Defining problems and struggling to find solutions: Framing Roma people in Italian news websites

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-397
Author(s):  
Umberto Famulari

This article employs a quantitative content analysis of news stories (N=600) to compare how six websites of Italian national newspapers of different political orientations framed Roma people during the campaign for the 2018 Italian general election and in the six months following the formation of the government coalition between the far-right Northern League party and the Five Star Movement. Drawing from framing theory and, in particular, looking at diagnostic and prognostic frames and sources interviewed and quoted, the article shows that when talking about the Roma community, a clear ideological divide between right-wing and progressive newspapers emerged. In a trend that follows the shifting Italian political landscape, news outlets that are historically considered as centrist gave prominence almost exclusively to stories about the removal of Roma camps, evictions and arrests while neglecting the coverage of programmes that would support and help the Roma community.

Thesis Eleven ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 072551362110086
Author(s):  
Imogen Richards ◽  
Maria Rae ◽  
Matteo Vergani ◽  
Callum Jones

A 21st-century growth in prevalence of extreme right-wing nationalism and social conservatism in Australia, Europe, and America, in certain respects belies the positive impacts of online, new, and alternative forms of global media. Cross-national forms of ‘far-right activism’ are unconfined to their host nations; individuals and organisations campaign on the basis of ethno-cultural separatism, while capitalising on internet-based affordances for communication and ideological cross-fertilisation. Right-wing revolutionary ideas disseminated in this media, to this end, embody politico-cultural aims that can only be understood with attention to their philosophical underpinnings. Drawing on a dataset of articles from the pseudo-news websites, XYZ and The Unshackled, this paper investigates the representation of different rightist political philosophical traditions in contemporary Australia-based far-right media. A critical discourse and content analysis reveal XYZ and TU’s engagement with various traditions, from Nietzsche and the Conservative Revolution, to the European New Right and neo-Nazism.


Significance The government consists largely of newcomers and politicians with dubious links to the far right. It embarks upon a five-year reform programme for Austria which is thin on detail but could lead to radical changes. Impacts A tougher stance on migrants and asylum seekers could foster a wider reluctance in some EU states to accept refugees. Major constitutional changes are unlikely as the government would need the support of the SPOe or the small Neos party. Any extreme right-wing tendencies will concern Brussels and Israel, which will keep a close eye on the government. Austria will be an unpredictable ally, sometimes siding with Macron and at other times favouring alliances with Eastern European countries. The SPOe’s loss of office could lead to changes in personnel and programmatic position.


Subject Italian political outlook. Significance On January 26, Italy’s co-ruling Democratic Party (PD) defeated Matteo Salvini’s far-right League party by 51.4% to 43.6% in elections in Emilia Romagna, a prosperous region of northern Italy. In what was a litmus test for the fragile national coalition between PD and the Five Star Movement (M5S), the PD victory has reduced the risk of a government collapse. Impacts Risk-averse investors will remain cautious about Italy over the next year. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte hopes the result will give the government the stability to cut taxes to boost private sector investment. Salvini’s support could decline if he continues to personalise the League’s election campaigns.


Subject Dutch right-wing populism. Significance The Netherlands' newest far-right party, Forum for Democracy (FvD), won the provincial elections on March 20, receiving almost 15% of the vote. The party’s support is expected to grow, and it joins the anti-Islamic Party for Freedom (PVV) as the Netherlands' second major far-right party. Impacts Support for far-right parties will increase pressure on the government to implement populist ideas, especially in cultural affairs. Centrist parties in the European Conservative and Reformist group may try to block the FvD’s admission after the European elections. Policymaking at the national level will become increasingly difficult.


Author(s):  
Andrei Belinsky ◽  

The police, the Bundeswehr and the intelligence services of the FRG have been recently drawn into a series of high-profile scandals provoked by right-wing extremism and growing xenophobic attitudes among the ranks of the armed forces and law enforcement officers. The article is an attempt to analyze the reasons for the spread of right-wing extremism in the power structures of Germany, its main forms and the level of the threat it poses to society and government. As for the far-right-wing potential, the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution puts the estimate at about 1,400 representatives. Although this number seems to be less than 1% of the country’s total number of law-enforcement authorities, don’t let it confuse you. Even a small group of right-wing extremists who possess weapons, are specially trained and have access to classified information can become a big problem for the government. Moreover, consideration must be given to the clearly growing rates of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes. According to the author, there are various reasons for the situation, with the main of them being the shifts in public sentiment, as well as the specifics of the activities of the police and the army. The European migrant crisis of 2015 and the following societal divisions influenced the attitudes of the country’s security agencies, which did not approve the policy of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Additionally, constantly operating in criminal districts of large cities, mainly populated by Turks and Arabs, the police developed a negative attitude to all representatives of the migrant community. Furthermore, we should not forget that security agencies and the army are quite conservative by nature, and the crisis of state institutions inevitably pushes some «men of arms» to the far-right-wing camp, which promises to restore order. The article concludes with some recommendations on right-wing extremism prevention in the law enforcement system (spe-cial agencies performance improvement, adoption of education policy, etc.).


Significance Except for the far-right Brothers of Italy (FdI), all the main parties are part of the government, thus giving Draghi significant political support as he prepares to tackle Italy's unprecedented health and economic crises. Impacts A strong recovery could go a long way in reducing Eurosceptic sentiment in Italy. Draghi will have to manage disputes carefully between national and state authorities, who have much control over health policy. Social unrest would put pressure on the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League to withdraw support for Draghi.


Significance This has put Salvini under pressure, though it has not weakened his support for Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government of national unity. Support for Draghi suggests the League is becoming a more moderate party, which could help FdI consolidate support on the far right ahead of the next election, currently scheduled for 2023. Impacts The prospects of an amalgamation between the League and Forza Italia are strong, and would boost the former’s centrist credentials. While Five Star Movement support for Draghi is unreliable, its MPs do not want a general election as many of them would lose their seats. An unforeseen crisis, such as an uncontrollable wave of illegal migrants, would play into the hands of the right-wing parties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-552
Author(s):  
Roland Atzmüller ◽  
Alban Knecht ◽  
Michael Bodenstein

Abstract The paper analyses and assesses social policy reforms of the conservative, far-right and right-wing populist coalition government in Austria between 2017 and 2019 in the light of the debates about welfare chauvinist, authoritarian and populist social policies. The latter had gained in importance over the previous years due to the upsurge of far-right and right-wing populist parties and the (at least partial) accommodation of mainstream parties to this tendency in many countries. The policies of the government were based on the view that the social problems associated with immigration were (at least) one of the main underlying causes for the problems affecting the Austrian society. The paper shows that the government initiated strategies to tackle these developments via a renationalisation of social policies. The analysis is focused on implemented and planned activities geared mainly towards the (former) margins of the Austrian welfare regime (social assistance, active labour market policies, unemployment assistance, youth integration policies), as well as on the ideological articulations the government uttered to justify these reforms via the combination of welfare chauvinist orientations with centre-right concerns about market dynamics and public finances. Our analysis concludes that nativist/racialised, nationalist and welfare chauvinist social policies transcend the distinction of deserving and non-deserving social groups, which raises the question about the social imaginaries that lie beneath the attempts of far-right political actors to shape societies through the reform of welfare.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Zanotti ◽  
Carlos Meléndez

This chapter deals with how populist parties reacted and engaged with the pandemic in Italy, one of the European countries most affected by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The main argument of this chapter is that populist actors are successful in profiting from a crisis when they can credibly frame it as a failure of representation. The case of Italy, which has been defined as a “country of many populisms” (Tarchi 2008), is particularly insightful. Since the outset of the pandemic at the end of February of 2020, there were two populist parties in the system , both on the right of the political spectrum: the League (former Northern League) and Brothers of Italy. After a first period known as “rally around the flag” the two parties' strategy was somehow similar until they started to diverge substantially in February 2021. In general terms, we can say that—until the breakdown of the second Conte government—the League discursively attacked the government on managing the pandemic, focusing mainly on two issues: migration and the economy. When the League entered the government, supporting Mario Draghi’s cabinet, its discourse changed even if its loyalty to the government has been flaky, at least. This strategy of keeping one foot in and one out of government (see Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005) has always been a trademark characteristic of the (Northern) League since the 1990s. Conversely, Brothers of Italy, while sharing with the League the critique to the government supported by the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement during the first year, has later changed its strategy becoming the only relevant party in opposition to Mario Draghi’s government. This allowed FdI to systematically challenge the government's actions and depict itself as the only party to act in the interest of the people, opposing to the elite. Even if the pandemic is still unfolding, vote intention shows that Brothers of Italy has become the first Italian party, demonstrating to have taken advantage of the crisis, through a framing that was more functional with its populist appeal and in turn resulted more credible to voters.


Author(s):  
A. S. BADAEVA

Sixty years old Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) history is very  representative for study West European far-right parties and  movements. In last decade West Europe are going through the  unprecedented rise of right-wing populism in conditions of citizens’  dissatisfaction with traditional parties’ politics and its institutions.  Trying to retain their power the governance parties are involving in  the common political trend: use narrative of right-wing populism, are ready to previously unthinkable party alliances erasing usual  ideological boundaries. FPÖ exclusive characteristic consists in its special interpretation of Austrian identity combining German  nationalism and Austrian patriotism. This position loyalty allows FPÖ  to have its own stable electoral foundation and to hope for its  support in crisis situations. FPÖ went through several intra-party conflict and experienced periods of serious falls and successful  upgrades. At present the party is on its political rise supported by almost one third of Austrian electorate. FPÖ chairman Heinz- Christian Strache became the Vice-Chancellor of Austria after  Austrian legislative election in 2017. FPÖ had 6 of 13 seats in the  government led by Sebastian Kurz. Set of specific to the Austrian  society circumstances, such as denazification minimize and imitation  of Austrian identity formation in the postwar period, politicization of  the immigration issue escalated in 2015 by European migrant crisis,  is making FPÖ a dangerous player on the Austrian political scene and  an encouraging example for the far-rights parties of neighbor  countries. 


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