scholarly journals A Strategy for Efficient Debt Reduction

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey D Sachs
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Reduction Scheme ◽  
International Debt ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Brady Plan

Debt reduction, like bankruptcy, needs an institutional setting to bring it about, to overcome an inherent free-rider problem. Even when it is in the collective interests of the banks to reduce the debt, each individual bank is still tempted to insist on full repayment of its own claims, while free riding on concessions made to the debtor by the other banks. The banks have recently come to endorse the idea of “voluntary” debt reduction, in which each individual bank can choose whether to participate in a given debt reduction scheme. The Brady plan similarly has endorsed the concept of voluntary debt reduction. But because of the free rider problem, such voluntary schemes are doomed to failure. A more fruitful course would be the establishment of an International Debt Facility (IDF) to provide the necessary institutional framework for debt reduction. First, I will discuss the profound shortcomings of so-called “voluntary debt reduction” schemes, as now supported by the commercial banks. Second, I will outline the case for an IDF, and try to clear away much of the underbrush of misunderstanding that has slowed the adoption of the proposal.

Political Centralization and Labour Coercion: Latin America and Russia in Comparative Perspective

Itinerario ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Pastore ◽  
Herman Freudenberger
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Basic Principle ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Transactions Costs ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Government

Government requires coercion, if only to arrest free riding. Physical coercion alone may not suffice for this purpose, however, and ideological means may be needed as well. This basic principle underlies all government. In market economies the coercive capabilities of government may be expected to be financed out of taxes ultimately levied on factor owners' money incomes, that is, on wages, profits, and rent. On the other hand, in economies where markets have not developed due to high transactions costs individuals' contributions to the provision of public goods will take the form of payments in kind and labour services. In this case, the free rider problem suggests labourers will attempt to shirk; the government, therefore, will have to compel labourers to work and, therefore, will appear to be coercing labour even though it may only be seeking to curtail shirking.

scholarly journals Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal

1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-250
Author(s):  
Shasikanta Nandeibam
Keyword(s):  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

DISCUSSION: HAMPTON ON FREE RIDING

2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-320
Author(s):  
Gordon G. Sollars
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Single Production

Jean Hampton has argued that an important case of the free-rider problem has the structure of a battle-of-the-sexes game, rather than the Prisoner's Dilemma, as is often assumed. This case occurs when the collective good to be produced is a ‘step’ or ‘lumpy’ good, one that is produced in a single production step. Battle of the Sexes is a coordination game, with stronger equilibria than games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken. Hampton argues that, because of this difference, there is good reason to think that players facing a battle-of-the-sexes game can more easily reach mutually desirable outcomes than players facing these other games. An examination of Hampton's argument, however, shows that she has failed to specify a condition that would clearly distinguish her examples of battle-of-the-sexes games from chicken games. Consequently, Hampton's claim that free riding in the provision of step goods is less tempting than other analyses have suggested because of the presence of coordination equilibria is incorrect as it stands.

scholarly journals Vaccine Refusal Is Not Free Riding

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Bradley ◽  
Mark Navin
Keyword(s):  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Vaccine Refusal ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
Community Protection ◽  
The Relationship

Vaccine refusal is not a free rider problem. The claim that vaccine refusers are free riders is inconsistent with the beliefs and motivations of most vaccine refusers. This claim also inaccurately depicts the relationship between an individual’s immunization choice, their ability to enjoy the benefits of community protection, and the costs and benefits that individuals experience from immunization and community protection. Modeling vaccine refusers as free riders also likely distorts the ethical analysis of vaccine refusal and may lead to unsuccessful policy interventions.

scholarly journals The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 268-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Salvatore Nunnari ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Markov Perfect ◽  
Steady State Levels ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

We report the results of an experiment that investigates free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility than irreversibility; accumulation is inefficiently slow; and the public good is under-provided in both regimes. On the other hand, public good levels are higher than MPE, and some evidence of history dependence is detected. (JEL C91, H41)

scholarly journals Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ebrahimi ◽  
Marzieh Yousefi ◽  
Farhad Shahbazi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Sheikh Beig Goharrizi ◽  
Ali Masoudi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Final Level ◽  
Input Signals ◽  
Tumoral Cells ◽  
Power Play

AbstractControllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

How do Optimistic Individuals Affect Insurance Advertisements?

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoichiro Fujii ◽  
Michiko Ogaku ◽  
Mahito Okura ◽  
Yusuke Osaki
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Level ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Insurance Premium ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Accident Probability ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Accident Probabilities ◽  
Equilibrium Number

AbstractSome people have optimistic expectations regarding their accident probability, and thus, refrain from purchasing adequate insurance. This study investigates how insurance firms use advertisements to lower the ratio of optimistic individuals in the market. The main results are as follows: first, the optimal level of advertisements is maximized when the insurance premium is moderate. Second, the maximum level of advertisement varies according to the degree of optimism, which is measured by the difference between accurate and optimistic accident probabilities. Third, the advertisement decision is affected by the free-rider problem, and the equilibrium number of insurance firms with advertisement is always larger than that of firms without advertisement in a competitive insurance market.

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