scholarly journals Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Collard ◽  
Harris Dellas ◽  
Behzad Diba ◽  
Olivier Loisel
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Excessive Risk Taking

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the interconnectedness between macroeconomic and financial stability, raising questions about how to combine monetary and prudential policies. This paper characterizes the jointly optimal monetary and prudential policies, setting the interest rate and bank-capital requirements. The source of financial fragility is the socially excessive risk taking by banks due to limited liability and deposit insurance. We provide conditions under which locally (Ramsey) optimal policy dedicates the prudential instrument to preventing inefficient risk taking by banks, and the monetary instrument to dealing with the business cycle, with the two instruments covarying either negatively, or positively and countercyclically. (JEL E32, E43, E44, E52, G01, G21, G28)

Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Corona ◽  
Lin Nan ◽  
Gaoqing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
False Alarm ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Quality Of Accounting Information ◽  
Accounting Information Quality ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
Excessive Risk Taking

ABSTRACT We study the interaction between interbank competition and accounting information quality and their effects on banks' risk-taking behavior. We identify an endogenous false-alarm cost that banks incur when forced to sell assets to meet capital requirements. We find that when the interbank competition is less intense, an improvement in the quality of accounting information encourages banks to take more risk. Keeping the banks' investments in loans constant, the provision of high-quality accounting information reduces the false-alarm cost of assets sales and improves the discriminating efficiency of the capital requirement policy. When considering the banks' endogenous investment decisions, however, this improvement in discriminating efficiency causes excessive risk-taking, because banks respond by competing more aggressively in the deposit market, and the increase in deposit costs motivates banks to take more risk. Our paper shows that improving information quality increases risk-taking with mild competition, but has no effect under fierce competition.

scholarly journals Capital requirements, risk-taking and welfare in a growing economy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Richard Agénor ◽  
Luiz A. Pereira da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Capital Adequacy Ratio ◽  
Monitoring Effort ◽  
Growing Economy

AbstractThe effects of capital requirements on risk-taking and welfare are studied in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking, limited liability, and government guarantees. Capital producers face a choice between a safe technology and a risky, more productive but socially inefficient, technology. Bank risk-taking is endogenous. As a result of a skin in the game effect—motivated either as an aggregate externality, or as the outcome of the optimal choice of monitoring effort by individual banks—default risk is inversely related to the capital adequacy ratio. Numerical simulations show that in an equilibrium where banks extend both safe and risky loans, the skin in the game effect must be sufficiently strong for a welfare-maximizing regulatory policy to exist. These results remain qualitatively similar with endogenous monitoring costs and a strong effect of monitoring on entrepreneurial moral hazard. However, numerical experiments also suggest that the optimal capital adequacy ratio may be too high in practice and may require concomitantly a broadening of the perimeter of regulation and a strengthening of financial supervision to prevent disintermediation and distortions in financial markets.

The inter-relationships among liquidity creation, bank capital and credit risk: evidence from emerging Asia–Pacific economies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tu D.Q. Le ◽  
Xuan T.T. Pham
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Small Banks

PurposeThis study investigates the inter-relationships among liquidity creation, bank capital and credit risk in selected emerging economies between 2012 and 2016.Design/methodology/approachA three-step procedure as proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) is used to measure liquidity creation. Thereafter, a simultaneous equations model with the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to examine the links between liquidity creation, bank capital and credit risk.FindingsThe findings indicate that bank capital and credit risk affect each other positively after controlling for liquidity creation. Also, the findings show a negative impact of credit risk on liquidity creation while our findings do not find any evidence to confirm the reverse relationship between them. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate a two-way negative relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital in these emerging economies. Finally, the results indicate a positive relationship between capital and credit risk, especially in the case of small banks in the sample.Practical implicationsThe findings suggest that the trade-off between the benefits of financial stability induced by tightening capital requirements and those of improved liquidity creation has crucial implications for policymakers and bank regulators in making the banking system more resilient. A positive impact of capital on credit risk emphasizes that the authorities in selected emerging economies should put more attention on small banks to ensure their exposures under target control.Originality/valueThis is the first study that examines the dynamic interrelationships among liquidity creation, bank capital and credit risk in the Asia–Pacific region.

scholarly journals Market structure, institutional quality and bank capital ratios: evidence from developing countries

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oyebola Fatima Etudaiye-Muhtar ◽  
Zayyad Abdul-Baki
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Institutional Quality ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Regulatory Quality ◽  
Capital Ratios ◽  
Excessive Risk Taking ◽  
Excessive Risk

PurposeThis paper investigates the role of market structure and institutional quality in determining bank capital ratios in developing economies.Design/methodology/approachThe generalised methods of moment technique is used to control for auto-correlation and endogeneity in a sample of 79 publicly listed commercial banks. The study period is between 2000 and 2016.FindingsResults show that market structure (proxied with bank competition) as well as institutional quality (regulatory quality) lowers bank capital in the sampled banks. This suggests that banks operating in less competitive markets with good regulatory quality do not need to engage in excessive risk-taking activities that would necessitate holding increased level of capital. Furthermore, the interaction of competition and regulatory quality reinforces the main findings, suggesting the importance of the two variables in determining bank capital ratio.Research limitations/implicationsResearch has limitation in that the study investigated publicly listed commercial banks, the findings may not be applicable to non-listed banks.Practical implicationsTaking into cognisance the developing nature of the banking system in Africa, the findings from this study imply that the maintenance of an improved regulatory quality in an environment where healthy competition exists would encourage banks to hold capital ratios appropriate for their level of banking activities, that is, the banks would not engage in excessive risk-taking activities.Originality/valueThis is one of the first papers that examine the effect of market structure and institutional quality on bank capital ratios in developing countries that have bank-based financial systems.

The Effect of Noisy Fair Value Measures on Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Valencia ◽  
Thomas J. Smith ◽  
James Ang
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Error ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Type I Error ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
Type Ii Errors

SYNOPSIS Fair value accounting has been a hotly debated topic during the recent financial crisis. Supporters argue that fair values are more relevant to investors, while detractors point to the measurement error in the estimation of the reported fair values to attack its reliability. This study examines how noise in reported fair values impacts bank capital adequacy ratios. If measurement error causes reported capital levels to deviate from fundamental levels, then regulators could misidentify a financially healthy bank as troubled (type I error) or a financially troubled bank as safe (type II error), leading to suboptimal resource allocations for banks, regulators, and investors. We use a Monte Carlo simulation to generate our data, and find that while noise leads to both type I and type II errors around key Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) capital adequacy benchmarks, the type I error dominates. Specifically, noise is associated with 2.58 (2.60) [1.092], 5.67 (6.44) [1.94], and 10.60 (26.83) [3.423] times more type I errors than type II errors around the Tier 1 (Total) [Leverage] well-capitalized, adequately capitalized, and significantly undercapitalized benchmarks, respectively. Economically, our results suggest that noise can lead to inefficient allocation of resources on the part of regulators (increased monitoring costs) and banks (increased compliance costs). JEL Classifications: D52; M41; C15; G21.

scholarly journals Developing “best practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III.

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiyi Yu ◽  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Incentive Compensation ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Bank Executives ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

scholarly journals Global Bank Capital and Liquidity after 30 Years of Basel Accords

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Benink
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Basel Accords ◽  
Capital Ratios ◽  
Working Together ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Financial System

In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of more than 30 years of efforts by international banking supervisors, working together in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to harmonize capital and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. Notwithstanding the great efforts and progress made by international banking supervisors since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, two important issues require further attention. First, although bank capital ratios have been raised significantly since the recent financial crisis, they are still at historically low levels. In a world in which global debt ratios have risen even further during the past decade, this is a worrying signal of fragility in the global financial system. Second, bank liquidity requirements may have become too complex and could also have unintented and unpredictable interaction effects with bank capital requirements.

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