scholarly journals External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Tong ◽  
Yina Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Internal Funds ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

To encourage firms to engage in green production, two different types of investment funding, namely external funds from agencies outside the supply chain (e.g., government subsidy), and internal funds from supply chain partners (e.g., greening cost-sharing with the retailer), are investigated in this paper. Based on game theory, the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer are analyzed under both funding schemes. The results show that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product’s degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals. Further, both via theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that although both the green manufacturer and the retailer can greatly benefit from government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract, they may have different preferences regarding these two methods, which are mainly related to the size of the government subsidy, the fraction of greening cost-sharing with the retailer, the Research and Development (R&D) cost coefficient, the greenness sensitivity coefficient, and price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, the supply chain members’ behaviors (including the production and pricing decisions and, the choice of funds investment) are largely affected by the government subsidy mechanism.

scholarly journals Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuyong Qian ◽  
Sen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

scholarly journals Cost-sharing strategy for recycling and service investment in a closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 2963-2990
Author(s):  
Renbang Shan ◽  
Li Luo ◽  
Ran Kou
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the cost-sharing strategies of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler in a Stackelberg game considering government subsidy and retailer’s service effort. Next, we construct profit functions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party recycler considering government subsidy and service effort for four scenarios: no cost-sharing (N), service investment cost-sharing (I), recycling investment cost-sharing (II), and both service and recycling investment cost-sharing (III). Furthermore, we obtain the optimal results and discuss the impact of cost-sharing ratio, service cost coefficient, government subsidy and service sensitivity coefficient on profits and social net benefits. The results show that the service investment cost-sharing strategy cannot achieve profit coordination, and under certain conditions, the recycling investment cost-sharing strategy and the service and recycling investment cost-sharing strategy can achieve profit coordination. In addition, changes in different factors such as government subsidy, service cost coefficients, and service sensitivity coefficients will affect the effectiveness of cost-sharing strategies.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination in the Context of Green Marketing Efforts and Capacity Expansion

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang ◽  
Hu ◽  
He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Capacity Expansion ◽  
Cloud Manufacturing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Cost Coefficient

This paper focuses on coordination issues related to the green supply chain with capacity constraints and green marketing efforts. We build a two-stage green supply chain, in which the upstream manufacturer has a certain amount of installed capacity to produce green product, yet can expand its capacity through a Cloud Manufacturing (CM) Platform once its existing capacity becomes insufficient, while the downstream retailer expends green marketing effort to promote the green product. In particular, we analyze the interaction between the capacity expansion options of the manufacturer and the green marketing efforts of the retailer. Aiming to mitigate the inefficiency under a decentralized green supply chain, we design a contract that combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing in green marketing in order to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: (1) when the manufacturer’s existing capacity falls below a certain threshold, it will choose to expand its capacity. The threshold is related to existing capacity, capacity expansion cost coefficient, green marketing cost coefficient, and sensitivity coefficient of demand to green marketing. (2) Under low capacity, if the capacity expansion cost coefficient is large, a higher consumer environmental awareness or preference for green products will weaken the retailer’s motivation for expending green effort. (3) A contract for cost-sharing and revenue-sharing in green marketing can fully coordinate the green supply chain, whereby the two share proportions are equal and meet certain constraints.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Product Design

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

Construction of New Circulation Model for Green Supply Chain of Agricultural Products in China

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Syed Shahid Khan ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Circulation Model ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Circulation Mode ◽  
The People ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Green Production ◽  
The Government

With the continuous development of China's agricultural economy, the concept of green production has begun to penetrate into the hearts of the people. Exploring a new circulation mode adapted to China's green supply chain of agricultural products is an important way to promote green production in China, and also an important condition to promote the successful transformation and development of China's rural economy. But in the process of building a green supply chain of agricultural products and exploring circulation mode, there are many problems that hinder the development of green industry economy. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to play a guiding role and actively guide farmers to explore green development ways and new circulation mode to meet their own development needs, which provides reference for better optimizing the new circulation mode of agricultural products supply chain in China.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 2045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Song ◽  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Corporate Social

In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.

scholarly journals Information Investment and Sharing in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Government Subsidy and Consumer Preference for Energy-Saving Products

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jinxi Li ◽  
Yuyin Yi ◽  
Haishen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
High Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Share Information

This study establishes a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer who invests in energy-saving products (ESPs) and one retailer who sells the products and may possess demand-forecast advantage. Considering government subsidy and consumer preference for ESPs and a random demand, we develop a four-stage Stackelberg game model to research the optimal strategies of the information investment and sharing of the retailer and the energy-saving R&D of the manufacturer. The results show the following: (1) When incurring a low information investment cost, the retailer is willing to invest in information acquisition techniques, while the retailer agreeing to share market information is related to the government subsidies and the probability of a high demand. The optimal strategy for the retailer is to share information when the probability of a high demand is less than 50% and the government subsidies for ESPs are high. Otherwise, the optimal strategy is not to share information. (2) The manufacturer not always expects the retailer to share information, which depends on the probability of a high demand and manufacturing cost. Especially, when the probability of a high demand is less than 50%, only a manufacturer incurring high cost will expect. (3) If the retailer refuses to share the information, the manufacturer can motivate the retailer to change his/her decision by sharing the information investment cost.

Contracting Emissions Reduction Supply Chain Based on Market Low-Carbon Preference and Carbon Intensity Constraint

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Ling Liang ◽  
Xu Fang ◽  
Guang Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Impact

Carbon emissions reduction has become a frequently discussed topic in industry and academia. However, how can reduction effects be enhanced with dominant brand and downstream manufacturer? This paper incorporates emissions reduction into a green supply chain which considers consumers’ low-carbon preference behavior and government intensity regulations, in order to discuss the impacts of consumers’ environmental awareness and government constraints on optimal emissions reduction and profit, respectively. The paper first constructs three reduction models on the basis of reality: independent reduction by manufacturer, contractual reduction by brand and collaborative reduction by both. Then it concludes the optimal decisions and compare the models. The results show that both the profits and emissions reduction will be decreased with the strengthened carbon intensity constraint, but the cost-sharing contract can mitigate this negative effect on dominant brand and society. Meanwhile, the acceptable range of cost-sharing ratio will be smaller with a lower cost coefficient of emissions reduction and a higher consumers’ preference. Furthermore, government should design the incentive method or regulate the carbon market to improve the social welfare level. Lastly, a numerical study is conducted, the impact of several key factors on supply chain performance and model selection are presented for management decisions.

scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Government

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

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