spent fuel. The regulatory requirements for each phase of the process are presented, and a licensing approach that would best serve the RK is recommended.


Author(s):  
Todd P. Lagus

Nuclear spent fuel reprocessing has lately reemerged as a subject of debate in the energy policy world. Since a 1977 Presidential Directive which deferred reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the United States has utilized a “once through” or “open cycle” system of nuclear fuel processing, which leaves most of the energy content in uranium unused. Current reprocessing technology increases the cost of nuclear electricity while only offering limited storage benefits. Advanced technologies have the potential to increase proliferation resistance, the need for more geologic repositories, and allow the United States to regain an international presence in reprocessing technology. The United States should not immediately engage in spent fuel reprocessing, but should begin aggressive research and development for new reprocessing technologies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 247 ◽  
pp. 16006
Author(s):  
Zs. Elter ◽  
V. Mishra ◽  
S. Grape ◽  
E. Branger ◽  
P. Jansson ◽  
...  

Before encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository, the fuels need to be verified for safeguards purposes. This requirement applies to all spent fuel assemblies, including those with properties or designs that are especially challenging to verify. One such example are quivers, a new type of containers used to hold damaged spent fuel rods. After placing damaged rods inside the quivers, they are sealed with a thick lid and the water is removed. The lid is thick enough to significantly reduce the amount of the gamma radiation penetrating through it, which can make safeguards verification from the top using gamma techniques difficult. Considering that the number of quivers at storage facilities is foreseen to increase in near future, studying the feasibility of verification is timely. In this paper we make a feasibility study related to safeguards verification of quivers, aimed at investigating the gamma and neutron radiation field around a quiver designed by Westinghouse AB and filled with PWR fuel rods irradiated at the Swedish Ringhals site. A simplified geometry of the quiver and the detailed operational history of each rod are provided by Westinghouse and the reactor operator, respectively. The nuclide inventory of the rods placed in the quiver and the emission source terms are calculated with ORIGEN-ARP. The radiation transport is modeled with the Serpent2 Monte Carlo code. The first objective is to assess the capability of the spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT) to verify the content for nuclear safeguards purposes. The results show that the thick quiver lid attenuates the gamma radiation, thereby making gamma radiation based verification from above the quiver difficult.


Author(s):  
Leroy Stewart ◽  
Mikal A. McKinnon

Abstract The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management conducted spent nuclear fuel integrity and cask performance tests from 1984–1996 at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Between 1994 and 1998, DOE also initiated a Spent Fuel Behavior Project that involved enhanced surveillance, monitoring, and gas-sampling activities for intact fuel in a GNS CASTOR V/21 cask and for consolidated fuel in a Sierra Nuclear VSC-17 cask. The results of these series of tests are reported in this paper. Presently, DOE is involved in a cooperative project to perform destructive evaluations of fuel rods that have been stored in the CASTOR V/21 cask. The results of those evaluations are presented elsewhere in these proceedings in a paper entitled “Examination of Spent PWR Fuel Rods after 15 years in Dry Storage”.


1981 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. C. Burkholder

In response to draft radioactive waste disposal standards, R&D programs have been initiated in the United States which are aimed at developing and ultimately using radionuclide transport-delaying (e.g., long-lived waste containers) and radionuclide transport-controlling (e.g., very low release rate waste forms) engineered components as part of the isolation system. Before these programs proceed significantly, it seems prudent to evaluate the technical justification for development and use of sophisticated engineered components in radioactive waste isolation.


1995 ◽  
pp. 33-33

Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
Daniel Poneman

In May, 1974, the Indian Government detonated a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The device contained heavy water supplied by the United States and plutonium that had been reprocessed from the spent fuel of a research reactor supplied by Canada. That event shocked the governments involved in international nuclear commerce into greater efforts to prevent the diversion of civil nuclear assistance to military purposes. By 1976, France and West Germany had joined the United States in pledging not to export facilities for the production of plutonium. Two years later the major suppliers agreed upon guidelines intended to ensure that international safeguards would be applied to all sensitive nuclear exports.


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