scholarly journals Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3575-3610
Author(s):  
Bruno Biais ◽  
Johan Hombert ◽  
Pierre-Olivier Weill
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Optimal Transport ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Expected Returns ◽  
Factor Loadings ◽  
Incentive Problems ◽  
Marginal Rates Of Substitution ◽  
Dynamic Exchange

Incentive problems make securities’ payoffs imperfectly pledgeable, limiting agents’ ability to issue liabilities. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of such endogenous incompleteness in a dynamic exchange economy. Because markets are endogenously incomplete, agents have different intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, so that they value assets differently. Consequently, agents hold different portfolios. This leads to endogenous markets segmentation, which we characterize with optimal transport methods. Moreover, there is a basis going always in the same direction: the price of a security is lower than that of replicating portfolios of long positions. Finally, equilibrium expected returns are concave in factor loadings. (JEL D51, D52, G11, G12)

Risk Factors of Collateralized Loan Obligations and Corporate Bonds

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 347-355
Author(s):  
Mark Wahrenburg ◽  
Andreas Barth ◽  
Mohammad Izadi ◽  
Anas Rahhal
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Risk Factor ◽  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Corporate Bonds ◽  
Risk Exposure ◽  
Expected Returns ◽  
Yield Spreads ◽  
Pricing Factors ◽  
Return Difference

AbstractStructured products like collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) tend to offer significantly higher yield spreads than corporate bonds (CBs) with the same rating. At the same time, empirical evidence does not indicate that this higher yield is reduced by higher default losses of CLOs. The evidence thus suggests that CLOs offer higher expected returns compared to CB with similar credit risk. This study aims to analyze whether this return difference is captured by asset pricing factors. We show that market risk is the predominant risk factor for both CBs and CLOs. CLO investors, however, additionally demand a premium for their risk exposure towards systemic risk. This premium is inversely related to the rating class of the CLO.

scholarly journals A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (6) ◽  
pp. 1430-1476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Strausz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Aggregate Demand ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Expected Returns ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Private Cost ◽  
Incentive Problems ◽  
Do So

Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)

scholarly journals The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadi Predtetchinski ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Hans Peters
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Dynamic Exchange

scholarly journals Twisting the truth: Foundations of wishful thinking

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 989-1022
Author(s):  
Matthew Kovach
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Wishful Thinking ◽  
Willingness To Accept ◽  
Considerable Evidence ◽  
The Status ◽  
Future Outcomes

Considerable evidence shows that people have optimistic beliefs about future outcomes. I present an axiomatic model of wishful thinking (WT), in which an endowed alternative, or status quo, influences the agent's beliefs over states and thus induces such optimism. I introduce a behavioral axiom formalizing WT and derive a representation in which the agent overweights states in which the endowment provides a higher payoff. WT is a novel channel through which an endowment may influence choice behavior and provides a coherent explanation for a variety of observed behavior, including choice reversals among nonstatus quo alternatives when the status quo changes. WT leads to inefficient risk sharing in an exchange economy and has unique implications for the gap between willingness to accept and willingness to pay for endowed goods.

Using Stocks or Portfolios in Tests of Factor Models

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Ang ◽  
Jun Liu ◽  
Krista Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Risk Premia ◽  
Factor Models ◽  
Idiosyncratic Volatility ◽  
Standard Errors ◽  
Coefficient Estimates ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Factor Loadings ◽  
Asset Pricing Models

We examine the efficiency of using individual stocks or portfolios as base assets to test asset pricing models using cross-sectional data. The literature has argued that creating portfolios reduces idiosyncratic volatility and allows more precise estimates of factor loadings, and consequently risk premia. We show analytically and empirically that smaller standard errors of portfolio beta estimates do not lead to smaller standard errors of cross-sectional coefficient estimates. Factor risk premia standard errors are determined by the cross-sectional distributions of factor loadings and residual risk. Portfolios destroy information by shrinking the dispersion of betas, leading to larger standard errors.

Linear Beta Pricing with Inefficient Benchmarks

2013 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350004 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Diacogiannis ◽  
David Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Market Risk ◽  
Expected Returns ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Expected Return ◽  
Risk Premiums ◽  
Asset Pricing Models ◽  
Current Asset ◽  
Mean Variance

Current asset pricing models require mean-variance efficient benchmarks, which are generally unavailable because of partial securitization and free float restrictions. We provide a pricing model that uses inefficient benchmarks, a two-beta model, one induced by the benchmark and one adjusting for its inefficiency. While efficient benchmarks induce zero-beta portfolios of the same expected return, any inefficient benchmark induces infinitely many zero-beta portfolios at all expected returns. These make market risk premiums empirically unidentifiable and explain empirically found dead betas and negative market risk premiums. We characterize other misspecifications that arise when using inefficient benchmarks with models that require efficient ones. We provide a space geometry description and analysis of the specifications and misspecifications. We enhance Roll (1980), Roll and Ross's (1994), and Kandel and Stambaugh's (1995) results by offering a "Two Fund Theorem," and by showing the existence of strict theoretical "zero relations" everywhere inside the portfolio frontier.

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