scholarly journals The World Defense Expenditure 2019 and trends in the Covid19 era

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 140
Author(s):  
Themistoklis Zanidis

This paper focuses on the recent publication of the SIPRI Institute on global defense spending for 2019. The latter is on the rise for 5th consecutive year, climbing to the highest point since 1988, the Cold War era. This fact has multiple interpretations. The most important construe apropos the geopolitical competition, from hegemonic competition between the United States and China to regional ones, can constitute perils to international security with unpredictable and catastrophic consequences for global peace, economy and trade. The recent crisis over the Covid-19 pandemic has expanded the breach between the West and China, raising skepticism or even suspicious on both sides. Relations between the two powers, the United States and China, have deteriorated, threatening global stability while states are unable to find a commonplace for a successful and definitive fight against the pandemic.The unstable geopolitical environment has experienced the burden of the pandemic crisis due to Covid-19. The restrictive measures taken by governments to intercept the pandemic may be the reasoning for restraining defense spending world widely. This prospect can be a future reality if we take into account the cost caused to national and global economy by the protracted lockdown. Therefore, governments may be compelled to increase spending on the welfare state (health infrastructure, support for the lower classes, support for sectors of the economy most affected by the pandemic such as transportation and tourism) by cutting the defense budget. The latter consists a critical indicator of national sovereignty and its fully understandable the fact that is exceptionally difficult for states to make unforced military budget cuts. However, because of the recent extremely critical situations experienced by humanity as a whole, governments should consider limiting their defense spending, which will be monitored closely by the United Nations for a limited time and focus on dealing with the economic and social effects of the lockdown.

Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

Otto von Bismarck famously said that “God has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Divine providence may not have hurt, but it was America’s domestic political institutions that transformed a smattering of British colonies in North America into, first, an independent nation and, then, a global superpower with a network of allies and partners spanning six continents. The United States faced off against the Soviet Union for a half century during the Cold War. But Washington possessed the better institutions, and the stress of the competition caused Moscow’s political system to collapse altogether. In the post–Cold War period that followed, Washington deepened and expanded the Pax Americana, and spread unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom. For the first time since Ancient Rome, a single superpower so overawed any potential competitors that great power rivalry itself came to a temporary halt.


1997 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Jones

The results of development are now widely thought to have betrayed expectations. Using illustrations from Bolivia, this essay argues that these dispiriting results often owe to distortions that render development something other than what it pretends to be, or is usually understood to be. The distortions derive from the use of inappropriate mental constructs, from links to foreign policy, from "expert" ignorance, and from weak sensitivity by development agencies to how their interventions are construed by local economic and power elites. While these agencies have formal mechanisms to correct some of the distortions, the mechanisms too often fail to work. Correcting these distortions is a daunting task, rooted as they are deep in national institutions and conceptions of national interest. The end of the Cold War nonetheless affords an auspicious moment for doing so. Indeed, not to is to risk turmoil in regions like Latin America. Yet international capitalist powers and local elites are not seizing the moment; exulting in victory, they continue down old paths. Further alarming is the anti-aid sentiment in the United States and Europe, with consequent political advocacy ranging from abolishment to varying degrees of reform under large budget cuts.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter analyzes the cost of the US nuclear arsenal. Many analysts have argued that a robust nuclear arsenal is unaffordable, but this chapter shows that this view is incorrect. It reviews the arguments made by those in favor of reducing spending on US nuclear weapons and moves on to present the counterargument about why the US nuclear force is affordable. It shows that nuclear weapons represent a small percentage of overall US defense spending and that roughly five percent of the US defense budget is not too much to spend for a strategic deterrent. The United States can afford to maintain and modernize its nuclear forces and, indeed, they come at a good value.


Author(s):  
Gregg A. Brazinsky

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, America’s relationship with China ran the gamut from friendship and alliance to enmity and competition. Americans have long believed in China’s potential to become an important global actor, primarily in ways that would benefit the United States. The Chinese have at times embraced, at times rejected, and at times adapted to the US agenda. While there have been some consistent themes in this relationship, Sino-American interactions unquestionably increased their breadth in the 20th century. Trade with China grew from its modest beginnings in the 19th and early 20th centuries into a critical part of the global economy by the 21st century. While Americans have often perceived China as a country that offered significant opportunities for mutual benefit, China has also been seen as a threat and rival. During the Cold War, the two competed vigorously for influence in Asia and Africa. Today we see echoes of this same competition as China continues to grow economically while expanding its influence abroad. The history of Sino-American relations illustrates a complex dichotomy of cooperation and competition; this defines the relationship today and has widespread ramifications for global politics.


2017 ◽  
pp. 140-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Kolodko

For years, the view has been repeated that Asia’s age is coming, and thus the position of both Europe and the United States is declining. The main factor behind these tectonic shifts in relative economic power and the associated geopolitical situation is the nearly four decades of rapid growth of Chinese economy. The achievements of other Southeast Asian countries, especially India, with robust growth are also meaningful with this regard. The article verifies these views and analyzes the different aspects of China’s confrontation with Europe and North America. The Asian dominance era is not coming, yet a relatively stronger position of the East at the cost of a weakening position of the West is emerging. Hence, a new multi-polar arrangement of forces in the global economy, without a hegemon, is being created.


Author(s):  
V. Mikheev ◽  
S. Lukonin

At the Boao Forum-2015 China fixed the main directions of its domestic and foreign policy. The major goal of its foreign policy is to actively influence the global economy development in the coming decades. The main impact directions are the following: restructuring of the world's infrastructure, changing of the global financial system, becoming one of the drivers in the global innovation economy. On a personal level, Xi Jinping continues to consistently implement its “strategic goal” – to go down in history as China's “number three leader” after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Xi is developing his major innovations: fight against corruption, establishment of the National Security Council, development of the “Chinese Dream” concept, formulation of the “New Norm” concept in the economy and of a new foreign policy doctrine. In the foreign policy, the course of improving China's global role and building a “new type” relationship with the United States is being strengthened. In relations with Russia and the United States, Beijing is following the dual-track policy of “hedging” political risks: on one hand, talking about a “special relationship with Russia”, and on the other – using the worsening of relations between Russia and the United States in order to receive dividends from both “Russia's turn to the East” and the U.S.' desire to prevent the rapprochement between Russia and China in a new version of the “Cold War”. Prospects for a new balance of forces configuration in the West-China-Russia triangle over the next five to ten years do not appear favorable for Russia. China will continue the trend to global leadership and “partnership-rivalry” relationship with the United States. Acknowledgement. The article is prepared with fi nancial support of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (grant no. 15-27-21002 “Eastern Europe and Russia Factor in Implementation of Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt Megastrategy”).


2016 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Marcin Jan Flotyński

The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 began a period of high volatility on the financial markets. Specifically, it caused an increased amplitude of fluctuations of the level of gross domestic products, the level of investment and consumption and exchange rates in particular countries. To address the adverse market circumstances, governments and central banks took actions in order to bolster the weakening global economy. The aim of this article is to present the anti-crisis actions in the United States and selected member states of the European Union, including Poland, and an assessment of their efficiency. The analysis conducted indicates that generally the actions taken in the United States in response to the crisis were faster and more adequate to the existing circumstances than in the European Union.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

After the end of the Cold War, it seemed as if Southeast Asia would remain a geopolitically stable region within the American imperious for the foreseeable future. In the last two decades, however, the re-emergence of China as a major great power has called into question the geopolitical future of the region and raised the specter of renewed great power competition. As this book shows, the United States and China are engaged in a broad-gauged and global competition for power. While this competition ranges across the entire world, it is centered in Asia, and here this text focuses on the ten countries that comprise Southeast Asia. The United States and China constantly vie for position and influence in this enormously significant region, and the outcome of this contest will do much to determine whether Asia leaves the American orbit after seven decades and falls into a new Chinese sphere of influence. Just as important, to the extent that there is a global “power transition” occurring from the United States to China, the fate of Southeast Asia will be a good indicator. Presently, both powers bring important assets to bear. The United States continues to possess a depth and breadth of security ties, soft power, and direct investment across the region that empirically outweigh China’s. For its part, China has more diplomatic influence, much greater trade, and geographic proximity. In assessing the likelihood of a regional power transition, the book looks at how ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the countries within it maneuver between the United States and China and the degree to which they align with one or the other power.


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