Interaction of Economic Thought and Economic Policy in the Soviet Union

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. G. Treml
2012 ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
L. Tsedilin

The article analyzes the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet experience of the protectionist policies. Special attention is paid to the external economic policy during the times of NEP (New Economic Policy), socialist industrialization and the years of 1970-1980s. The results of the state monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions in the Soviet Union are summarized; the economic integration in the frames of Comecon is assessed.


1956 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Campbell

SOVIET economic policy in the few years since Stalin's death has been characterized by flamboyance and ferment. In an attempt to free economic growth from the bottleneck of stagnation in agriculture, Khrushchev has sponsored some extravagant gambles in corn-growing and in expansion of the sown acreage. Policy toward the consumer has gone through two complete reversals: the regime at first experimented with offering the population an improvement in the standard of living, but is now once again asserting that abundance in the future requires austerity today. Perhaps the most startling innovation of all emerged in the past year when the regime began to develop a program of foreign economic assistance as a weapon in its economic competition with the capitalist part of the world. Because of their spectacular nature, these shifts of policy have attracted considerable attention in the West and have been commented on at length. Aware diat the Soviet Union is expanding her economic power at a more rapid rate than are the capitalist countries, Western students of the Soviet economy have sought in these policy changes-some clue as to whether its rate of growth is likely to decline or to be maintained in the future. The early indications of a rise in standards of living that would cause a reduced growth of heavy industry and so a decline in investment and in the rate of growth have now been dispelled. The inability of Soviet agriculture to provide an expanding food supply for a growing work force certainly appears to be a real threat to industrial growth, and with die failure of Khrushchev's gambles, this threat remains. Thus the evidence as to the over-all effect of these changes on the rate of expansion of die Soviet economy is still inconclusive.


Slavic Review ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-336
Author(s):  
Robert W. Campbell

1993 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 134
Author(s):  
Gertrude Schroeder ◽  
Pekka Sutela

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Boldyrev ◽  
Martin Kragh

Research within the history of economic thought has focused only little on the development of economics under dictatorship. This paper attempts to show how a country with a relatively large and internationally established community of social scientists in the 1920s, the Soviet Union, was subjected to repression. We tell this story through the case of Isaak Il’ich Rubin, a prominent Russian economist and historian of economic thought, who in the late 1920s was denounced by rival scholars and repressed by the political system. By focusing not only on his life and work, but also on that of his opponents and institutional clashes, we show how the decline of a social science tradition in Russia and the USSR as well as the Stalinization of Soviet social sciences emerged as a process over time. We analyze the complex interplay of ideas, scholars, and their institutional context, and conclude that subsequent repression was arbitrary, suggesting that no clear survival or career strategy existed in the Stalinist system, due to a situation of fundamental uncertainty.


2019 ◽  
pp. 177-195
Author(s):  
Julia Elyachar

This chapter upends usual discussions of neoliberal governmentality by focusing on the relation of neoliberalism to the irrational. The central task of neoliberalism in its early days was to resurrect a discredited liberalism. WW I and the problematic Versailles Peace of 1919 convinced many that irrationality lay at the core of the “civilized” European world. Those who became neo-liberal (before the hyphen was eliminated) embraced that which was irrational while resolutely attacking all kinds of collectivism. Early neoliberals such as Mises equated socialists with savages and put socialists in what Trouillot called “The Savage Slot,” thanks to their wilful overthrow of the free market price system, without which rationality itself could not exist. Hayek and the next generation of neoliberals shifted the source of irrationality into the physiology of individual humans. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union against which early neoliberal polemics were aimed, tacit knowledge moved out of the body to the corporation via Jean Lave’s concept of communities of practice. The chapter draws on classic works in anthropology; history of economic thought; US corporate history; and obscure annals of the public sector in Egypt to make these arguments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 265-278
Author(s):  
Maksim Nazarenko

The article considers the industry estimates of the USSR of the late socialist period contained in the works of foreign economists. Particular attention is paid to the sovietological interpretations of the state of the USSR industrial sector as well as the economic policy of Soviet leadership in generating growth of industrial production, development of the Eastern regions of the country, innovation and modernization of fixed assets. The author concludes that the studies conducted by foreign scientists make it possible to clarify the assessment of the industrial sector of the Soviet Union before Perestroika and to adjust the estimates of economic development of the USSR of the “Brezhnev Era”.


Slavic Review ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Hessler

One of the firmest popular conceptions of the Soviet Union in the United States is of a system diat categorically banned private enterprise. Embraced by specialists and the general public alike, this conception reflects the official Soviet stance diat the private sector was eradicated during losif Stalin's “great break” of 1929-30. Indeed, over the course of diose two years, individual peasants were compelled to collectivize, private stores forcibly shut, private manufactures socialized, and even doctors and dentists pressured to cooperate or to close shop. The concept of an interdiction against all private economic activity found support in the words of the dictator–Stalin's assertions that the Soviet Union was a society “without capitalists, small or big,” that socialist, not capitalist, property was the “foundation of revolutionary legality,” and many other statements of a similar ilk. Stalin proved his commitment to this model by his readiness to resort to coercion against its violators: at his instigation, repressive laws threatened entrepreneurs with five to ten years in prison camp for profitable private business. Such developments appeared as unequivocal as they proved lasting; when commentators discussed perestroika in the late 1980s, the only historical precedent they could identify was Lenin's New Economic Policy six decades before.


1991 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 219-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M Collins

As the Soviet Union and the countries in Eastern Europe take steps towards market economies and democratic political systems, the U.S. and other western countries have been confronted by a range of difficult and important questions about the appropriate economic policy response. What role should government policies play? How much assistance should be given? In what form? What actual policies have been undertaken? Are they a lot or a little? At one extreme, some argue that the United States and other developed countries should finance the rebuilding of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—even though it may cost tens of billions of dollars per year, for at least a decade. At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that Eastern Europe does not warrant official U.S. assistance, other than for humanitarian purposes, because the situation is just too precarious, because there are worthier uses of scarce government resources, or because any restructuring should be undertaken by the private sector. This paper suggests a framework for answering these questions that considers both the nations of Eastern Europe and recent proposals for direct assistance to the Soviet Union. It draws upon the valuable lessons to be learned from assistance to the developing countries and from historical experience.


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