scholarly journals Strategies for poverty alleviation supply chain with government subsidies and misreporting behavior in China

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. e0253761
Author(s):  
Fangyu Ye ◽  
Qilong Deng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
The Government ◽  
Negative Implication ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

In the poverty alleviation supply chain, subsidies for enterprises or farmers are widely implemented as part of government policy. However, subsidy fraud often occurs, such as misreporting cost information to secure subsidies. Inspired by this, our study aims to explore the optimal decision-making problem of the three-level (government + enterprises + farmers) poverty alleviation supply chain under asymmetric cost information. Four-stage models are constructed to capture the interactions among these three players. Additionally, numerical examples are used to analyze the implications of key parameters, such as cost coefficient and punitive measures coefficient, on supply chain members’ optimal decision and profit. Our findings demonstrate that both the enterprise and the farmer can obtain maximum profit from the misreporting behavior. Unfortunately, this behavior always damages the profit of other participants and weakens the efficiency of subsidy policy. Moreover, to mitigate the negative implication of misreporting behavior, the government can establish punitive measures to curtail misreporting. Our work provides important policy implications for governments and enterprises. To ensure that more consumers have access to poverty alleviation products, government organizations should prioritize such projects. In addition, the provision of public facilities and technical guidance should be more effective and prompt to share enterprises’ and farmers’ costs. We further recommend that subsidy policies be formulated according to recipients’ performance in poverty alleviation projects, with corresponding supervision and punitive measures. Finally, in cooperating with farmers in poverty alleviation, enterprises should maximize their interests and reduce costs through technological innovation and channel sharing.

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

scholarly journals Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Guanbing Zhao ◽  
Yangyang Qiu ◽  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Fazal Manan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Consumer Electronics ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Consumer Electronic ◽  
Market Launch ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
New Consumer

Pricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism of a secondary supply chain of new consumer electronics products (which consists of a manufacturer and a seller). Price and the degree of promotion together affect the demand for products. Manufacturers give sellers a sales target. Manufacturers and sellers set prices and promotions separately, introduce repurchase penalty joint contracts, and establish supply chain profit models to compare and analyze optimal pricing, promotion efforts, and maximum profit of supply chains under different decision-making situations. We prove that the repurchase penalty joint contract can coordinate the supply chain under the assumptions of a single-period game and a multiperiod repeated game. The results show that under the repurchase penalty joint contract, when manufacturers and sellers choose high prices and high promotions at the same time, the supply chain of new consumer electronics products has the largest profit. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to study the influence of parameters on optimal decision-making and supply chain profits.

Supply Chain Management

2016 ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Ramakrishna
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
Large Enterprises

Majority of research conducted in Supply Chain Management worldwide relates to areas of supply chain like, definitions, its frameworks and strategies, supply chain design, achievement of competitive advantage through its successful implementation etc. But, vast part of this research is limited to only large scale enterprises and very limited research is done in supply chain related to SMEs sector. Also, the strategies and frameworks of SCM that are developed for these large enterprises are found to be not suitable and implementable in small scale enterprises. This lack of research with special focus on SCM is more pertinent to Indian SMEs and its much more less in small enterprises belonging to manufacturing sector. It is found that most of the strategies of SCM applicable and implementable in large enterprises are either difficult to implement or SMEs do not view those strategies seriously due to lack of understanding, implementation feasibility and awareness. Thus, there are many differences in the way the SCM is viewed and understood in SMEs when compared to that of large enterprises. This paper focuses on these differences of SCM with reference to challenges and difficulties in implementations when compared with large enterprises with the help of literature review. It is found that there exists a huge gap in understanding, appreciating and utilizing the practices of SCM in SME sector. The research is limited only to the secondary data available in published national / international journals. It is identified that SCM can be a potential tool for competitive advantage, cost minimization and optimal decision-making, risk-sharing in SMEs also. The paper identified the gaps, challenges and opportunities for SMEs in the implementation of SCM.

Low Carbon Footprint

2015 ◽  
pp. 324-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government

Malaysia has committed to a 40% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. The government has encouraged industry, society, and non-government organizations to work together to achieve this objective. The government has provided incentives through several energy programmes such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, green technology, and green building. One key area that has been targeted is logistics and supply chain, which has been contributing to high carbon emissions in manufacturing industries. Scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to pay attention to creating a low carbon supply chain. Furthermore, Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have faced several challenges in adopting low carbon activities. SMEs are unable to take the advantage of energy initiatives because of a lack of knowledge, a shortage of funds, and inadequate facilities. Almost 90% of firms are in the service industry working with large manufacturing firms and some SMEs working in manufacturing industry are working closely with their supply chain networks; achieving low carbon targets is hampered by the readiness of the manufacturing itself. This chapter discusses the challenges and future agenda of creating low carbon supply chains in manufacturing in Malaysia. Possible solutions are provided at the end of the chapter.

Low Carbon Footprint

2017 ◽  
pp. 1414-1437
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government

Malaysia has committed to a 40% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. The government has encouraged industry, society, and non-government organizations to work together to achieve this objective. The government has provided incentives through several energy programmes such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, green technology, and green building. One key area that has been targeted is logistics and supply chain, which has been contributing to high carbon emissions in manufacturing industries. Scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to pay attention to creating a low carbon supply chain. Furthermore, Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have faced several challenges in adopting low carbon activities. SMEs are unable to take the advantage of energy initiatives because of a lack of knowledge, a shortage of funds, and inadequate facilities. Almost 90% of firms are in the service industry working with large manufacturing firms and some SMEs working in manufacturing industry are working closely with their supply chain networks; achieving low carbon targets is hampered by the readiness of the manufacturing itself. This chapter discusses the challenges and future agenda of creating low carbon supply chains in manufacturing in Malaysia. Possible solutions are provided at the end of the chapter.

scholarly journals Evaluation of a facility location for a food assistance supply chain. The case of Bienestarina in Colombia

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 50-61
Author(s):  
Feizar Javier Rueda-Velasco ◽  
Wilson Adarme-Jaimes ◽  
Angélica Garzón-Luna ◽  
Jhonatan Marroquín-Ávila ◽  
Gabriel Parada-Caro
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Food Assistance ◽  
Social Program ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Current Configuration ◽  
Location Allocation ◽  
The Government

The evaluation of the strategic supply chain configuration is considered one of the strategic logistics decisions, especially in food assistance supply chains focused on generating better nutritional conditions in vulnerable populations. In Colombia, there is a social program called Bienestarina, which aims to promote food and nutritional security in a vulnerable population. Although the government supports the program for improving nutritional support, there are currently inconsistencies in freight flows, lack of coverage in some areas, and delivery delays. Therefore, this work aims to evaluate the current configuration of the supply chain and propose improvements related to the facility location. Such advances would enable the increase in the efficacy of the network and the reduction of malnutrition in the country. For this purpose, a mixed-integer mathematical programming model is presented, which considers the weighted distance criterion for different demand scenarios and supports the location-allocation decision in a social assistance supply chain. The current network configuration was compared with the optimal proposed structure. The comparisons show highly potential improvements in freight flow allocation, suggests several variations in the existing warehouses emplacement, and generates public policy implications to reduce the logistic cost in the system, prioritizing in turn the demand covering.

scholarly journals External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Tong ◽  
Yina Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Internal Funds ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

To encourage firms to engage in green production, two different types of investment funding, namely external funds from agencies outside the supply chain (e.g., government subsidy), and internal funds from supply chain partners (e.g., greening cost-sharing with the retailer), are investigated in this paper. Based on game theory, the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer are analyzed under both funding schemes. The results show that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product’s degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals. Further, both via theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that although both the green manufacturer and the retailer can greatly benefit from government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract, they may have different preferences regarding these two methods, which are mainly related to the size of the government subsidy, the fraction of greening cost-sharing with the retailer, the Research and Development (R&D) cost coefficient, the greenness sensitivity coefficient, and price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, the supply chain members’ behaviors (including the production and pricing decisions and, the choice of funds investment) are largely affected by the government subsidy mechanism.

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