The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 569-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Xie ◽  
Joseph Gerakos

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies often file lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. Institutional horizontal shareholdings, measured by the generic shareholders' ownership in the brand-name company relative to their ownership in the generic manufacturer, are significantly positively associated with the likelihood that the two parties enter into a settlement agreement in which the brand pays the generic manufacturer to stay out of the market.

Author(s):  
Seth Silber ◽  
Kara Kuritz

Since the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, generic drug companies have benefited from its provisions to facilitate approval of generic alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals. Upon generic entry, consumers of prescription drugs benefit from large discounts as brand manufacturers lose significant market share to these lower-priced alternatives. Over time, brand-name drug manufacturers have undertaken strategies, such as ‘product switching’ or ‘product hopping’, that may delay or prevent generic entry and protect their market share. Generic drug manufacturers, drug purchasers and antitrust authorities have begun looking to the antitrust laws to address these strategies and their impact on generic entry. This article discusses the regulatory framework under which pharmaceutical companies introduce new drugs, two prominent cases in which courts have wrestled with whether product switching violates the antitrust laws, factors that might support an antitrust claim for product switching, and the FTC's interest in challenging product switching.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-245
Author(s):  
Wenqing Li

Both the courts and the economists have identified risk aversion as a justification for reverse payment agreements, especially the risk aversion of brand-name companies. However, existing economic researches show whether risk aversion can be a rationale for reverse payment agreements depends on the type of reverse payment agreements reached. In “complete” settlement agreement where a brand-name drug manufacturer provides consideration to a generic drug company to completely settle the patent litigation, with agreed-upon entry dates for the generic, risk aversion does not provide a justification for reverse payment, but asymmetry in risk aversion can be a rationale for reverse payment. In “partial” settlement agreement where a branded drug manufacturer provides consideration to a generic drug company in exchange for the generic to agree not to enter the market while they continue the patent litigation, it is not the risk aversion of the brand company, but the risk aversion of the generic company that can facilitate the parties to reach a partial settlement agreement with reverse payment that serves the procompetitive purpose.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-112
Author(s):  
Jin Xie

The Federal Trade Commission frequently files complaints against “pay-for-delay” settlements between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic-drug manufacturers, the latter of which challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. I document than when the top 20 generic shareholders have more substantial financial interests in the brand, then the likelihood that the brand enters into a settlement agreement with the first generic to challenge the brand goes up. The result of such a settlement is a payment from brand to generic, in exchange for the generic’s delayed entry. Only after the first generic’s entry, a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity for that particular generic starts. Other generics can only market their drugs after that period expires. As such, the settlement between brand and the first generic extends the brand’s monopoly position. I conclude that horizontal shareholdings facilitate coordination between brand-name patent holders and generic challengers in response to the threat of entry.


Author(s):  
Henry Grabowski ◽  
Genia Long ◽  
Richard Mortimer ◽  
Mehmet Bilginsoy
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-542
Author(s):  
Merri C. Moken

The use of pharmaceutical products in the United States has increased more than the use of any other health resource from 1960 to 1990. In excess of 9,600 drugs were on the market in 1984, and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approves approximately 30 new drugs and countless new applications for alterations of already existing drugs each year. In 2001, the $300 billion pharmaceutical industry sold $154 billion worth of prescription drugs in the United States alone, nearly doubling its $78.9 billion in sales in 1997. With such a rapid increase in market domination and expenditures, the U.S. government and many hospitals have focused their attention on the sales and pricing practices of pharmaceutical companies, as well as other potential factors contributing to these escalating prices. One such cause of the steadily increasing prices of brand name pharmaceuticals is the sale of fake or counterfeit pharmaceuticals (also called “look-alike” drugs).


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Iizuka ◽  
Kensuke Kubo

AbstractHistorically, brand-name pharmaceuticals have enjoyed long periods of market exclusivity in Japan, given the limited use of generics after patent expiration. To improve the efficiency of the health-care system, however, the government has recently implemented various policies aimed at increasing generic substitution. Although this has created expectations that the Japanese generic drug market may finally take off, to date, generic usage has increased only modestly. After reviewing the incentives of key market participants to choose generics, we argue that previous government policies did not provide proper incentives for pharmacies to boost generic substitution. We offer some recommendations that may help to increase generic usage.


2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Grabowski ◽  
Genia Long ◽  
Richard Mortimer

2014 ◽  
Vol 132 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Cesar Scheffer

CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE: Given that Brazil has a universal public policy for supplying medications to treat HIV and AIDS, the aim here was to describe the forms of relationship between physicians and the pharmaceutical companies that produce antiretrovirals (ARVs). DESIGN AND SETTING: Cross-sectional epidemiological study conducted in the state of São Paulo. METHODS : Secondary database linkage was used, with structured interviews conducted by telephone among a sample group of 300 physicians representing 2,361 professionals who care for patients with HIV and AIDS. RESULTS : Around two thirds (64%) of the physicians prescribing ARVs for HIV and AIDS treatment in the state of São Paulo who were interviewed declared that they had some form of relationship with pharmaceutical companies, of which the most frequent were receipt of publications (54%), visits by sales promoters (51%) and receipt of small-value objects (47%). CONCLUSIONS: Two forms of relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians who deal with HIV and AIDS can be highlighted: facilitation of professionals' access to continuing education; and antiretroviral drug brand name promotion.


Blood ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 128 (22) ◽  
pp. 5441-5441
Author(s):  
Vasily Shuvaev ◽  
Mikhail Fominykh ◽  
Vera Udaleva ◽  
Irina I Zotova ◽  
Regina Golovchenko ◽  
...  

Abstract Introduction. A generic drug is a pharmaceutical drug considered to be equivalent to a brand-name product. A generic drug has to contain the same active ingredients as those of the original formulation. Regulatory agencies used to require that generics be identical to their brand-name counterparts with regards to pharmacokinetic properties. In most cases, generic products are available after the patent protection given to a drug's original developer expires. In Russia, a patent protection lasts for a 10-year period from registration of the original drug. To this day, twelve Imatinib generics have been registered in Russia. Aim. To assess the safety and efficacy of Imatinib generics for treatment of newly diagnosed Chronic myelogenous leukemia patients that have been in our center since August 2012. Materials and methods. 30 newly diagnosed CML patients were started on generics. The drugs: 1) GenericPh 100 mg, in capsules (Ph-Syntez, Russia); 2) GenericG 100 mg, in tablets (Laboratorio TUTEUR S.A.C.I.F.I.A., Argentina); 3) GenericIm 100 mg, in tablets (Sandoz d.d. (Slovenia). Switching from one generic to another was done due to intolerance. We analyzed the range and frequencies of adverse events (AE), cumulative incidences of complete hematologic (CHR), major cytogenetic (MCyR), complete cytogenetic (CCyR), and early molecular responses (BCR-ABL<10% by IS), as well as the rate of BCR-ABL<1% by IS, major molecular (MMR) and molecular 4.0 log (MR4.0, BCR-ABL<0.01% by IS) responses at time-points according to the National CML diagnostic and treatment guidelines. The response rates were assessed only in regard to the generic treatment (with death, progression and switching to second-generation inhibitors as competing risks). Statistical analysis included descriptive statistics and cumulative incidence function. Results. Duration of the treatment with generics was 7-45 months, with a median of 13 months (GenericPh (27) + GenericG (2) + GenericIm (1)). No unexpected adverse events were observed during the Imatinib generics treatment. The generics tolerance did not differ from that of the original brand-name drug. Six patients were switched to second-generation tyrosine kinase inhibitors (TKI2) due to Imatinib intolerance. One patient progressed to blastic phase at 3 months after diagnosis. Three deaths were registered (1 - due to CML and 2 due to concomitant diseases). Overall survival rate was 90% and CML-related mortality - 3%. CHR at 3 months of the treatment was achieved in 93% of the patients. Cumulative response rates for cytogenetic and molecular responses are presented in Table 1. MR4.0 was registered in 23% of patients during overall treatment. Seven patients were switched to TKI2 due to insufficient efficacy of Imatinib. At the time of analysis 13 patients remained on Imatinib generics treatment: 12 patients with CCyR and 1 with PCyR, including 10 patients with MMR. Conclusion. Use of generics demands evaluation of its equivalency and control during its adoption into clinical practice. In terms of efficacy or tolerance no significant differences between the Imatinib generics studied and the original brand-name drug in newly diagnosed CML patients were found. Disclosures Shuvaev: Pfizer: Honoraria; BMS: Honoraria; Novartis pharma: Honoraria. Fominykh:BMS: Honoraria; Novartis Pharma: Honoraria.


Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Huiying Sun ◽  
Daphne P. Guh ◽  
Larry D. Lynd ◽  
Aidan Hollis ◽  
...  

Background: Generic drug prices have been capped at specified percentages of the interchangeable branded drug’s price by the Canadian provincial public drug plans since 1993. The Pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance, formed as a coalition by the provinces/territories in Canada, implemented an alternative approach, a tiered-pricing framework (TPF) for new generic drugs on April 1, 2014, under which the percentage varies with the number of generic firms in each market. We evaluate the impact of the TPF on generic entry, ie, listing in public drug plans in Canada. Methods: Our study compared the pre-TPF period (01/01/2012-03/31/2014) with the TPF period (04/01/2014- 06/30/2016). Prescription drugs from nine provincial public drug plans were grouped into a "market" if they had the same active ingredient and strength, route of administration, and dosage form. Each "market" was contestable by generics and met the eligibility criteria for TPF. At the "market" level, Cox proportional-hazards models with time-varying covariates were used to measure the impact of the TPF on the first generic listing in any provincial public drug plan in Canada relative to the first launch date worldwide. Results: A total of 189 markets in Canada were selected for the analyses. Generic drugs in small markets were more likely to be listed in Canada during the TPF period compared to the pre-TPF period (hazard ratio [HR], 95% CI: 3.81, 1.51-9.62). There was no significant difference in generic drug listings in large markets between the two policy periods. Conclusion: TPF speeds up generic entry in small markets and generates the benefits of generic competition while avoiding the pitfalls of the previously employed price-cap regulations.


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