A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons

Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). This paper proposes a simple mechanism that implements the first-best for any number of firms: a uniform price, sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. Paybacks, which rapidly decrease with the number of firms, are such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non-cooperatively or collusively. The mechanism also provides firms with incentives to invest in socially optimal R&D. (JEL D44, L51, Q21)

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In the Beginning was the Commons: Transformative Learning as Praxis for Regenerating the Cultural Commons

Interdisciplinary Journal of Partnership ◽

10.24926/ijps.v8i2.4446 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 6

Author(s):

Aftab Omer ◽

Melissa Schwartz

Keyword(s):

Transformative Learning ◽

Educational Institutions ◽

Truth Telling ◽

Human Capabilities ◽

Shared Meanings ◽

The Core ◽

State Education ◽

The Commons ◽

Cultural Commons ◽

In The Beginning

Culture is the medium through which human capabilities are transmitted. In this respect, culture may be understood as a commons that is consequential to the future of other forms of commons. Regenerating the commons is inherently and intrinsically associated with democratizing and partnering. The commons of shared meanings that enable truth telling are exploitable by the market when education is dominated by the market. If educational institutions are at the behest of the market and the state, education can neither be a commons nor be in the service of the commons. We can frame this circumstance as an enclosure of learning. Transformative learning facilitates a shifting from the mindset of exploiting the commons to a mindset of regenerating the commons. In fact, the core transformation that occurs in transformative learning is the liberation of awareness from identity enclosure. Such a liberation prepares the ground for growing partnership capabilities from the intimate to the global, essential for preserving and regenerating the commons. An education that transforms seeks to re-sacralize and regenerate culture as a commons, which can then enable partnership-based care towards all other forms of commons.

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What Really Matters in Auction Design

The Journal of Economic Perspectives ◽

10.1257/0895330027166 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 169-189 ◽

Cited By ~ 425

Author(s):

Paul Klemperer

Keyword(s):

Mobile Phone ◽

Competition Policy ◽

Third Generation ◽

Auction Design ◽

Uniform Price ◽

Spectrum Auctions ◽

Sealed Bid ◽

Ascending Auctions

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”

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Sequential auction based parking space sharing and pricing mechanism in the era of sharing economy

Industrial Management & Data Systems ◽

10.1108/imds-04-2019-0244 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 119 (8) ◽

pp. 1734-1747 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Bing Qing Tan ◽

Su Xiu Xu ◽

Ray Zhong ◽

Meng Cheng ◽

Kai Kang

Keyword(s):

Market Design ◽

Parking Space ◽

Content Type ◽

Auction Mechanism ◽

Management Platform ◽

Sealed Bid ◽

Sequential Auction ◽

Auction Mechanisms ◽

Design Mechanism ◽

The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a parking space management platform to alleviate the parking problem and a two-stage solution for sharing and allocating parking spaces. Design/methodology/approach The market design mechanism and auction mechanism are integrated to solve the problem of parking space sharing and allocation. In the first stage, the market design mechanism with two rules is applied for making the good use of idle parking spaces. In the second stage, two sequential auction mechanisms are designed by extending first/second-price sealed bid auction mechanism to allocate both private and public parking spaces, which are received in previous stage and owned by the platform. Two stages are connected through a forecasted price which is calculated through the exponential smoothing method. Findings First, we prove three important properties of the proposed sequential auction mechanisms, namely, incentive compatibility, revenue equivalence and individual rationality. Second, a simulation study is used to verify the effectiveness of the mechanisms through numerical analysis. The impact of the system on three parts, namely, agents (private parking space suppliers), bidders (parking space customers) and the platform, is examined. Third, the results show that the sharing mechanism with monetrary incentive will attract a number of agents to join in the platform. The bidders are also able to obtain considerable utility, as compared with the (average) market parking fees. The platform can thus effectively allocate parking spaces with reasonable prices. Originality/value This paper combines the classical sequential auction mechanisms with the market design mechanism for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. The modeling and analysis method can also be used to address the similar allocation and pricing problems of other resources like bicycle sharing.

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An extended uniform-price auction mechanism of homogeneous divisible goods: supply optimisation and non-strategic bidding

International Journal of Production Research ◽

10.1080/00207543.2016.1171417 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 54 (13) ◽

pp. 4028-4042 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Congjun Rao ◽

Yong Zhao ◽

Junjun Zheng ◽

Cheng Wang ◽

Zhongwen Chen

Keyword(s):

Uniform Price Auction ◽

Uniform Price ◽

Auction Mechanism ◽

Strategic Bidding ◽

Price Auction ◽

Divisible Goods

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Trustworthy Jammer Selection with Truth-Telling for Wireless Cooperative Systems

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing ◽

10.1155/2021/6626355 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 ◽

pp. 1-17

Author(s):

Yingkun Wen ◽

Tao Jing ◽

Qinghe Gao

Keyword(s):

Dominant Strategy ◽

Cooperative Systems ◽

Numerical Results ◽

Reverse Auction ◽

Truth Telling ◽

Constant Power ◽

Selection Scheme ◽

Trust Degree ◽

Additive Increase ◽

Wireless Cooperative Systems

In this paper, we propose a trustworthy friendly jammer selection scheme with truth-telling for wireless cooperative systems. We first utilize the reverse auction scheme to enforce truth-telling as the dominant strategy for each candidate friendly jammer. Specifically, we consider two auction cases: (1) constant power (CP) case and (2) the utility of the BS maximization (UBM) case. In both cases, the reverse auction scheme enforces truth-telling as the dominant strategy. Next, we introduce the trust category and trust degree to evaluate the trustworthiness of each Helper transmitter (Helper-Tx). Specifically, an edge controller calculates the reputation value of each Helper-Tx periodically using an additive-increase multiplicative-decrease algorithm by observing its jamming behavior. With the historical reputation values, the edge controller (EC) classifies a Helper-Tx into one of four trust categories and calculates its trust degree. Then, the EC selects the best Helper-Tx based on the trust category and trust degree. Lastly, we present numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our proposed jammer selection scheme.

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Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

Asia Pacific Journal of Operational Research ◽

10.1142/s0217595919500131 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 36 (03) ◽

pp. 1950013

Author(s):

Jie Xiang ◽

Juliang Zhang ◽

T. C. E. Cheng ◽

Jose Maria Sallan ◽

Guowei Hua

Keyword(s):

Private Information ◽

Dominant Strategy ◽

Purchase Decisions ◽

Reverse Auctions ◽

Reverse Auction ◽

Truth Telling ◽

Supply Disruption ◽

Bidding Strategies ◽

Numerical Studies ◽

The Cost

Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

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Modelling and Simulation of Game Applications in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Routing

Simulation in Computer Network Design and Modeling ◽

10.4018/978-1-4666-0191-8.ch001 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Omar Raoof ◽

Hamed Al-Raweshidy

Keyword(s):

Power Consumption ◽

Ad Hoc ◽

Routing Algorithm ◽

Polynomial Time Algorithm ◽

Time Algorithm ◽

Equilibrium Path ◽

Random Allocation ◽

Intermediate Node ◽

Auction Mechanism ◽

Sealed Bid

This chapter presents a game theory based routing algorithm that defines the best route based on the power consumption that each intermediate node will suffer to forward a packet, the price the destination will pay to the source, and the amount of compensation the source will pay to each intermediate node. The chapter also presents a polynomial time algorithm that can give a Nash Equilibrium path and use it to evaluate the performance of the game. The key features of the introduced mechanism are: it uses the first and second price auctions; the auction mechanism insures a fare allocation of the data to the user who values it the most; the second-price sealed-bid auction gives better revenue to the source when compared to the random allocation scheme and the first-price sealed-bid mechanism; the game mechanism combines both source compensation to the intermediate nodes and the power consumption to improve the path reliability between the source and the destination (i.e. the winning bidder); the source payoff will increase once the network density increases; and, finally, the simulation results prove that the introduced auction mechanism dramatically increases the destination’s revenue whether the first or second-price auction is chosen.

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A Mechanism Design for Managing Emissions in Energy Supply Sector

Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics ◽

10.20965/jaciii.2013.p0094 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 94-102

Author(s):

Ken Nagasaka ◽

◽

Hiroshi Takamori ◽

Eiroku Go ◽

◽

...

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Program Implementation ◽

Co2 Emission ◽

Energy Supply ◽

Behavioral Model ◽

Auction Mechanism ◽

Strategic Design ◽

The Commons ◽

Clear Presentation

The strategic design for a program for managing the commons involves devising a scheme where those regulated are not trapped into inefficient equilibrium of moral hazardous behavior. This paper studies the auctionmechanism for allocating allowance or licenses for CO2 emission and also pricing transferable allowance. For the sake of clear presentation, we use a behavioral model of an electricity supplier firm to define key ingredients in the auction mechanism. Program implementation is evaluated by simulating the firm’s response to various levels of constraint under the program.

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