Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Pettersson-Lidbom
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Empirical Framework

This paper develops an empirical framework for the problem of soft budgets which is explicitly based on a dynamic commitment problem, i.e., the inability of a supporting organization to commit itself not to extend more resources ex post to a budget-constrained organization than it was prepared to provide ex ante. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since the central government distributed a large number of fiscal transfers. The estimated soft-budget effect is economically significant: on average, a local government increases its debt by more than 20 percent by going from a hard to a soft budget constraint. (JEL D82, G32, L32)

scholarly journals Hardening the budget constraint: Institutional reform in the financial management of Hungarian local governments

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-592
Author(s):  
Tamás Vasvári
Keyword(s):  
Financial Management ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The One ◽  
Negative Messages

AbstractKornai (2014) described the problems of municipal indebtedness in Hungary and analysed the process of bailout carried out between 2011 and 2014. In the same period, the central government also reformed the local government system, which included serious limitations of their financial independence. This study re-examines the state of the soft budget constraint (SBC) of Hungarian local governments. To start, the general theoretical framework of SBC is introduced. Then, the budget constraint on the Hungarian local governments before the bailout is described briefly, followed by an assessment of the corresponding measures which were expected to offset the negative messages of the completed bailout and to harden the budget constraint. The study concludes that the central government decided to harden the budget constraint through the introduction of new hierarchical mechanisms, while the development of fiscal discipline stopped. On the one hand, this resulted in the consolidation of municipal budgets, but on the other, it was accompanied by a serious limitation of local autonomy, projects and borrowing in general, while the central government employs specific administrative tools to show favour to some settlements according to its (political) interests.

scholarly journals Delegation of Taxation Authority and Multipolicy Commitment in a Decentralized Leadership Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-537
Author(s):  
Nobuo Akai ◽  
Takahiro Watanabe
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Leadership Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Interregional Transfers ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Taxation Authority ◽  
Decentralized Leadership ◽  
Level Government

This article examines to what extent taxation authority should be delegated to local or lower-level government. Delegation of taxation authority can be regarded as a commitment to the local tax rate ex ante in a decentralized leadership model, in which local governments set policies ex ante and the central government decides transfer policies ex post. Previous papers point out that ex post interregional transfers of the central government distort ex ante regional policies of local governments. However, Silva clarify the case where efficient expenditure by local governments is achieved. This article examines the delegation of taxation authority by extending Silva’s model to include commitment to taxation and generally derives the conditions when efficient public expenditure by local governments can be achieved in relation to the delegation of taxation authority. The model adopted in this article allows various levels of spillovers of local public goods and various types of multipolicy commitments of taxation and/or expenditure.

scholarly journals Empirical Analysis of the Driving Factors of China’s ‘Land Finance’ Mechanism Using Soft Budget Constraint Theory and the PLS-SEM Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinhua Zhu ◽  
Yigang Wei ◽  
Yani Lai ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Sujuan Zhong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Driving Factors ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Land Transfer ◽  
Constraint Theory

“Land finance” refers to the key fiscal strategy in which local governments in China generate revenue through land grant premiums and land tax revenues. A burgeoning body of literature has focused on the driving factors of China’s land finance from different aspects including fiscal decentralization, revenue decentralization, competition among local governments, land marketization, infrastructure development, and economic development. However, little research has provided a comprehensive perspective integrating social, economic and institutional aspects to investigate the driving forces of these unique and profound issues in China. This study aims to investigate the driving factors and working mechanism of land finance. A theoretical and empirical model was proposed using soft budget constraint theory and least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). The panel data of 35 Chinese major cities were assessed between 2006 and 2015. The empirical results contend the following: (1) the land transfer and fiscal systems provide the key impetus for land financing because the land transfer system forms a stable modality, and the fiscal system is an important incentive for land financing; (2) the effects of the economic development and political system are insignificant; and (3) the political and land systems significantly influence economic development. Our contributions focus on two aspects. Firstly, a comprehensive framework of factors germane to land finance is constructed. Secondly, a new research methodology for land use study is proposed. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to employ the PLS-SEM method to delineate and verify the influence paths between multiple driving factors and land finance in different cities. Hence, research reliability can be improved.

Public Finance and Soft Budgets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosella Levaggi
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Public Healthcare ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint

The concept of soft budget constraint, describes a situation where a decision-maker finds it impossible to keep an agent to a fixed budget. In healthcare it may refer to a (nonprofit) hospital that overspends, or to a lower government level that does not balance its accounts. The existence of a soft budget constraint may represent an optimal policy from the regulator point of view only in specific settings. In general, its presence may allow for strategic behavior that changes considerably its nature and its desirability. In this article, soft budget constraint will be analyzed along two lines: from a market perspective and from a fiscal federalism perspective. The creation of an internal market for healthcare has made hospitals with different objectives and constraints compete together. The literature does not agree on the effects of competition on healthcare or on which type of organizations should compete. Public hospitals are often seen as less efficient providers, but they are also intrinsically motivated and/or altruistic. Competition for quality in a market where costs are sunk and competitors have asymmetric objectives may produce regulatory failures; for this reason, it might be optimal to implement soft budget constraint rules to public hospitals even at the risk of perverse effects. Several authors have attempted to estimate the presence of soft budget constraint, showing that they derive from different strategic behaviors and lead to quite different outcomes. The reforms that have reshaped public healthcare systems across Europe have often been accompanied by a process of devolution; in some countries it has often been accompanied by widespread soft budget constraint policies. Medicaid expenditure in the United States is becoming a serious concern for the Federal Government and the evidence from other states is not reassuring. Several explanations have been proposed: (a) local governments may use spillovers to induce neighbors to pay for their local public goods; (b) size matters: if the local authority is sufficiently big, the center will bail it out; equalization grants and fiscal competition may be responsible for the rise of soft budget constraint policies. Soft budget policies may also derive from strategic agreements among lower tiers, or as a consequence of fiscal imbalances. In this context the optimal use of soft budget constraint as a policy instrument may not be desirable.

The Center’s Distributive Strategy and Fund Allocation

2020 ◽  
pp. 86-110
Author(s):  
Xian Huang
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Welfare Provision ◽  
Fund Allocation ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Important Means ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Primary Materials

Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese central leaders (the Center) and their distributive strategy and behaviors in providing social welfare. The deliberations and calculations reflected in the central leaders’ speeches between 1998 and 2011 show that the stratified expansion of social welfare was the Center’s most preferred model for social welfare provision in this period. Various internal speeches and communication revealed the hidden concern and measures taken to maintain the elites’ welfare privileges and benefits during the welfare expansion. Careful reading of the primary materials also suggests that the Center’s fiscal transfers to local governments were an important means for maintaining the welfare privileges of elite groups (e.g., civil servants, public-sector and SOE formal employees). This chapter later analyzes the central-to-local fiscal transfers from 1999 to 2010 and finds that the larger the elite groups in a province, the greater were the fiscal transfers the province received from the central government.

Do professional sport franchise owners overpromise and underdeliver the public? Lessons from Brooklyn’s Barclays Center

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Propheter
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Financial Incentive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Benefits ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Usa

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a number of promises typically made by owners of professional sports franchises in the USA that are also typically ignored or underevaluated by public bureaus and their elected principals using the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York as a case study. Ex post subsidy outcomes are evaluated against ex ante subsidy promises in order to draw lessons that can inform and improve subsidy debates elsewhere. Design/methodology/approach The case study adopts a pre-post strategy drawing on data from multiple sources over a period of up to ten years in order to triangulate the narrative and build credibility. The franchise owner’s ex ante promises and financial projections were obtained from various media including newspaper, video and interviews between December 2003, when the arena was publicly announced, and September 2012, when the arena opened. Data on ex post outputs were obtained from financial documents and government records covering periods from September 2011 through June 2016. Findings The franchise owner is found to have exaggerated the arena’s financial condition, under-delivered on its employment promises, and exaggerated the scope and timeliness of ancillary real estate development. Only promises of event frequency and attendance levels, measures of the public’s demand for the facility, have been met during the first three years. Research limitations/implications Because the evaluation is a case study, causal conclusions cannot be drawn and some aspects of the Barclays Center context may not be applicable in other jurisdictions or subsidy debates. In addition, the case study does not evaluate an exhaustive list of the promises franchise owners make. Practical implications Franchise owners have a financial incentive to overpromise public benefits, since subsidy levels are tied to what the public is perceived to receive in return. This case study demonstrates that the public sector should not take owners’ promises and projections of public benefits at face value. Moreover, the case study reveals that the public sector should put more effort into ensuring ex post policy and data transparency in order to facilitate benefit-cost analyses of such subsidies. Originality/value The data required to evaluate promises, other than economic development ones, made by franchise owners are not systematically collected across state and local governments in the USA, making large-n studies impossible. Case studies are underutilized approaches in this area of public affairs, and this paper illustrates their usefulness. By focusing on a single facility, an evaluation of the franchise owner’s less acknowledged and arguably more important promises about the facility and its local impact is possible.

scholarly journals Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Anderberg ◽  
Carlo Perroni
Keyword(s):  
Political Process ◽  
Public Information ◽  
The Political ◽  
Homogeneous Groups ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Collective Commitment ◽  
Commitment Problems

Abstract We consider the implications of a lack of policy commitment when policies are chosen through a political process and individuals are ex-ante identical. We show that politics, by allowing ex-post distributional tensions to shape policy, can make it possible to sustain non-trivial equilibria in which the commitment problem is alleviated or fully eliminated. How effective politics can be at countering collective commitment problems in homogeneous groups depends on the nature of the political process and on the extent to which private choices are public information.

scholarly journals Developing sustainable arrangements for “proactive” disaster risk financing in Java, Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-451
Author(s):  
Robby Soetanto ◽  
Ferry Hermawan ◽  
Alistair Milne ◽  
Jati Utomo Dwi Hatmoko ◽  
Sholihin As'ad ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Disaster Risk ◽  
Local Context ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Emerging Issues ◽  
Disaster Risk Financing

Purpose Recent years saw a paradigm shift from ex post (reactive) to ex ante (proactive) approaches (e.g. insurance) to disaster risk financing for building resilience of communities in developing countries. To facilitate adoption, the approaches should be adapted so that they can be technically feasible and culturally desirable to the local context. This paper aims to report an exploratory study to elaborate the existing arrangements to deal with the impacts of disaster and the potential to shift to a more proactive disaster risk financing in Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach A series of stakeholder engagement activities in Semarang and Solo, Indonesia was conducted to ascertain the existing arrangements for disaster risk financing at local government level, the challenges/barriers to the adoption of insurance, education and policies to facilitate the transformation from reactive to proactive process. Thematic analysis was applied to transcribed conversations during interviews, focus groups and workshops. Identification of emerging issues/themes was also guided by the researchers’ notes during the events, and facilitated by qualitative analysis software, Atlas Ti®. This was complemented by an analysis of regulations and documents provided by the local stakeholders. Findings The local governments heavily rely on contingency fund, which is not enough and often significantly delayed to fund recovery and reconstruction of public infrastructure. The use of insurance is limited in both public and private sectors, particularly in the majority of low-income communities. Various barriers and challenges were identified under several categories, namely, institutional, cultural, affordability, lack of awareness and knowledge, insurance arrangement process and lack of trust. The findings also suggest that improving insurance education should involve multiple stakeholders, and both formal and informal routes should be pursued. Originality/value The research fills the gap of knowledge in disaster risk financing in the context of developing countries, specifically in local governments and communities in Indonesia. The findings may be replicable for other developing countries with low adoption of ex ante financial instruments for dealing with the impacts of disaster.

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