scholarly journals Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950013
Author(s):  
Jie Xiang ◽  
Juliang Zhang ◽  
T. C. E. Cheng ◽  
Jose Maria Sallan ◽  
Guowei Hua
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Purchase Decisions ◽  
Reverse Auctions ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
The Cost

Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

scholarly journals Trustworthy Jammer Selection with Truth-Telling for Wireless Cooperative Systems

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yingkun Wen ◽  
Tao Jing ◽  
Qinghe Gao
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Systems ◽  
Numerical Results ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Constant Power ◽  
Selection Scheme ◽  
Trust Degree ◽  
Additive Increase ◽  
Wireless Cooperative Systems

In this paper, we propose a trustworthy friendly jammer selection scheme with truth-telling for wireless cooperative systems. We first utilize the reverse auction scheme to enforce truth-telling as the dominant strategy for each candidate friendly jammer. Specifically, we consider two auction cases: (1) constant power (CP) case and (2) the utility of the BS maximization (UBM) case. In both cases, the reverse auction scheme enforces truth-telling as the dominant strategy. Next, we introduce the trust category and trust degree to evaluate the trustworthiness of each Helper transmitter (Helper-Tx). Specifically, an edge controller calculates the reputation value of each Helper-Tx periodically using an additive-increase multiplicative-decrease algorithm by observing its jamming behavior. With the historical reputation values, the edge controller (EC) classifies a Helper-Tx into one of four trust categories and calculates its trust degree. Then, the EC selects the best Helper-Tx based on the trust category and trust degree. Lastly, we present numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our proposed jammer selection scheme.

Institutional Investors, Private Information, and the Cost of Capital

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huong Giang (Lily) Nguyen ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Luong Hoang Luong
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Bei ◽  
Ning Chen ◽  
Guangda Huzhang ◽  
Biaoshuai Tao ◽  
Jiajun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Piecewise Constant ◽  
Cake Cutting ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
To Receive

We study envy-free cake cutting with strategic agents, where each agent may manipulate his private information in order to receive a better allocation. We focus on piecewise constant utility functions and consider two scenarios: the general setting without any restriction on the allocations and the restricted setting where each agent has to receive a connected piece. We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.

Applications to Economics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Common Effort ◽  
The Cost ◽  
All Pay Auction ◽  
Individual Effort ◽  
Applications To Economics

This chapter explores whether the equilibrium effects of noisy behavior can cause large deviations from standard predictions in economically relevant situations. It considers a simple price-competition game, which is also partly motivated by the possibility of changing a payoff parameter that has no effect on the unique Nash equilibrium, but which may be expected to affect quantal response equilibrium. In the minimum-effort coordination game studied, any common effort in the range of feasible effort levels is a Nash equilibrium, but one would expect that an increase in the cost of individual effort or an increase in the number of players who are trying to coordinate would reduce the effort levels observed in an experiment. The chapter presents an analysis of the logit equilibrium and rent dissipation for a rent-seeking contest that is modeled as an “all-pay auction.” The final two applications in this chapter deal with auctions with private information.

How to do a reverse auction

2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-31
Author(s):  
Ulli Arnold ◽  
Wolfgang Schnellbächer ◽  
Philipp Glaser-Gallion
Keyword(s):  
Time Limit ◽  
Reverse Auctions ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Face To Face

Elektronische Beschaffungsauktionen sind das wohl am intensivsten diskutierte Einkaufsinstrument des vergangenen Jahrzehnts. Befürworter sehen den Grund dafür primär in den zu erzielenden Preisreduktionen im Vergleich zu Face-to-Face-Verhandlungen oder Ausschreibungen. Bei Durchführung einer so genannten electronic reverse auction ist eine Vielzahl an Parametern wie der Auktionstyp, die Dauer des Verfahrens oder der Transparenzgrad zu bestimmen. Dieser Artikel stellt die zur Verfügung stehenden Parameter bei einer Einkaufsauktion vor und zeigt auf, in welcher Beschaffungssituation welches Verfahren zu wählen ist. Electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) are one of the central tools in e-procurement. They enable significant price reductions in comparison to former negotiation methods. When conducting an eRA purchasers have to decide on a variety of parameters such as the auction type, the time limit or the transparency degree. This article introduces these parameters and connects them to specific purchasing situations. Keywords: reversed auction

scholarly journals Tax or Subsidy? Optimal Carbon Emission Policy: A Supply Chain Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xing Yin ◽  
Xiaolin Chen ◽  
Xiaolin Xu ◽  
Lianmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government ◽  
Increasing Demand ◽  
The Cost

With a rigid requirement for environment protection, governments need to make appropriate policies to induce firms to adopt green technology in consideration of the rapidly increasing demand for environmentally friendly products. We investigated the government policy from the perspective of a supply chain, which consisted of the upstream government (she) and the downstream manufacturing firm (he). The government decided on the policy (tax or subsidy) to maximize the social welfare, while the firm decided on the greenness level of the product, which affects the consumers’ choice behavior and hence his own demand. Assuming else being equal, the government should adopt the tax policy if consumers are very sensitive to the greenness, the cost of greening is high, or the negative impact due to carbon emission is large, and subsidize the firm otherwise. We also conduct some numerical studies when price is endogenous. The main insights can be carried over.

scholarly journals Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

Algorithmica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Leonardi ◽  
Gianpiero Monaco ◽  
Piotr Sankowski ◽  
Qiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Deterministic Algorithm ◽  
Matroid Intersection ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Budget Feasible

AbstractMotivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms with the goal of procuring an independent set of a matroid. More specifically, we are given a matroid $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) . Each element of the ground set E is controlled by a selfish agent and the cost of the element is private information of the agent itself. A budget limited buyer has additive valuations over the elements of E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid of largest possible value. We also consider the more general case of the pair $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) satisfying only the hereditary property. This includes matroids as well as matroid intersection. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that returns an $$\alpha $$ α -approximation to the problem of finding a maximum-value independent set in $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M , there exists an individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism which is $$(3\alpha +1)$$ ( 3 α + 1 ) -approximated and runs in polynomial time, thus yielding also a 4-approximation for the special case of matroids.

scholarly journals “Buy Online, Pick Up in Store” under Fit Uncertainty: To Offer or Not to Offer

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Huijing Li ◽  
Shilei Yang ◽  
Haiyan Kang ◽  
Victor Shi
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Distribution Function ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Cost Factor ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Shopping Experience ◽  
Complex Decision ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Decision Complexity

Retailers offer BOPS (Buy Online, Pick Up in Store) service to improve consumers shopping experience. However, this greatly increases the decision complexity for retailers and consumers. For consumers, whether to purchase online or from a store with the BOPS service is a complex decision. This is especially true when the product has fit uncertainty. That is, consumers are uncertain about product fitness before using it. Also, their store visit cost can be heterogeneous and follows some distribution function. For a retailer, it needs to jointly optimize multiple decisions including the convenience degree of BOPS. To help the retailer develop the jointly optimal decisions, we first build a mathematical model where the retailer sells the product through online and store channel and analyzes the possible effects of BOPS. We find that the retailer should offer BOPS when the channel cost ratio (ratio of shipment fee divided by average store visit cost) is large enough. Through numerical studies, we show that the ratio of profit offering BOPS divided by the benchmark increases with the probability of product fit, shipment fee, and the convenience degree of BOPS. We then consider the case where the convenience degree of BOPS is also a decision itself. We find the optimal convenience degree of BOPS increases along with the average store visit cost and the probability of product fit. When the cost factor of offering the convenience for BOPS is larger than a threshold, the retailer should never offer BOPS.

scholarly journals A Pricing Strategy of E-Commerce Advertising Cooperation in the Stackelberg Game Model with Different Market Power Structure

Algorithms ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Zhu ◽  
Jie Lin
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Total System ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
The Cost

A lot of research work has studied the auction mechanism of uncertain advertising cooperation between the e-commerce platform and advertisers, but little has focused on pricing strategy in stable advertising cooperation under a certain market power structure. To fill this gap, this paper makes a study of the deep interest distribution of two parties in such cooperation. We propose a pricing strategy by building two stackelberg master-slave models when the e-commerce platform and the advertiser are respectively the leader in the cooperation. It is analyzed that the optimization solution of the profits of both parties and the total system are affected by some main decision factors including the income commission proportion, the advertising product price and the cost of advertising effort of both parties’ brand in different dominant models. Then, some numerical studies are used to verify the effectiveness of the models. Finally, we draw a conclusion and make some suggestions to the platforms and the advertisers in the e-commerce advertising cooperation.

scholarly journals Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
Matthias Fahn ◽  
Nicolas Klein
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Bonus Payments ◽  
The Future ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Future Value ◽  
The Relationship

We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing. (JEL D23, D82, D86)

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